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 How can utopia, as a concept and a project, have as its goal the exposure and defense of 
the commons while its very articulation must posit a tabula rasa to be enclosed, improved, and 
defended? 
 This question lies at the heart of my own project. I investigate and critique a series of 
moments that mobilize the twin concepts of utopia and commons: More's original 1516 text and 
the conquest of the Americas that lies behind it; several agrarian and communal projects in the 
Americas situated at the intersection of modernity, imperialism, land, and history; post-
apocalyptic narratives that find their logic in the revelation of a primal utopian moment turned 
dystopian; and contemporary debates over the enclosure of immaterial property and labor that, in 
turn, posit cyberspace as a new utopia and decry new enclosures of that immaterial realm. 
 Chapter 1 pairs two contemporary dystopian post-apocalyptic novels from Argentina—
Plop and El año del desierto—with Sarmiento's classic liberal text Facundo: Civilization and 
Barbarism in order to open up a new critical space to consider the curious relationship between 
liberalism, catastrophe, and the end of the world as we know it. 
 Chapter 2 investigates the implications of the historical coincidence of the sixteenth-
century Spanish conquest of the Americas and Thomas More's 1516 publication of Utopia. 
 Chapter 3 continues to develop the problematic relationship between conquest, 
colonialism, utopia, and commons, but in the context of the Andes; specifically, by tracing a 
constellation of Andean utopians that runs from Inca Garcilaso through José Carlos Mariátegui, 
Manuel Scorza, and José María Arguedas. 
 Chapter 4 studies the paired notions of commons and enclosure in the realm of 
contemporary cultural production in Latin America through a focus on literary phenomena such 
as plagiarism, recycling, and community activism, with particular attention paid to Cartonera 
publishing houses. 
 Chapter 5 attempts to extract a theory of the practice of copyleft capable of both 
recognizing the entirely novel elements of contemporary cultural production (the digital horizons 
of intellectual property) and exposing the hidden line of past struggle that traverses the very 
concept of the commons.
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I On White Picket Fences 
A fence erected to protect a suburban family home. A gated community insulated from 
urban poverty. Inside: a post-War dreamland of appliances and convenience, or a little 
homogenous utopia. Outside: chaos, or simply the opposite of that internal utopia. 
The concept of utopia has, ever since Thomas More coined the term in 1516, dealt at once 
with the design of a perfect, harmonious community as well as with the borders and exclusions 
that create and/or disrupt that community. The "white picket fence," that illusory dream-
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imaginary sina qua non of mid-twentieth century suburban life, is the best example of utopia's 
physical manifestation. Within its borders grows the fantasy of a well-ordered world aligned with 
reason and human flourishing; outside of those borders lies everything that must be excluded in 
order for the fantasy to function. Perhaps a concrete wall topped with shards of glass and broken 
bottles is a more 'transparent' expression of the enclosure connected to every utopia. 
But yet, no fence, no wall can truly contain the utopian impulse. For if we understand 
utopia as a demand—and not as a place—we see that it will never be satisfied with anything other 
than a better, other, possible world. The world not as it is, but as it could be, if only... Hence the 
concept is fundamentally unstable: each and every utopia eventually specifies the necessary 
conditions for converting that possible world into reality. The world as it could be...: that phrase 
extends the horizon of the possible, it opens politics and culture to the force of imagination. If 
only...: upon completing the second half of the phrase—upon specifying, determining, enacting 
utopia—part of utopia's pure potentiality vanishes. Or rather: part of utopia's pure potentiality 
becomes enclosed. Our most advanced and progressive political impulse—the impulse to imagine 
another possible world—relies on a most primitive defense of territory and enforcement of 
borders. 
This problem recapitulates the two-part division within Thomas More's original text. In 
the first part of Utopia, More responds to the growing wool trade that was sweeping through his 
native land in the early sixteenth century. Part I stands as a witty and damning satire of the 
contemporary process of English land enclosure, and in it, More crafts some of his most 
memorable images. Timid-seeming sheep that actually devour men and entire towns due to the 
nascent capitalist wool trade's insatiable appetite for expansion. A penal system created to punish 
those able-bodied peasants cast into unemployment and destitution by the enclosure of their 
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traditional, subsistence-based cultivation of common fields. Indeed, there are few problems in 
Part I of Utopia that don't have their root, according to More, in the enclosure movement. Not that 
More has much hope, for when he isn't condemning enclosure, he is bemoaning the deafness of 
kings to good council and warning of the certain ruin that any gentleman or scholar faces in the 
prospect of a political life. 
Luckily, More cedes his satirical and pessimistic word to Raphael Hythloday, a traveler 
who has just returned from five years on the island of Utopia. Utopia is a perfect society located 
somewhere in the New World; and it is Part II of More's text that lays the foundation for the entire 
genre of speculative fiction, art, and politics that operate under the name 'utopian.' The Utopia of 
Part II is the polar opposite of the England of Part I. All property is held in common, society 
functions smoothly, with neither political nor social unrest, equality reigns, and reason prevails. 
Raphael's tale is a tale of the New World. As I will argue in Chapter Two, it is no 
coincidence that More stages utopia-the-island in the newly 'discovered' American continent. The 
promise of a new world offered More a philosophical and literary opportunity to image a new 
society, a perfect society that differed in every way from his contemporary world. As opposed to 
enclosure and poverty, More paints a picture of commons and abundance; as opposed to the fever 
for gold (which, ironically, was motivating Spanish conquistadores to begin mounting exploratory 
expeditions into the Mesoamerican interior the very decade that More publishes his satire), the 
Utopian use gold to fashion shackles and chamber pots. 
Yet the astute reader may ask: where is America itself in More's text? Where are the 
Americans? If they do exist, they are either avoided completely, enslaved, bribed to remain at a 
safe distance, or contracted as mercenaries. The island of Utopia itself was once an isthmus; the 
historic King Utopos' heroic project to construct a trench and change the isthmus into an island is 
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the foundational myth of the Utopians. Utopia itself—that beacon of hope for a true commons— 
is actually enclosed. Furthermore, it is America against which the trench is directed. America is 
left beyond the trench, beyond the utopian enclosure. And thus, More's defense of the commons 
in one place—England—is based upon the invisible enclosure of another—the New World. 
 
II Blank Slates 
We can name this logic that takes enclosure and erasure as its primary constituitive act: the 
logic of the blank slate. The need to posit a tabula rasa from which to begin seems to have deep 
roots in many diverse traditions of human thought, yet there also seems to be something 
fascinatingly modern about the myth of a clean break with the past, with starting anew, whether it 
be in the revolutionary gesture of abolishing a calendar, the myth of a virgin frontier, the hubris of 
imposing democracy, or the dream of extraterrestrial exploration. 
Perhaps this is why the appearance of the New World in European consciousness was such 
a momentous event: it seems to be the emergence of something new, clean, uncorrupted, and full 
of promise. When else could have More make the bold move of describing a contemporary 
society that succeeded in everything where Europe was failing? And where else could he have 
located it but in the hazy, indeterminate zone of the still-unexplored American continent? 
Of course, Raphael Hythloday was a character in the service of More's satire, and the 
Island of Utopia was a figment of the author's imagination. More did not know any Americans 
when he composed Utopia, even if he was familiar with some of the earliest European accounts of 
the New World. It can be understood that from the subject position of an indigenous American, 
the European arrival and subsequent conquest of the continent might appear to be more of a 
dystopian (or even apocalyptic) event. Indeed, this may be the very definition of a dystopian 
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subject: he who serves as raw material for another's utopian construction. This is the hidden logic 
of Utopia: one of enclosure and improvement that finds its motor in the erasure of conquest. 
The task, then, is to expose the utopian impulse as a split impulse to at once defend a 
commons and to sustain that commons through enclosure. This mode of thinking implies turning 
utopia against its blank slate tendencies; it exposes that tabula rasa as a palimpsest that bears the 
traces of what had been erased in 'wiping the slate clean.' Through the confrontation between 
utopia and enclosure, utopia itself becomes politicized and historicized. At that point, we will see 
the 'common, lower instinct'—for which Gary Larson's cartoon couch potatoes censure the 
whistling male sparrow—operating even in the loftiest utopian ambitions. 
 
In that spirit, the reader can understand the guiding question of the current project: Is there 
a Latin American utopia that accounts for, rather than erases, history and place? A utopia that 
doesn't fall into the trap of the 'blank slate'?  Is it possible, in thinking literature, history, and 
technology, to imagine some form of utopia that is not based on a prior act of erasure or 
enclosure? 
The material connection between those questions and the sixteenth century conquest of the 
American continent should be clear enough. Even today, we live through a new, immaterial wave 
of primitive accumulation. Cyberspace and the Internet, it would appear, are the next great 
frontiers for the expansion of democracy, the betterment of humanity, and the spread of the good 
life. Yet if the Internet is indeed a frontier, we must proceed with caution, as every frontier—and 
the frontier logic it spawns—simultaneously appears as a site of conquest and enclosure. 
What, then, of all the enthusiasm for the digital and the utopian projections of online life? 
Where are the enclosures that lie behind the digital commons? What gets erased or fenced off in 
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contemporary celebrations of the immaterial realm? Addressing these questions, I hope to show, 
implies a return to the historical origins of the concept of utopia, and a pairing of that concept 
with the concept of the commons. 
 
III The Chapters 
How can utopia, as a concept and a project, have as its goal the exposure and defense of 
the commons while its very articulation must posit a tabula rasa to be enclosed, improved, and 
defended? The following five chapters investigate and critique a series of moments that mobilize 
the twin concepts of utopia and commons: More's original 1516 text and the conquest of the 
Americas that lies behind it; several agrarian and communal projects in the Americas situated at 
the intersection of modernity, imperialism, land, and history; post-apocalyptic narratives that find 
their logic in the revelation of a primal utopian moment turned dystopian; and contemporary 
debates over the enclosure of immaterial property and labor that, in turn, posit cyberspace as a 
new utopia and decry new enclosures of that immaterial realm. 
Chapter 1, "Dystopia and the Post-apocalyptic: Barbarism amongst the Muck of the 
Present," pairs two contemporary dystopian post-apocalyptic novels from Argentina—Rafael 
Pinedo's Plop and Pedro Mairal's El año del desierto—with Sarmiento's classic liberal text 
Facundo: Civilization and Barbarism in order to open up a new critical space to consider the 
curious relationship between liberalism, catastrophe, and the end of the world as we know it. 
Strangely enough, these two post-Apocalyptic textual nightmares gesture towards a coincidence 
of the historical conquest of the Americas and the post-apocalyptic wastelands they depict. The 
conquest, for these novelists, becomes something much closer to a dystopian moment. With this 
inverted horizon as my guide, I work through a series of other "utopian" historical moments to 
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unmask their dystopian sides. This unorthodox critical coupling of post-apocalypse and conquest 
allows me to develop an understanding of utopian projects based on the logic of the blank, 
benevolent non-place superimposed upon actual American referents. 
Chapter 2, "Utopian Emergence and the Myth of an American Blank Slate," returns 
directly to many of the ideas outlined in this brief introduction.  Namely, investigating the 
implications of the historical coincidence of the sixteenth-century Spanish conquest of the 
Americas and Thomas More's 1516 publication of Utopia. I read More's Utopia from the 
perspective of the American continent, for it is the European "discovery" of the New World in 
1492 that structures More's very idea of the perfect island "over there" off the coast of Brazil. 
Again, the question that emerges after the exposure of the 'blank slate logic' is: can there be a 
utopian concept of the commons that is not already based on some kind of enclosure? 
This is the guiding question of the third chapter, "Appropriation and Enclosure in the New 
World," and to answer it I return to a tradition of Andean thinkers who maintain the tension 
between conquest and utopia, between appropriation and the commons. This constellation of 
Andean utopians that runs from Inca Garcilaso through José Carlos Mariátegui, Manuel Scorza, 
and José María Arguedas; all of whom think the problematic relationships between conquest, 
colonialism, utopia, and commons. What these thinkers and writers all share is that they are 
incapable of beginning from a blank slate, as that blank slate's very possibility would lie in their 
own erasure as American subjects.  Furthermore, this Andean line of thought attacks any 
affirmation of an American "non-place," an attack most forcefully articulated by Mariátegui who 
famously formulated that Latin America's problems all arise from the problem of land. The 
insistence on America's place—and this includes the thinkers of "coloniality" and the "invention 
of America"—has provoked an ambivalent reaction amongst readers: some criticize it for 
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representing an antimodern "archaic utopia" that is incompatible with the general flow of history; 
others view this tradition as the point at which "blank slate" utopianism reveals its fundamental 
contradictions. What is certain is that this constellation of Andean thinkers compel us to think 
through the concept of Fence, and the enclosure that the erection of any fence metaphorical or 
material entails, as intimately connected to utopia: Fence as the border that allows for utopia to 
develop within. Against a tradition of thinking the American continent as the non-place upon 
which fences are erected—a tradition that runs through Carl Schmitt and John Locke—this 
Andean utopian counters non-place with land itself. The vision of that land is not enclosed private 
property, but rather a commons. 
 
Commons, of course, is a term that came to prominence during the anti-enclosure struggles 
surrounding the long aftermath of the English Revolution. How, then, does the idea of a commons 
appear today? This question guides the final two chapters of the dissertation. To answer it, we 
must—without losing the materiality of enclosure—move to the metaphorical register: from 
property to intellectual property. This task—accounting for the shift from land to metaphor—
requires a reassessment of the contemporary debates over the meaning and status of intellectual 
property. I ground my critique in both the concept of the land (as developed in the third chapter) 
and in the historical specificity of Latin American literary production. Latin American literature 
has a history of directly engaging assumptions about authorship. The stakes of these engagements 
have always been high: in play are questions of literary community, artistic production, tradition 
and influence, even the very question of the division between intellectual production and 
production in general. More and more, the idea of the commons appears as the orienting concept, 
the horizon of these engagements; and recent technological developments have forced these 
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issues into new relief. 
Yet the commons as the horizon of intellectual production is itself a contested concept. I 
explore these tensions in the fourth chapter, "The Commons, Between Literature and the City," 
through the study of two distinct models of aesthetic production, each of which works to expose 
the commons. The first elevates plagiarism as practice (a line that runs through Jorge Luis Borges 
and Ricardo Piglia, yet reaches back to Cervantes and forward to cases such as Di Nucci's 2006 
Bolivia construcciones). The second model, less confrontational but no less vocal, rallies around 
the notion of copyleft (a rethinking of copyright with an eye towards progressive global politics 
and an aesthetically-informed community-based activism).  
My investigation of this second strand—the practice of copyleft—leads me to alternative 
circuits of literary/intellectual production, distribution and consumption. In the final chapter, 
"Copyleft as Training Ground: The Digital Horizons of Intellectual Property," I attempt to extract 
a theory of the practice of copyleft capable of both recognizing the entirely novel elements of 
contemporary cultural production (the digital horizons of intellectual property) and exposing the 
hidden line of past struggle that traverses the very concept of the commons. This utopian vision of 
an intellectual commons extends beyond the literary to include problems such as biodiversity, 
alternative knowledge traditions and the land itself. In its contemporary articulation, the demand 
for a commons can be said to move beyond "the world turned upside down," and toward a 
demand that the world be turned inside-out. 
 
  
  
   

	   11	  
CHAPTER 1 
DYSTOPIA AND THE POST-APOCALYPTIC: BARBARISM AMONGST THE MUCK OF 
THE PRESENT 
 
In this chapter, I read two recent post-apocalyptic Argentine novels, and consider the 
temporality, generally, of post-apocalyptic narrative. That temporality is a familiar one for literary 
critics: such novels are the germs and seeds of future catastrophes—the end of the world as we 
know it—and those catastrophes will only be fully recognized in retrospect. As readers and 
critics, we exist in a pre-post moment: the narrative itself tells the story of a catastrophe-to-come 
as if it has already happened. As a sub-genre of science fiction, post-apocalyptic narratives reside 
at the peculiar crossroads of sci-fi and sacred literature, between utopia and the definitive end of 
civilization. In the following pages, I will give an account of the genre itself, and then move to 
two concrete examples of post-apocalyptic novels that arose from a specific moment of crisis: the 
political and economic turmoil in Argentina in late 2001 and early 2002. Rafael Pinedo's Plop 
(2004) creates a dystopian post-apocalyptic universe that recapitulates and rehearses the classic 
binary of nineteenth century Argentine political and cultural theory: the civilization/barbarism 
debate. Pinedo updates that debate for a neoliberal moment through a reconsideration of language 
and history in the wake of catastrophe. Pedro Mairal's El año del desierto (2005) also uses 
catastrophe as a point of departure, in this case for a historical rewind of five centuries of 
Argentine and Latin American history. 
 
I After the Post 
Post-apocalyptic literature is situated at the intersection of two distinct genres: the 
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apocalyptic narrative and utopia. The apocalypse—and its synonym, revelation—is a narrative 
mode supremely preoccupied with the end. Although it is not the original, John of Patmos' text— 
alternatively called the Book of Revelations or the Apocalypse of John—occupies a central 
position of reference in the Western tradition of apocalyptic literature. Lois Parkinson Zamora has 
synthesized the general elements that make up an apocalyptic narrative: 
In both the canonic Hebrew apocalyptic texts (Ezekiel, Daniel, Zachariah) and the 
Christian apocalypses (the thirteenth chapter of Mark, the twenty-fourth chapter of 
Matthew, the Second Epistle of Peter, the Revelation of John), the end of the world 
is described from the point of view of a narrator who is radically opposed to 
existing spiritual and political practices. Whether Jew or early Christian, his 
narrative reflects not only his opposition to existing practices but also his political 
powerlessness to change them. His is a subversive vision: He is outside the cultural 
and political mainstream (in John's case, literally in exile on the Greek island of 
Patmos), awaiting God's intervention in human history, when the corrupt world of 
the present will be supplanted by a new and transcendent realm. From a point 
ostensibly beyond the end of time, the apocalyptist surveys the whole of human 
history, focusing on its cataclysmic end. For him, the future is past: He states God's 
plan for the completion of history, alternately in the prophetic future, then as 
accomplished fact (L. P. Zamaora 2). 
For Zamora, as for the majority of critics who study the apocalypse, the apocalyptic narrative is a 
genre that operates in a sacred register, but one that maintains strong links with its contemporary 
historical context. Zamora proposes that current day renewed interest in the apocalypse is a 
predictable reaction to the social rupture and the temporal uncertainty of our time (L. P. Zamora 
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11). In other words: the register must be sacred, but the apocalypse is still able to respond to the 
problems of more modern and secular societies. 
Zamora, again in following with the majority of her colleagues, makes an effort to give a 
detailed account of the limits of the genre. And rightfully so: without a coherent theorization, the 
apocalypse becomes an empty form, without content, to be applied to any narrative with a 
definitive ending. Thus, for Zamora, an apocalyptic narrative must go beyond a mere vision of 
destruction; according to her, the apocalypse works in a mythic register, and the revelation it 
announces exists in a state of tension with the historical reality that operates as the starting point 
and the motor of the narrative.1 The price that this demarcation carries is the loss of any non- 
sacred (in the Western sense) conceptualization of the apocalypse. It also proscribes (and this is a 
corollary of the previous loss) the conceptualization of a collision of cosmovisions beyond any 
interaction that does not recapitulate the confrontation between the early Christians and the 
Roman Empire. In other words, readings of the apocalypse that limit themselves to Judeo- 
Christian eschatology in a mythic register fall victim to a significant blind spot: narrative accounts 
of the actual, historical destruction—the cataclysmic end—of non-Judeo-Christian civilizations. I 
am specifically referring to indigenous accounts of the conquest of the American continent. Both 
La visión de los vencidos and Guaman Poma's Nueva crónica y buen gobierno— to name just two 
examples—coincide with the majority of Zamora's generic definition. Furthermore, Rolena 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  "The myth of apocalypse is, then, both a model of the conflictual nature of human history and a 
model of historical desire. This tension between transformation and completion, desire and 
satisfaction, has as much to do with fictional form as it does with historical vision. Though a 
given work of literature may emphasize one side of the myth or the other, when the tension 
disappears, when the vision is merely optimistic or pessimistic, we do not have apocalyptic 
literature but fantasy. Hence my distinction between mere visions of doom, to which the word 
apocalypse is commonly misapplied, and the more complex history envisioned in the myth itself. 
Apocalyptic literature is fundamentally concerned with our human relation to the changing forms 
of temporal reality, not with static simplifications" (L. P. Zamora 12-13).	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Adorno's celebrated reading of Nueva crónica y buen gobierno itself operates in an apocalyptic 
register, even if the author does not use the standard vocabulary of that tradition.2  
It is possible that the American Conquest is not the most appropriate moment for the 
formulation of a universal theory of apocalyptic literature, but this historical moment—or, more 
clearly, the conjunction of the so-called "Discovery" of the New World and the subsequent 
Conquest—is fundamental for utopic fiction.3 
Even if Thomas More's 1516 Utopia did not give birth to the genre of utopic fiction he did 
name it and marked it definitively; the enduring trace of More's mark was the act of locating his 
island at once in the New World and in a no-place. More published Utopia in 1516, an in- 
between moment during the pause between the so-called 1492 "Discovery" and the subsequent 
Conquest of the New World. More knew of the Spanish presence on several Caribbean Islands; he 
did not, however, know any details of the ongoing mainland Conquest when he published the first 
edition of Utopia. More had read Amerigo Vespucci and Pedro Mártir, but not Bartolomé de las 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Adorno says: "[Guaman Poma's] interpretation of the past supports his claims about the present; 
these, in turn, are articulated in ways to ensure the redress of grievances in the future. The moral 
and political implications of the past for the present are written into every line of the text, and the 
consistency of his effort makes it possible to argue that a coherence of intention underlies the 
entire work" (Adorno 33). She concludes her book about Guaman Poma in the following way: 
"Yet it is not merely a sense of the foreigners' smugness and superiority that Guaman Poma 
rejects in responding to this discourse. It is, more profoundly, the European concepts of history, 
religion, and justice that he finds wanting. The histories that he knew were created to justify and 
celebrate colonial domination; the religious tracts that simply augmented the extirpation of 
idolatrous campaigns aimed at controlling native society; the debate over the just war that took 
place well after the conquests, when the institutional machinery of colonization was already in 
place—Guaman Poma tested each of these means in succession and together to help make sense 
of the world around him. His failure to find in any an acceptable explanation of events, a possible 
resolution of the colonial situation, reflects the failure of European discourse itself to lay the 
foundations on which to build a just society in that brave, New World. Guaman Poma's book 
stands as a testimony of the real response of Americans to the utopian reality of America 
dreamed by others" (Adorno, Guaman Poma 143). 3	  What follows is a brief preview of the central argument of the second chapter, "Utopian 
Emergence and the Myth of an American Blank Slate." 
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Casas. From here springs utopia.4 
The genre that More named has since experienced a process of displacement. If More's 
precursors located their imaginary and perfect societies in an abstract-philosophical space (Plato's 
Republic) or in a sacred-eschatological time (Augustine's City of God), More himself gave it a 
concrete no-place: over there in the New World. More's successors, for their part, gradually lost 
the uncertainty implicit in the name, and, with greater and greater specificity, began to locate the 
good-place within a temporal horizon. Thus, Charles Fourier's four historical movements that 
ultimately give rise to the phalanxes; the Boston Year 2000 that Edward Bellamy describes in 
1887: all oriented towards the future. It is from this affinity with future society that the link 
between utopia and science fiction arises, which is in fact nothing more than a return to utopia's 
foundational moments, but now an intergalactic spacecraft replaces the Niña, the Pinta and the 
Santa María. 
Perhaps as a reaction to the failed attempts to construct a utopia in the present moment, the 
late-nineteenth century witnessed the birth of dystopia as a literary genre. Dystopias, on the 
whole, narrate the construction of a planned, total society, yet they present that society not as a 
harmonious organism attuned to human perfection, but rather as a stifling, oppressive 
encroachment erected as a barrier to human flourishing. The root source of that oppression varied 
in the earliest historical manifestations, ranging from capitalism (H.G. Wells' early fiction), to 
gender inequality (Charlotte Perkins Gilman's Herland), to oligarchy (Jack London's The Iron 
Heel), to Soviet communism (Zamyatin's We); later dystopias developed towards highlighting the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  To further complicate the story, one Vasco de Quiroga, a Spanish oidor sent by the Crown to the 
New World, landed in New Spain (México) in 1531. Soon after his arrival, Bishop of Mexico 
Juan de Zumárraga's copy of More's 1518 Basle edition of Utopia found its way into Quiroga's 
library. Six years later, Quiroga founded a utopic community populated by the indigenous peoples 
of Michoacán. See Zavala's Sir Thomas More in New Spain and Quiroga's La utopía en América. 
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utopian impulse itself as the source of oppression (as in Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-four).5 
Somewhere, sometime, the nightmare-vision of a total future society crossed with the idea of the 
world's imminent end, and the post-apocalyptic vision thus arose. A society's ruin, the remains 
after the Revelation, the most powerful nightmare of all: that the end will not be a singular 
moment of terror, but rather an unending continuity of nothing, a never-ceasing 'after' that 
signifies the impossibility of civilization. 
When Argentina found itself once again immersed in an economic and political crisis in 
December 2001/January 2002, consumers of Western culture already had a developed imaginary 
of post-apocalyptic society based in large part on the Cold War and the constant threat of global 
nuclear annihilation.6 The scenes of the Crisis—the dissolution of civil society, the betrayal of 
economic promises, the corralito, the cacerolazos, State repression—were described and 
presented in apocalyptic terms.7 It is not surprising, then, that in the search for how to best narrate 
the 'after' of the Crisis, some authors felt the attraction of the post-apocalyptic tradition. 
The post subgenre takes what is generally considered one of science fiction's weak 
points—its "incapacity to sever itself from the present" as Daniel Link puts it8—and converts it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  In our contemporary moment the dystopia, especially in film, has become consolidated as 
spectacle; one only need ponder the number of films that attempt to imitate—both at the artistic 
and the commercial level—the Matrix's success. 6	  The central Argentine reference would be the first two parts of Héctor German Oesterheld's 
Eternauta; this comic book's shadow touches the entire post-apocalyptic tradition in Argentina, 
even though Pinedo and Mairal confront this inheritance in two distinct ways. See below. 7	  The corralito was the derogatory nickname for the banking restrictions that forced citizens to 
watch idly as their peso-denominated bank accounts were devalued while their assets were 
frozen—corralled—within a collapsing banking system. The cacerolazos were the pot-and-pan 
banging protests that arose in opposition to the corralito policies. 8	  "Una de las paradojas más interesantes de la ciencia ficción es su incapacidad para despegarse 
del presente: postulada la ficción como un relato del futuro, inscripta la instancia narrativa en un 
como si del futuro absoluto (o de la realidad alternativa, que para el case es lo mismo), la 
especulación no llega nunca más allá que el conjunto de problemas imaginarios (ideológicos) que 
constituyen el presente de cada texto. Así, la ciencia ficción americana clásica es un conjunto de 
relatos alrededor de los terrores más típicos de los adolescentes varones: el éxito o el fracaso, el 
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into its fundamental referent. During the after of the Crisis, several authors converted that 
contemporary after into the starting point for their fictional narratives. For James Berger, this is 
precisely the operation of post-apocalyptic fiction: 
"A disaster occurs of overwhelming, disorienting magnitude, and yet the world 
continues. And so writers imagine another catastrophe that is absolutely conclusive, 
that will end this world. The initial disaster, which distorts and disorients—which, 
in a sense, is not an apocalypse in that it does not reveal— requires imagining a 
second disaster that is an apocalypse and thereby gives the first disaster 
retrospective apocalyptic status" (Berger 6-7). 
But in the Argentina of early 2002, the disaster was not complete, and the only thing revealed by 
that apocalypse was the muck of the Pampa. 
 
II Barbarism's muck 
"Argentina helps cultivates pessimism," states Rafael Pinedo in a 2006 interview about his 
novel Plop. This post-apocalyptic dystopian novel has been classified by some, in a category that 
evokes one of Borges' encyclopedias, as "impossible to classify." Some bloggers, however, have 
dared to classify it; among those attempts, "bildungsroman in an atomic trash heap" stands out.9 
What is certain is that Plop, published in Argentina in 2005 after winning the Premio Casa de las 
Américas a few years earlier, is a novel of ruins. We don't know the origin of the savage world 
Pinedo presents, but there are signs of an already forgotten ecological disaster. The 
anthropological attention to ritual highlights the primitive and savage kernel of a future society; in 
terms of space and time, this future is disturbingly close. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
estar lejos de casa, encontrar el amor" (Link, Cómo se lee 135). 9	  "Acerca de Plop de Rafael Pinedo," Juan Marcos Leotta. 
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Like the vast plains where the novel takes place, the text itself appears to surge forth from 
the abyss. But as the mounds of plastic and rusted metal that rise from the omnipresent mud 
evoke an anterior cause, so too does Pinedo's text gesture towards its participation in a discourse 
that employs post-apocalypse and dystopia to confront the paradoxes of globalization. As in any 
post-apocalyptic narrative, Plop begins with an after. Pinedo presents a dual-layered after: Plop's 
personal after and the global after. The novel focused on the filling-in of the lacuna in Plop's 
personal after: the text opens with Plop deep inside a hole; soon shovels of dirt begin to fall on his 
head, and the first scoop—because there will be no madeleines after the Apocalypse—sets the 
protagonist's memory into motion, and we move to the linear narration of Plop's life until we find 
ourselves once again in the hole that closes the novel.10 
But the global after is harder to pin down. The novel contains some future, and plenty of 
the past. There are vague signs that point towards an ecological disaster—this would be a future 
vision from our present—but the spectacle of savage tribes wandering amongst the Plain suggests 
a relationship to a particular historical vision: barbarism in the Argentine Pampas. In order to 
understand this strange novel, we must follow the thread that lies at the intersection of the 
environment, civilization and barbarism. And we would not be wrong to do so: the Argentine 
Pampa, as sketched by its most best-known critic, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, is the perfect 
background for the post. Sarmiento's 1845 book Facundo: Civilización o barbarie en las pampas 
argentinas (Facundo: Civilization or Barbarism), which today might be classified as 'creative 
non-fiction,' is the definitive nineteenth century condemnation of strongman Latin American 
politics. The text uses the story of one such strongman, the caudillo Facundo Quiroga, to describe 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  In several interviews Pinedo has described the centrality of the scoops of dirt to the novel's 
narrative structure: "Plop recuerda su vida con cada palada de tierra que le cae encima, y cada 
palada es una imagen" (Alonso, Axxón).	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the struggle between power, modernization, geography, and culture in Argentina.11 Furthermore, 
one could even say that Facundo, with its civilization-barbarism opposition, is a sort of proto-
post-apocalyptic novel; Sarmiento, however, does not locate his vision in time, but rather in 
space: the opposition of the city and the Pampa.12 
The spatial referent is central to Sarmiento's dystopia: the few cities that continue resisting 
the barbarian invasion are, in the well-known formulation, islands within the vast savage sea. The 
temporal result is the soon-to-be definitive triumph of barbarism. Facundo Quiroga—and the 
continuation represented by mid-nineteenth century Argentine dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas—is 
the Apocalypse Now: Sarmiento does not promise to reveal anything more than the actual state of 
Argentine reality. In this sense, the apocalypse has already occurred, and the Argentines find 
themselves in the midst of the post. 
Sarmiento's geographic scene is—anachronistically—the perfect backdrop for post- 
apocalyptic narratives. Sarmiento's readers will be forgiven if they imagine themselves in front of 
the Road Warrior script: the sweeping desert, lacking any sign of civilization;13 unification only 
through barbarism or slavery;14 the stoic resignation to a violent death.15 At the end of the first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Sarmiento wrote the enigmatic Facundo while exiled in Chile; it was originally serialized in 
1845, but quickly found its way into book form. The text is a mixture of biography, proto- 
ethnography and polemic; its publication clearly installed Sarmiento as a key figure in the 
struggle to establish a centralized Argentine republic. Sarmiento's main target, the dictator Juan 
Manuel de Rosas, maintained his power through a series of allegiances with local caudillos in the 
rural agricultural areas of the country; Facundo Quiroga was one such regional strongman. 
Sarmiento would eventually become President of the Argentine Republic (1868-1874). 12	  I recognize that this binary simplification ignores the richness of the text, but what matters here 
is that Sarmiento's conception is more spatial than temporal.	  13	  "El mal que aqueja a la República Argentina es la extensión: el desierto la rodea por todas 
partes y se le insinúa en las entrañas; la soledad, el despoblado sin una habitación humana, son 
por lo general los límites incuestionables entre unas y otras provincias" (Sarmiento 59-60; all 
translations mine). 14	  "Así es cómo en la vida argentina empieza a establecerse por estas peculiaridades el predominio 
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part of his description of the barbaric desert, Sarmiento concludes: "This is how, in Argentine 
daily life, these peculiarities came to dominate: the predominance of brutal force, the rule of the 
strongest, limitless and unaccountable authority, justice administered without form or debate."16 
Like the anti-Thomas More, Sarmiento writes from the island of civilization to describe 
the barbarism that surrounds him. Thomas More, writing from the barbarism of early-sixteenth 
century Europe, described an island located far away from the continent where a proto-socialist 
civilization flourished.17 But the fact that Sarmiento is still able to write opens a temporal ellipsis 
between the barbarian invasion and the complete and total loss of civilization. This may explain 
why Sarmiento dedicates part of his text to an ethnographic account supported by the then- 
current fads of European popular science, phrenology and physiographic description: in a last- 
ditch effort, Sarmiento composes a preamble to the mock last will and testament of civilized life 
in the Argentine Republic. 
Pinedo has a different project. If Sarmiento, in 1845, writes his version of civilization's 
last battle, Pinedo is interested in taking the failure of that battle as his starting point.18 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
de la fuerza brutal, la preponderancia del más fuerte, la autoridad sin límites y sin responsabilidad 
de los que mandan, la justicia administrada sin formas y sin debate" (Sarmiento 65). 15	  "Esta inseguridad de la vida, que es habitual y permanente en las campañas, imprime, a mi 
parecer, en el carácter argentino cierta resignación estoica para la muerte violente" (Sarmiento 
60). 16	  If we read on, it is hard not to think of the iconic images from Gibson's film: "La tropa de 
carretas lleva, además armamento, un fusil o dos por carreta, y a veces un cañoncito giratorio en 
la que va a la delantera. Si los bárbaros la asaltan, forma un círculo atando unas carretas con otras, 
y casi siempre resisten victoriosamente a la codicia de los salvajes ávidos de sangre y de pillaje" 
(Sarmiento 65). 17	  In an attention-grabbing coincidence, both authors were ignorant of the landscapes they were 
describing. As we saw above, all of More's knowledge of the New World came to him second-
hand; in the Losada edition of Facundo, the editors state: "Conviene recordar que Sarmiento no 
conocía la pampa cuando hace esta descripción ["Aspecto físico de la República Argentina y 
caracteres, hábitos e ideas que engendra"]. Tiene sí en cuenta la primera hecha por un autor 
argentino, la de Echeverría en La cautiva, que le sirve de antecedente" (nota de pie 2, 60). 18	  At this point, it is worth mentioning that Pinedo's project dialogues with Oesterheld's 
Eternauta. Even if Plop's images appear to be the novelization of the drawings from the second, 
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Sarmiento's text, thus, cannot be classified as post-apocalyptic in strict terms. As James Berger 
proposes, "If apocalypse in its most radical form were to actually occur, we would have no way 
even to recognize it, much less to record it" (Berger 13).19 Sarmiento uses the language of the end 
of civilization as a rhetorical strategy to give more weight to his political claims; he is far from 
putting into doubt language itself as the fundamental medium and the constitutive base of 
civilization. Sarmiento historicizes the origin of his Apocalypse Now through the life of Facundo 
Quiroga, and he names the event in the present moment: Rosas. 
Pinedo, on the other hand, writes after. Because of this, we do not find a narration of the 
apocalyptic event. Pinedo understands that in order to describe the post-apocalypse, the post must 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
post-apocalyptic part of the Eternauta, Pinedo attempts to resolve a tension that is present in the 
first part of Oesterheld's graphic novel. The first part of the comic shifts between a "state of 
nature"—every man for himself—and a community constituted against the invading forces— 
Oesterheld as a Schmittean—. Pinedo denies his characters a common enemy, and thus 
annihilates any concept of a "communal protagonist" that Oesterheld so often celebrated. If the 
Eternauta's invaders had never materialized, the societal degeneration that preceded the invasion 
would have increased until it completely erased any trace of communitarian triumph. Pinedo 
expands and enhances this social disintegration to its ultimate consequences; this is Plop's starting 
point. We can say the Oesterheld's communitarian concerns no longer seem plausible when the 
"invading forces" become neoliberal ideology itself: a valorisation of free markets and 
individualism that undermines the very concept of community and cooperation.	  19	  Berger does not theorize the utopian side of the post; in his reading, any post-apocalyptic text 
is, constitutively, an apocalyptic text (with the exceptions of Mary Shelley's The Last Man and 
Gore Vidal's Kalki, which are both purely and uniquely apocalyptic; see footnote 8 in his second 
chapter). By affirming this, and thus negating the fundamental difference that underlines his 
study, Berger undermines his own work, supposedly on post-apocalyptic texts. Furthermore, by 
turning his back on utopia (or, more relevant to the texts he discusses, on dystopia), he forecloses 
any possibility of a critical reading of the remains of a post-catastrophe society. He says: "The 
apocalypse would replace the moral and epistemological murkiness of life as it is with a post- 
apocalyptic world in which all identities and values are clear" (8, emphasis mine). He confuses 
the clarity of the total critique of society that an apocalyptic narrative presents, on the one hand, 
with the ambiguity and confusion that post-apocalyptic narratives, like the two I propose to read, 
present, on the other. In other words, Berger proposes to read post-apocalyptic texts as utopias (he 
says: "The post-apocalypse in fiction provides an occasion to go 'back to the basics' and to reveal 
what the writer considers to be truly of value"; 8), but he does so using a theoretical apparatus 
applicable for apocalyptic narratives. Finally, the supposed equivalence between apocalyptic and 
post-apocalyptic narratives does not leave any space for the analysis of the omission of any 
narration of the apocalyptic event that forms a central axis of Pinedo's text. I will refer to this 
omission in more systematic fashion in the following section. 
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be total. This implies the loss of culture, memory, even language as we know it. It can now be 
said that Plop's global after is the after of the anticipated battle between civilization and 
barbarism, with the barbarians emerging victorious. This victory is concretized in the 
omnipresence of mud and muck. It is crucial to read the novel as a restatement of the 
civilization/barbarism debate, but this reading is not without its contradictions and complications. 
Pinedo's novel transcends a simple updating of Sarmiento's ideological scheme. As we know, 
Sarmiento's language rapidly consolidated itself as a model (one model among many, but 
nonetheless a model that captured the attention of many readers) to speak about the process of 
modernization. In his anticipation of the dystopian genre that will fascinate twentieth century 
readers, Sarmiento situates himself on the side of modernity and the city. The spatial dystopia that 
he creates—the predominance of the rural, the wholesale destruction of culture. the triumph of a 
Hobbesian state of nature—does not coincide with the typical image of the temporal, urban-
futuristic dystopia of the twentieth century. In effect, the triumph of the 'barbarian threat' did not 
imply a totalitarian state of control and surveillance to the Argentine letrado; on the contrary, as 
we have seen, it represented something much closer to an approximation of a post-apocalyptic 
state. A brief fragment suffices to demonstrate: 
We in America are on the wrong path, and there are deep, traditional causes for 
this that we must break with if we don't want to be swept away by decomposition, 
nothingness, I even dare to say barbarism, the inevitable mud into which the 
remains of dying peoples and races sink, like those hazy primitive creations left in 
the wake of a changing atmosphere.20 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  "La idea de que vamos en América en el mal camino, y de que hay causas profundas, 
tradicionales, que es preciso romper, si no queremos dejarnos arrastrar a la descomposición, a la 
nada, y me atrevo decir a la barbarie, fango inevitable en que se sumen los restos de pueblos y 
	   23	  
In order to untangle Plop's reimagining of the civilization-barbarism contradiction, we 
must begin at the most material level: the mud. Sarmiento describes barbarism as the "inevitable 
mud into which the remains of dying people and races sink." There is no more accurate synthesis 
of Pinedo's narrative world, with one exception: the author uses the word barro instead of fango. 
This becomes obvious when the narrator describes the landscape: 
It rains. Always. 
Sometimes lightly, like floating water. Other times, more often, it's a liquid 
wall that pounds against your head. 
You can only drink the rainwater. Once it hits the ground, it's impure. The 
old people say "contaminated". 
You walk in the mud, between huge mounds of iron, rubble, plastic, rotting 
rags and rusted cans. [...] 
You can find anything in the trash heaps. Most of it is iron and cement. But 
there is also a lot of wood. And plastic. Of all kinds. And cloth, always half- rotten. 
And apparatuses. Nobody knows what they are for, or what they were for. 
All the metal is covered by rust. All the wood, fungus.21 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
razas que no pueden vivir, como aquellas primitivas cuanto informes creaciones que se han 
sucedido sobre la tierra, cuando la atmósfera se ha cambiado" (qtd in Ramos, 20).	  21	  "Llueve. Siempre. 
A veces muy poco, como agua que flotara. Otras, muchas, es una pared líquida que golpea 
la cabeza. 
Sólo esa puede tomarse. Una vez que cayó, está impura. "Contaminada" es la palabra que 
usan los viejos. 
Se camina sobre el barro, entre grandes pilas de hierros, escombro, plástico, trapos 
podridos y latas oxidadas. [...] 
Entre las pilas de basura se encuentra de todo. La mayor parte es hierro y cemento. Pero 
hay mucha madera también. Y plástico. De todas las formas. Y tela, casi siempre medio podrida. 
Y aparatos. Que nadie sabe para qué son, o fueron. 
El óxido cubre todo el metal. El hongo, la madera" (Pinedo 20-1). 
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Mud. The remains of people and races. The coincidence between the two visions cannot be pure 
chance. 
Pinedo's language is startling. The 58 chapters—none of which exceeds four pages—are 
full of short, declarative sentences. The descriptions never go beyond pure action: there are few 
adjectives, and not a single interior monologue. Barbarism has won in the linguistic field, and 
within the Group—Plop's name for his roving band of survivors—language serves only to 
command. Pinedo's linguistic economy only augments the horror, and the frigid account of 
violence reaffirms the reader's repulsion. For instance, the process of "recycling" cadavers, 
presented for the first time when we see the practice applied to Plop's mother: "They brought him 
to see the operation. The needle in the vertebrae, the flaying, the butchering. As he was her child, 
he was allowed to ask for a part: he chose a femur, to make a flute. He never made it."22 The text, 
like the society it narrates, has no interest in anything not directly linked to survival. In the above 
fragment, the language does not even try to give a detailed account of the process. We see only 
three images of the butchering, and then, the frustrated attempt (one supposes) to make a musical 
instrument. Nothing more: from death to mourning in 32 words (and not one adjective!). 
Perhaps due to the impoverished language, the great expanse of post-apocalyptic 
wasteland—the Plain, as it is called by the Group—also lacks history. Rites and rituals abound, 
but these have no justification, and there are few moments when the Group's members reflect 
upon them. It seems as if the Group's strongest taboo has it origin in a Sanchopanzian refrain: 
"Flies don't enter closed mouths!" screams the Brigade Secretary during Plop's initiation rights.23 
This is the only motivation given for the total prohibition (under penalty of death) against publicly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  "Lo llevó a ver la operación. La aguja entre las cervicales, el despellejamiento, la carneada. 
Siendo el hijo, le correspondía pedir algo: eligió un fémur, para hacer una flauta. Nunca la hizo" 
(Pinedo 91). 23	  "¡En boca cerrada no entran moscas!" (Pinedo 30).	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showing one's tongue. The vacant transmission and the blind repetition of the taboos lend 
structure to the societies that inhabit the Plain; these minimal conditions for survival, however, 
are a far cry from an historical conception of society. When barbarism wins, history loses. But 
history does not disappear without leaving traces. Plop, in his rise to power, learns how to manage 
history; as we will see further on, this is a fundamentally material management, given that the 
"history" Plop manages is a fragmentary piece of text (probably from an astronomy or physics 
textbook) fetishized by an illiterate society. In other words: even though language tries to 
barbarize itself and erase any link with the pre-post memory, something of the past remains in the 
present, even in the post-apocalyptic present. 
 
If we compile the clues, the traces, and the signs, we arrive at the inevitable conclusion: 
the elusive event was an ecological disaster. The description of standing water awakens our 
suspicion: "as soon as it touched the ground it went bad, black, and when it forms puddles it 
shined at night, and you had to keep your distance, so that the women wouldn't give birth to 
deformed children and balls of flesh wouldn't grow in peoples' insides."24 Any doubt disappears 
as soon as we read about the instantaneous decomposition of a character who falls into a river.25 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  "Que apenas tocaba la tierra se pudría, negra, y cuando se acumulaba brillaba en la noche, y 
había que alejarse, para que las mujeres no empezaran a parir hijos deformes y a la gente no le 
crecieran bolas de carne desde adentro" (Pinedo 101).	  25	  See Pinedo 83-4. In another point of contact with Facundo, Pinedo focuses on the toxicity of 
rivers and lakes. One of Sarmiento's central complaints is the gauchos' misuse of navigable rivers: 
"El hijo de los aventureros españoles que colonizaron el país detesta la navegación y se considera 
como aprisionado en los estrechos límites del bote o de la lancha. Cuando un gran río le ataja el 
paso, se desnuda tranquilamente, apresta su caballo y lo endilga nadando a algún islote que se 
divisa a lo lejos; arribado a él, descansan caballo y caballero, y de islote en islote se complete al 
fin la travesía. De este modo, el favor más grande que la Providencia depara a un pueblo, el 
gaucho argentino lo desdeña, viendo en él más bien un obstáculo opuesta a sus movimientos, que 
el medio más poderoso de facilitarlos" (Sarmiento 61-2). Pinedo carries this attitude to its ultimate 
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Nor can we ignore the Group's historical indifference or ignorance: it appears that there is no 
mythology26—only taboos—no history, and almost no written word. The sole sheet of paper, a 
fragment from a science textbook, mentions the "great extinction" connected with the big bang 
(Pinedo 47), but without any further comment or explanation. 
But what gave rise to that other extinction, the one that brought an end to the civilization 
that produced the apparatuses that litter the Plain? We know very little. One of the few clues lies 
in one of the Group's refrains: "Each is the owner of his own death."27 Beyond the arbitrary 
aphoristic taboos that rule the Group, this saying is the only sign of an anterior ethics, a remnant 
of the pre-post life. In it we find expressed the notion of property—owner—and a concept of 
individuality. Each is the owner of his own death. It appears to be a translation of the foundational 
idea of liberalism—possessive individualism—to the post-apocalyptic environment.28 In a world 
filled with nothing more than rusted metal and toxic water, life is the only thing of value over 
which a human being can exercise dominion. The cynicism represented by this saying—the sole 
attempt to articulate a philosophy of the Plain, based on the annulment of the human organism as 
an immaterial possession—is frightening, but in it we can read the vestiges of the concept of 
personal liberty drawn out to its ultimate consequences. In other words: Pinedo's post-apocalyptic 
dystopia has its basis, just like Sarmiento's dystopian Pampa, in the real world. Pinedo's novel, 
with its fleeting wink to the current-day crisis that lies at the crossroads between the neoliberal 
order and the global ecological problem, complicates the traditional forms of conceiving the 
problematic; he does this by creating a vision that looks towards the final social and ecological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
consequences: an Argentina in which, far from enjoying "el favor más grande que la Providencia 
depara a un pueblo", rivers carry the promise of a quick and painful death.	  26	  With the exception of the "tree"; see below.	  27	  "Como decía el dicho: 'Cada uno es dueño de su muerte'" (Pinedo 63).	  28	  See C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism.	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results of an uninhibited neoliberal logic of unlimited property rights and radical market solutions. 
 
It is worth exploring the text's two alternative social visions. The first is the myth of the 
tree, a kind of minimalist mythology, a skeletal myth based around a tree (an uncommon thing on 
the Plain), the Guardians who care for it and defend it, and the pilgrims who come to contemplate 
it. Structurally, the two details we have regarding the mythical tree—the pure mud that surrounds 
it, "Without piece of wire, nor glass, nor broken bits of wood," and the gallows to the side so that 
nobody hangs himself from the branches—are excessive; it is one of the richest and most detailed 
descriptions in the entire novel.29 It is an almost peaceful moment, until the revelation of the 
battles where blood soaks the mud. But this detail cannot undermine the tree's inspirational weight 
to the Group. Plop's companions draw it in the dirt, they describe it: that is to say, it could be the 
gestation of an art or a literature of the Plain. That said, Plop is incapable of imagining it. 
 The Messiah's arrival complicates the situation. The key question is, obviously, what can 
a Messiah offer after the Apocalypse? According to Plop, not much. The novels sets up the 
confrontation as a challenge to Plop's power. The Messiah preaches—as Messiahs tend to do— 
about the promised land. His followers—who quickly grow in number—totally reject the Group's 
life. For Plop, the Plain allows no possibility for hope or rejection. The Messiah's message is 
simply unthinkable: it goes against the Plain consensus. 
Plop recognizes that a consensus occupies a weak position when faced with mythology, 
and that his only option is to destroy the myth. Once resolved in his decision, the leader 
transposes the imminent confrontation with the Messiah from a metaphorical level to a material 
level. In a tribute to the literalness that runs throughout the entire text, Plop tricks the Messiah. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  "Sin pedazos de alambre, ni de vidrio, ni de madera rota" (Pinedo 68).	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a supremely rhetorical gesture, the visitor states that he would give his right hand to arrive to the 
Healthy Land (tierra sana).30 Plop, with an efficiency that would impress a fundamentalist, takes 
charge: "The following morning, a pole with a right hand stuck on the point appeared in the 
middle of the Plaza."31 The Messiah disappears, neither martyr nor guide to the promised land. 
The primary reason behind the so-called Messiah's unremarkable departure has to do with 
the vacuity of the concept of judgment in Pinedo's post-apocalyptic world. Apocalyptic narratives 
are, of course, thoroughly tied to an act of judgment; Judgment Day and Revelation are nearly 
synonymous in the contemporary lexicon. Certain popular post-apocalyptic narratives carry this 
preoccupation with judgment into the world of the post. Cormac McCarthy's The Road is a perfect 
example of this tendency (which, it should be clear, Pinedo rejects). The Road, McCarthy's 2006 
novel, tells the story of a father and child who rather aimlessly navigate an ash- strewn post-
apocalyptic wasteland. The other human beings they encounter are either treacherous or simply 
savage, and the child's constant inquiry into the moral nature of themselves and the others (Are we 
the good guys? Are they good guys like us?) highlights the post-catastrophic reduction of morality 
to the simplest Manichean binary. Yet even that binary—good guys/bad guys—carries too much 
of a pre-post connotation for Pinedo. In an apocalypse, judgment both moral and theological 
distinguishes between the damned and the saved; in Pinedo's world, even The Road's simplistic 
division is too much. There are neither damned nor saved in Plop, only survivors. Amoral, post-
ethical...we could name that world many things. Indeed, the Plain's post- ethical landscape may 
represent one more element of Pinedo's neoliberal reductio ad absurdum. After the absolute 'end 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  The wordplay is obvious: with the bankruptcy of religion and the spiritual notion of sainthood 
(tierra santa, Holy Land), the Messiah responds to a much more corporeal demand: health 
(sanidad).	  31	  "A la mañana siguiente, en medio de la Plaza apareció un palo con una mano derecha clavada 
en la punta" (Pinedo 103). 
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of ideology,' where "Each man is the owner of his own death." survival itself become the only 
recognizable criterion for judgment. 
 
Liberal utopia degenerates into post-apocalyptic dystopia. Yet this shift should not be too 
surprising for readers of nineteenth century utopias and twentieth century dystopias. Between 
those two modes lies little more than a change of perspective. If we leave aside technology, the 
reader can ask himself: what are the material differences between a world such as More's Utopia 
or Bellamy's Boston in Looking Backwards, on the one hand, and Orwell's Big Brother nightmare, 
on the other? The majority of utopian texts take Plato's Republic as a model: control of the 
masses, be it by supposedly passive means as proposed by More and Bellamy (although these 
utopias exert their own violence and coercion), or be it by intrusive means such as brainwashing, 
propaganda, and total surveillance. No matter how it is presented, these are two sides of the same 
coin: a social vision directed by a Philosopher-King. 
But Pinedo does something different. Pinedo directs himself towards the post. Post- 
apocalyptic narratives, even though they are marginal within the already marginal world of 
science fiction, have always attracted authors because, in the words of one writer, "It allows us to 
start from degree zero, to wipe the slate clean and see what the world could have been if we knew 
then what we know now" (JJ Adams). These words direct us straight back to Plato. In the 
Republic, he states: 
The philosopher-kings would take the city and the characters of human beings as 
their sketching slate, but first they'd wipe it clean—which isn't at all an easy thing 
to do. And you should know that this is the plain difference between the 
philosopher-kings and other rulers, namely, that they refuse to take either an 
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individual or a city in hand or to write laws, unless they receive a clean slate or are 
allowed to clean it themselves (Republic 501a).32 
Pinedo does not take advantage of the clean slate in the way foreseen by Plato. Pinedo does 
something much more cryptic: he attempts to wipe clean language itself. That is to say: he 
narrates the post. Of course, his task is an impossible one, but he comes remarkably close to 
achieving this goal. Yet something pulsates through this stripped-down, violently transparent 
language. That nagging thing behind crisp, frightening descriptions is history itself: that which 
can never be wiped completely clean. In self-defense, the Plain's history has wrapped itself tightly 
to protect its truth from the harsh environment. It appears as a fetishized seed, waiting out the 
toxic muck to once again flourish at some future moment. Only that seed, in this case, happens to  
be a sheet of paper, the fragment of text which narrates the "great extinction." The old woman 
who "adopted" Plop after his mother's death carried that sheet of paper with her, but hidden. Old 
Goro, as she is called, takes out the sheet of paper—the sole remaining trace of a literate culture—
only once, at a festival, where she reads it aloud to the illiterate Group. Before her death, she 
passes on both the fragment itself and the gift of literacy. Plop uses both to consolidate his power; 
the sheet, which he keeps guarded and out of view, becomes the seal of Plop's ascent. 
Literacy and history become Plop's secrets. No truly clean slate, Plop's truth hibernates. 
The Group's collective memory is dirty, clouded; in a word: muddied. The final scene of Plop's 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Michel de Certeau also weighs in on the blank page in his reflections on the scriptural 
economy. After he affirms the blank page as the site where the subject confronts/dominates the 
object (thus recapitulating Descartes), he continues: "In other terms, on the blank page, an 
itinerant, progressive, and regulated practice—a 'walk'—composes the artefact of another 'world' 
that is not received but rather made. The model of a productive reason is written on the nowhere 
of the paper. In many different forms, this text constructed on a proper space is the fundamental 
and generalized utopia of the modern West" (134-5). Like many of his contemporaries, de 
Certeau stops short of definitively linking the "generalized utopia of the modern West" and the 
Spanish conquest of the Americas.	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slow death beneath successive scoops of slop could be read as the entombment of the last 
remaining scrap of history, but perhaps it is otherwise. Throughout the protagonist's life, he has 
metaphorically dug his own grave. Now, as he finds himself buried under the successive 
memories from his brutal life, he may finally escape the contaminated mud. The question 
becomes: is it possible to get beyond the toxic ahistoricality of the tabula rasa? Can the roots of 
history penetrate the layers of muck of the ages? Or is it rather that history, buried along with 
Plop's body and the final remaining trace of literary, has simply exhausted itself? Dormancy, 
rather than extinction: Plop's seed lies fallow in history's sediment. 
 
III Final consumers 
If Pinedo buries his protagonist in the sedimented remains of the aftermath of catastrophe, 
Pedro Mairal excavates those historical layers with an archeological precision. There is plenty of 
mud in El año del desierto, but Mairal is interested in what Marx called the muck of the ages.33 
Mairal doesn't flee that muck; on the contrary, he muddies himself in the most profound way. He 
sinks both his protagonist and his city into that fango inevitable of Argentine history. 
Unlike Plop, El año del desierto (Interzona, 2005) is a massive novel with encyclopedic 
aspirations. The post-apocalyptic backdrop uses the events of December 19-20, 2001 as concrete 
references, but these references are mere jumping-off points. And Mairal's jump is a backwards 
one: throughout the novel, as the narrative advances, history recedes. María, the 23 year-old 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  "Both for the production on a mass scale of this communist consciousness, and for the success 
of the cause itself, the alteration of men on a mass scale is, necessary, an alteration which can 
only take place in a practical movement, a revolution; this revolution is necessary, therefore, not 
only because the ruling class cannot be overthrown in any other way, but also because the class 
overthrowing it can only in a revolution succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of ages and 
become fitted to found society anew." "Feuerbach: Opposition of the Materialist and Idealist 
Outlook" (Chapter I of The German Ideology), see 
<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01d.htm>.	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protagonist, lives through a sort of "rewind" that condenses five centuries of events in the span of 
one year. This narrative device does not, however improbably, appear heavy-handed; the rewind 
is an integral part of the novel and it is intimately connected to María's life and actions. Thus, if 
the historical rewind is the novel's backdrop, María's personal story—the most pressing aspect of 
the novel—becomes a rewound bildungsroman. This is another point of convergence between 
Plop and El año del desierto—two unsentimental educations, two apprenticeships of the post— 
but structurally, each novel has its own orientation, and the two move in opposite directions. Plop, 
as we have seen, is an after in which only a fragment of history exists; El año, in turn, is an after 
ad infinitum, a regression that implicates every moment of Argentine history as always already 
post-apocalyptic. 
If Pinedo works as an ethnographer of a society that lives in the ruins of civilization, 
Mairal becomes an archeologist who begins his excavation too early, a coroner who starts the 
autopsy on a still-living body. It is precisely this anticipation—this untimeliness—that allows the 
author to reanimate the past and bring it to bear on the present. 
 
As one would expect of any attempt to condense over five centuries of history into one 
single novel, references abound, both historical/social and literary. Many critics have already 
pointed out—in blogs and reviews—the most obvious: the plagiarism of "Fundación mítica de 
Buenos Aires" written by a depressed young poet while "everything goes to shit"; the references 
to Echeverría's "El matadero" (a near-automatic association when one reads the scene of María 
venturing out to the slaughterhouse to buy meat for her pimp); and the wink to Cortázar during 
the State's literal take-over of María's family's house.34 
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Some of the references to European literature, however, appear to obey the Rewind Law. 
For example, as she is working in Buenos Aires' Bajo, now the city's emigration center (in a total 
inversion of Argentina's history of a nation of immigrants, boats now depart to Ireland, Spain, 
Italy and various Eastern European cities), Maria meets an Irish sailor about to return to Dublin. 
After a 24-hour courtship, Frank invites María to go live with him on the banks of the Liffey. As 
she is boarding the ship, María has second thoughts, and Frank disappears into the horizon 
screaming "Eveline!" This other name, one that highlights the protagonist's Irish roots, 
concretizes the reference: it is an inverted story from Dubliners; Joyce's characters plan their 
escape from Dublin to begin their lives anew in "Buenos Ayres", but at the last instant, Eveline 
changes her mind and leaves Frank alone on the boat, shouting his lover's name from the deck.35 
Another fundamental presence throughout the entire novel is an Argentine who did in fact 
manage to exile himself during a difficult historical moment: Julio Cortázar. There are further 
references beyond the "apartment taken-over" incident. The bridges built by the inhabitants 
during the "enclosure" (see below) are clear allusions—even if de-eroticized—of the famous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  The references are, respectively, to Jorge Luis Borges' poem "Fundación mítica de Buenos 
Aires" (in Fervor de Buenos Aires, 1923); "El matadero," Esteban Echeverría's staging of the 
nineteenth century civilization/barbarism debate (written and circulated in manuscript form in 
1839 but not published until 1871); and Julio Cortázar's "Casa tomada" (Bestiario, 1951). 35	  Mairal translates entire sentences from Joyce's story, but it is not until the last moment, when 
Frank cries out the name of that other lover, the historical one, does the reader become aware of 
the inversion of the literary relationship between Dublin and Buenos Aires. Compare: "Se 
empinaba la gorra un poco hacia atrás, y el pelo le caía sobre la cara" (Desierto 160) vs. "his 
peaked cap pushed back on his head and his hair tumbled forward over a face of bronze"; "Frank 
me contó historias de sus viajes. Había empezado limpiando cubiertas, por una libra al mes, en un 
barco que iba a Canadá. Había cruzado el Estrecho de Magallanes y el Mar Báltico" (Desierto 
161) vs. "He had tales of distant countries. He had started as a deck boy at a pound a month on a 
ship of the Allan Line going out to Canada. He told her the names of the ships he had been on and 
the names of the different services. He had sailed through the Straits of Magellan and he told her 
stories of the terrible Patagonians." According to the author himself, this episode must have 
carried special significance for Mairal; naming the other inspirations—beyond the crisis—that 
gave rise to the novel, he says: "Quizá la posibilidad que se me presentaba en ese entonces de 
irme a vivir fuera del país. Como un miedo primario, inconciente, de que si me iba, si me exiliaba, 
la Argentina dejaría de existir (al menos para mí)" (Mairal, piedepágina). 
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bridge in Hopscotch.36 Beyond these isolated quotations, the novel's entire temporal logic is a 
homage to "The Southern Throughway." Although Cortázar does not use an inverted chronology 
in that story, he does construct a singular temporal logic that could have served as one of Mairal's 
models.37 Cortázar's story opens with the image of rush-hour traffic as motorists return to Paris 
from a weekend in the South. Within a few pages, however, the motorists begin to count the days 
instead of the hours; soon after, the seasons change, snow falls, and we lose all track of time. It is 
here that Cortázar's artistry shines (and this is what Mairal lifts from the story): the characters 
never make any kind of observation about the shift from a verisimilar time to a more mythical 
time, but neither do they ignore it. They simply live it. With respect to Mairal's novel, the subtle 
movement from one temporal logic to another separates it from other contemporary examples that 
employ inverted chronology. For Mairal, it is not about an innovative way to organize the telling 
of certain events that the protagonist lives (as is the case with several filmmakers who have used 
inverted chronology, principally Christopher Nolan in Memento, Gaspar Noé in Irréversible and 
François Ozon in 5x2), but rather, María lives the inversion itself. Because of this, each narrative 
advance is, at the same time, a historical regression: the temporal logic of the intemperie. 
That said, it is complicate to talk about the "intemperie's logic". The narrative is more 
focused on underlining the official negation of the phenomenon and its usage by various groups 
of protestors as an empty signifier. Like the untold catastrophe that forms Plop's basis, the 
intemperie vaguely points towards an ecological disaster; in this case, however, Mairal is more 
interested in pointing out the strong links—he does this through a verisimilar representation of the 
events of 19-20 December—with the 2001 crisis. The beginning chapters never give us a direct 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  See Rayuela (Hopscotch), chapter 41.	  37	  The best-known literary examples of inverted chronology are Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse 
Five and Martin Amis' Time's Arrow. 
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view of the intemperie; on the contrary, we only see the political and social consequences within 
the Federal Capital (with the exception of María's quick trip to the suburb of Beccar). The 
protests, and the subsequent police repression, form the nucleus of the chapter "Suárez & Baitos", 
and our visions of the wastelands are mediated by flyers and the protestors' chants. At one point, 
María reads one of those flyers that paper the streets: "'The intemperie that the Government 
doesn't want to see'. It had photos of a block before and after the intemperie. Before, there were 
houses lining the street; in the after, it was all a wasteland. I threw it away so they wouldn't arrest 
me for it."38 On one side, a total absence of concrete information and the steady growth of rumors 
and accusations; on the other, official negation and the threat of state violence that, negatively, 
lends credence to the rumors. The reader can thus discern at least two registers in which the 
temporal logic of the intemperie operates: on the surface, a pure historical reenactment of the 
events of December 2001; but also State repression—without a doubt present during the Crisis—
and above all the fear of being swept up by the police that gesture towards the fear inculcated in 
the population during the 1976-1983 military dictatorship. These, then, are the first steps of the 
rewind, already mixed with a verisimilar representation of a concrete moment in recent Argentine 
history. As such, any attempt to read this chapter in strictly historical terms, to search for a 1:1 
correspondence between the plot and history, will not produce results sensu stricto. It is more 
appropriate to read history's return in the extension (to its ultimate consequences) of the present 
moment as an illumination of the past as much as of the present. In this sense, Alejandro's letter 
(María's boyfriend, army deserter, and mythical hero-in- construction) describing the State's 
actions is quite revealing: "The don't know how to lie, they use stupid tricks. In Lanús one night, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  "'La intemperie que el Gobierno no quiere ver'. Tenían fotos de una cuadra antes y después de 
la intemperie. En el antes, había casas una al lado de la otra y, en el después, se veían sólo los 
baldíos. Lo tiré por si me agarraban con eso encima" (Desierto 15).	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we kicked down the door of an abandoned house to hide there, and when we entered, we saw that 
there wasn't any house, the whole block was just a wasteland with ruins. In order to hide the 
intemperie, they just put up façades on the block, like a movie set."39 The passage contains 
several allusions: not only an exaggeration of the State's denial of the gravity of the Crisis, but 
also a reference to the Armed Force's hoodwinking of the public during the Malvinas War; 
furthermore, the fictitious Argentine state reproduces the Allies' World War II strategy, 
"Operation Fortitude", the disinformation campaign that included the usage of cardboard façades 
to conceal the invasion of the beach at Normandy. 
With that in mind, the reader who focuses only on the historical regression will lose sight 
of Mairal's contemporary cultural critique, while the reader who ignores the chronological 
inversion, perhaps due to Mairal's subtlety, omits a key part of the novel. If the reader maintains 
the two opposite movements in a state of tension, the narrative crystallizes in a devastating 
version of an American post-apocalypse. To arrive at these conclusions, we must study the novel's 
structure and follow the various temporal arrows (including the inverted ones) that Mairal 
sketches.  
Using broad strokes, we can divide the novel into five parts: the present moment, 
civilization versus barbarism, María's flight, barbarism's triumph, and utopia/apocalypse. The 
novel opens with a fragment from the narrator's present time that installs her in a purely post 
temporality. Her language is already other; her old speech pertains to another epoch and simply 
no longer serves any purpose. The civilization with which she had identified also no longer exists. 
María is a survivor, a witness of the catastrophe, and the fragments that begins her narrative are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  "No saben ni disimular, caen en trucos estúpidos. En Lanús, una noche, forzamos la puerta de 
una casa abandonada para escondernos y, cuando entramos, vimos que no había casa, había un 
baldío con ruinas que ocupaba toda la manzana. Para ocultar la intemperie, levantan sólo las 
fachadas de la cuadra, como un decorado de cine" (Desierto 68).	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pure foreshadowing. The narrator will maintain her omniscient position during the first parts of 
her story, and until she leaves her fortress-apartment building, she will continue to insert splinters 
of narrative anticipation into her tale. Once she enters the desert, however, the comments that 
reveal her temporal and spatial location in her present narrative moment definitively disappear. 
After this approximation of a prologue, the reader encounters María working at an 
investment company (and it is significant that the chapter that fictionalizes the Crisis bears the 
name of a financial services company as its title), and thus begins the second section. This section 
tells the story of the battle between civilization (which builds office towers as flags raised over 
conquered lands) and barbarism that the intemperie sets into motion, and it is here that the novel's 
against-the-grain temporal logic is most visible. 
As soon as the novel begins, Argentina has already fallen behind. María describes her 
office on January 2 (the protagonist's birthday and the first day of the "desert year"): "Even 
though the communication system no longer worked, we had to make it look like we continued to 
use the latest technology. Whenever a client entered, I would pretend to type something on the 
keyboard. In reality everything had crashed several months before."40 The reader does not know if 
María's corporate ruse is the result of the already-present intemperie, or if it is simply an 
unfortunate coincidence that the intemperie is advancing on a city that already has a history of 
technological fakery. What is true is that from that first day onward, María will be cultivating the 
wastelands so as to give rise to the novel's iconic penultimate image: an office tower that rises 
from the vast, depopulation Plain with nothing more on the horizon than the ruins and remains of 
a defeated civilization. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  "Aunque ya no funcionara el sistema informático, había que aparentar que seguíamos usando la 
última tecnología. Cuando entraba un cliente, yo simulaba que tipeaba algo en el teclado. En 
realidad todo estaba muerto hacía varios meses" (Desierto 9-10).	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The skyscraper inherently elevates itself: it rises to the abstract altitude of the global financial 
sector and thus escapes from the national mud, as María proposes: 
The height of the twenty-fifth floor allowed for that geographical vantage point. It 
was the view of powerful men. That's why they put the conference rooms on that 
side. It wasn't a pretty view, but it was perfect for getting business done. Like a 
place in another country, far away from the national mud, like looking down from 
an airplane. It was the height of the global economy, the great aerial financiers, 
with perfect telephonic connectivity with the antipodes. It was as if, up there where 
the air is clear, on top of the world, New York and Tokyo were at your fingertips 
[...] The trick was the altitude, far above the third world, the distant horizon...41 
Back on earth, "hay quilombo." We see scenes of police repression at the anti-intemperie 
demonstrations, the reinstatement of the national military draft, hyperinflation; later: riots, 
curfews, and the bulldozing of shantytowns. Notwithstanding, business continues while porteños 
complain about "barrios de categoría" being converted into tenements. María's boss most clearly 
expresses the CEO attitude: "Stay calm. We're not going anywhere. What's the worst that can 
happen? They'll block the roads? We'll buy ten helicopters. The Earth's temperature rises? Will 
buy the biggest air conditioner ever seen."42 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  "La altura del piso veinticinco permitía esa mirada geográfica. Era la vista de los hombres 
poderosos. Por eso habían puesto las salas de reunión hacia ese lado. No era una linda vista, pero 
parecía perfecta para hacer negocios. Como si fuera un lugar en otro país, lejos del barro nacional, 
como visto desde un avión. Era la altura de la economía global, de las grandes financieras del aire, 
donde se establecían a la perfección los contactos telefónicos con las antípodas. Como si, ahí 
arriba en el mejor oxígeno, en la cima del mundo, pudieran tocarse la punta de los dedos con New 
York, con Tokio [...] El truco del lugar era la altura, lejos del tercer mundo, el horizonte lejano..." 
(Desierto 13). 42	  "Quedate tranquilo. De acá no nos movemos. ¿Qué puede pasar? ¿Cortan todas las rutas?: 
compramos diez helicópteros. ¿Aumenta la temperatura de la tierra?: compramos el aire 
acondicionado más grosso que exista" (Desierto 31). 
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Given that the suburbs—thanks to the intemperie—are being reduced to desert, the bosses 
and their families see no other option than a wholesale move of their McMansions to the Garray 
Tower. This parody of the privatization of social life, the proliferation of vertical clubs "where a 
perimeter fence, two guards and, above all, the vertical distance guarantee security"43 that signals 
the absurdity of contemporary enclosures in private neighborhoods, mixes with the first visible 
signs of torture. The McMansion/shantytown division finds its expression, once again, through a 
historical reappearance: those locked out of the downtown towers live the palpable risk of being 
"disappeared". 
 
As María leaves the elaborate closed system of interconnected tunnels and bridges, she 
steps into a shifted temporal logic. At this point, Mairal focuses less on the extension of the 
contemporary (although this focus persists in the background), instead centering his attention on 
an excavation of the urban fabric. Released from her enclosure, María travels along the Capital's 
surface streets; the many superficial changes—for example, street names that have reverted to 
earlier incarnations (Cangallo replaces Perón, p. 93; Victoria replaces Hipólito Yrigoyen, p. 105; 
Calle de la Piedad replaces Mitre, p. 168)—are only a part of an enormous project of urban 
archeology. Although María never crosses paths with an Avant-garde poets reading his poems, 
trams replace buses; Shopping Abasto is once again a market; Plaza Las Heras has reverted to its 
previous incarnation as a penitentiary (Desierto 96-8). 
The most developed of these reverse displacements is the Hotel de Emigrantes. María 
ends up there as she looks for work in the Bajo (now an export center for frozen meat).44 What is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  "Donde la seguridad estaba garantizada por una reja perimetral, dos guardias y, sobre todo, por 
la lejanía de la altura" (Desierto 31). 44	  The majority of the novel's specific temporal references appear in this section: the tram car that 
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shocking is not the reference itself, but rather the way Mairal handles it (and inverts it): the Hotel 
de Inmigrantes, historically a welcoming space, with its promise of a better life in the shape of a 
bed and government subsidies for new arrivals, is now the Hotel de Emigrantes. For María, it is a 
hopeless workplace and a monument for the total failure of her native country. For Argentina 
itself, the scene does not only describe a moment from the national past, but it also carries the 
connotation of the endless lines in front of foreign embassies throughout the summer of 2001-
2002: "Thousands of people tried to organize themselves, scared and anxious to board a ship and 
sail off in search of new opportunities on other continents. Entire families with grandparents, 
newborn babies. They all left the Hotel and gathered on the docks."45 
But it is in the details where Mairal shines: the number of beds stays the same (4000 in 
both cases), but the Hotel's policies do change. Instead of an open invitation to stay until finding a 
job, the guests at the Hotel de Emigrantes are faced with a much less hospitable situation: "This is 
where they spend their last night before they leave the country. The wake up at five. The ships 
sail at dawn."46 Again, the overlapping between the image of the busy port during the 
immigration-heavy first decades of the twentieth century and its negative, inverted image from 
the contemporary moment is shocking. 
The historical regression continues, and María soon finds herself working as a prostitute in 
a brothel/cabaret whose client base is mostly English sailors transporting contraband. Here, the 
novel takes a hard-boiled turn, and María the prostitute kills her pimp. As if María's fate was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
crashes into the Riachuelo (12 July, 1930; p.112); the Semana Trágica (p.120); a rare snowy day 
in the Capital (22 June 1918; p.121); the passing of Halley's comet (1910; p.129); among others. 45	  "Miles de personas trataban de organizarse, asustados y ansiosos por subirse a un barco y partir 
a buscar nuevas oportunidades en otros continentes. Familias enteras con abuelos, con bebés 
recién nacidos. Salían del Hotel y se iban ubicando en los muelles" (Desierto 107).	  46	  "Es donde pasan la última noche los que se van del país. Los despiertan a las cinco. Los barcos 
salen cuando amanece" (Desierto 107).	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intertwined with that of her country, her crime and subsequent flight coincide with the barbarians' 
triumph, and we thus enter the novel's next section. 
 
When María's escape leads her (along with some of her companions in the mala vida) to 
the intersecction of Pueyrredón and Córdoba, the barbarian wave finally crashes up against the 
shores of the city. Beyond that crosswalk, pure desert: "Beyond that zone, it was a dirt road with 
uneven patches of asphalt jutting up; the cart had to avoid them so as not to split the wooden 
wheels," María continues, "Seeing the barren countryside like that, and then heading into it, made 
us all scared. It was like entering the ocean, moving away from the coast without a lifevest."47 
And she continues on; María's first steps into barbarism are as definitive as the border crossing 
that closes El gaucho Martín Fierro: "Faithfully following the path / they entered the desert,"48 
The gaucho sings: 
Y Yo, empujao por las mías, 
quiero salir de este infierno.  
Ya no soy pichón muy tierno  
y sé manejar la lanza 
y hasta los indios no alcanza  
la facultá del gobierno. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  "A partir de esa zona, el camino era de tierra pisada y tenía parches de asfalto que sobresalían 
en desniveles que había que esquivar porque las ruedas de madera se podían partir"; "Ver el 
campo abierto así de golpe y empezar a meterse daba miedo. Era como entrar en el mar, como 
alejarse de la costa sin salvavidas" (Desierto 176). 48	  "Y siguiendo el fiel del rumbo / se entraron en el desierto" (2299-2300). 
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Yo sé que allá los caciques  
amparan a los cristianos, 
y que los tratan de 'hermanos'  
cuando se van por su gusto. 
¿A qué andar pasando susto? 
Alcemos el poncho y vamos. (2185-2196)49 
María also passes over to the other side; she carries a Tramontina steak knife instead of a lance, 
and she too will end up with an indigenous tribe, but not before a stay at an estancia and a stint as 
a captive of a group of gauchos malos. 
At the Peregrina Estancia—a stopover on her exiled wanderings—María is witness to a 
frightening social reversion. We hear the Governor Juan Marín Celestes pontificate, "the land 
didn't belong to he who could buy it nor he who could work it, the land belonged to he who could 
defend it"50 while the local priest praises civilization's most recent 'advancements': the prohibition 
of teaching Darwinian evolution, the annulment of the universal secret vote, the destruction of 
any and all mechanical apparatuses, justice in the form of severed heads displayed in the central 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  José Hernández published his epic poem Marín Fierro in 1872 as an attempt to vindicate the 
figure of the gaucho—so savaged by Sarmiento in his Facundo—in Argentine literary and 
cultural history. It tells the story of a knife-fighting gaucho who 'goes native,' deserting the 
military in order to live amongst the Amerindians of the Pampas. In Kate Kavanagh's revised 
translation (http://sparrowthorn.com/MartinFierro_PART_ONE.pdf): 
 
And it's driven by my sorrows  that I want to leave this hell. 
I'm no longer a young fledgling,   I know how to handle a spear — 
and the powers of the Government   don't reach to the Indians. 
 
I know that the chiefs over there   will give shelter to Christians, 
and they treat them as "brothers"   when they go of their own accord.... 
Why keep on going through these alarms?   Take our ponchos, and let's go. 50	  "La tierra ya no era ni del que la pudiera comprar ni del que la pudiera sembrar, la tierra era del 
que la pudiera defender" (Desierto 190)	  
	   43	  
plaza. All of this occurs on an estancia—as we find out later—that only a few months prior was a 
tourist ranch. This little twist strips down the Disneyfication of history, and forces to the forefront 
the historical underbelly of a past celebrated by the tourism industry. Here, Mairal's excavation 
reveals the reality hidden beneath images of an idealized past that form the central axis of an 
economic boom based on gaucho tourism. 
María doesn't have time to think about these things; the locals find out about her past life 
as a prostitute and allow her to be carried off by bandits. From this point on, the reader enters a 
world of linguistic alienation similar to that which dominates Pinedo's novel. The Braucos' (the 
local bandits) language is a sort of Plain argot, an illiterate interpretation of Hernández's 
gauchesque verses. María forces us once again to consider Berger's linguistic mandate of the post-
apocalypse: "At the beginning it was hard for me to understand them, until I discovered they were 
speaking a slurred and shortened Spanish. For example: 'Biníguach' meant Come here, guacho or 
Come here, guacha (they used guacho to address anyone and everyone). 'Bocataí nomá' meant 
You stay here, right. 'Áaaleguach' meant That's it, guacha. 'Bajamcá', We're here. 'Cate pío 
laguach', It's all good, guacho."51 This is yet another incomprehensible version of post- 
apocalyptic language, this time marked by the history of gaucho speech. Their language is other, 
their reality other as well.52 The scene of the nineteen leaders each in his own bathtub in the 
middle of the Plain, attended to by their harem of captives, will quickly become one of the iconic 
post-apocalyptic images. Again: the Argentine Pampa seems to be a curiously appropriate 
backdrop for the post. But the Braucos are not as 'other' as they seem: as a blogger points out, 
their cultivation of (and total dedication to) drugs, the former bus drivers among them, their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  "Al principio me costaba entenderles, hasta que descubrí que hablaban un castellano muy 
cortado y cerrado. Por ejemplo: 'Biníguach' era Vení, guacho o Vení guacha (usaban el guacho 
para dirigirse a cualquiera). 'Bocataí nomá' era Vos quedate ahí nomás. 'Áaaleguach' era Dale 
guacha. 'Bajamcá', Bajamos acá. 'Cate pío laguach', Quedate piola, guacho" (Desierto 222). 52	  Note the inversion, this time at the syllabic level: from gaucho to guacho.	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predilection for flip flops and "chor", and their tattooed bodies together betray these men as the 
post-apocalyptic remains of a gang of soccer hooligans (barra brava). 
 
María's 'boyfriend' plans a valiant rescue that liberates her from the Brauco's misogynistic 
world and places her in the midst of the Ú, a pre-Columbian society. Rather: an indigenous 
society contemporary with the Conquest. We can attribute this knowledge to the presence of the 
stories of Ñuflo and his deceased companion Gonzalo. Even though these characters share the 
names of two well-known Conquistadores (Ñuflo de Chaves, Conquistador and Cabeza de Vaca's 
enemy; Gonzalo de Mendoza, founder of Asunción de Paraguay in 1537), I do not see any 
specific concrete connection between them, but rather a general invocation of a historical moment 
when men named Ñuflo et. al. wandered the American continent. 
The move from the Braucos to the Ú, María's second-to-last, flows into the novel's final 
section: the confrontation between utopia and apocalypse. The Ú's society is either truly post-
apocalyptic or completely utopic. As we have seen, this division is artificial, and instead of 
insisting on the contradiction, Mairal raises the stakes in a surprise that, in reality, shouldn't shock 
the reader who has been sketching out the inverted chronology. The Ú have developed a transitory 
and flexible society that appears to coincide with Marx's celebrated formula of unalienated 
society: hunting in the morning, fishing in the afternoon, herding cattle at night... María describes 
her life with them: 
I stayed with them, trying to adapt. As soon as I though I had learned their names, 
they corrected me. This continued until I learned that what I thought were their 
names were actually their vocational titles. But as the tasks rotated, each person's 
named changed every four days. There were no proper names; they were hunters 
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for four days, boat builders for four days, fisherman for four days, or tent repairers, 
or labourers, or firewood collectors...Thus each member assumed the name of his 
task, and they all rotated through every task.53 
This indigenous community, for as much as they appear to be a mix of the young Marx and the 
European "noble savage", do not live beyond the intemperie. On the contrary, they live after the 
intemperie; and like the myth of the Inuit with dozens of names for snow, the Ú have over fifteen 
words for mud (Desierto 260). With María as interpreter, they decide to venture downstream and 
investigate the ruins of the Capital. It is this journey that gives rise to the novel's second-to-last 
image (perhaps the one that will remain burned into the reader's memory): the Garray Tower, the 
only building among the rubble and ruins, inhabited by the now (truly) savage company men from 
Suárez & Baitos. This scene represents the cumulative moment of the inversion: "All the past and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  "Seguí viviendo con ellos, tratando de adaptarme. Cuando creía haber aprendido sus nombres, 
me corregían. Hasta que entendí que lo que yo había pensado que eran los nombres resultaron ser 
los oficios. Pero como los oficios rotaban, cada uno se llamaba de forma distinta cada cuatro días. 
No había nombres propios; eran cazadores cuatro días, cuatro días constructores de canoas, cuatro 
días pescadores, o reparadores de toldos, o labradores, o recolectores de leña...Así cada uno 
practicaba todos los oficios y asumía el nombre del oficio" (Desierto 255). 
 
Compare with the following fragment from The German Ideology: "And finally, the division of 
labour offers us the first example of how, as long as man remains in natural society, that is, as 
long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, as long, therefore, as 
activity is not voluntarily, but naturally, divided, man’s own deed becomes an alien power 
opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him. For as soon as the 
distribution of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, 
which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a 
herdsman, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of 
livelihood; while in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but 
each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production 
and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the 
morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a 
mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic. This fixation of social 
activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective power above us, 
growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one 
of the chief factors in historical development up till now." 
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all the future / Ruin atop ruin."54 
The culmination, on the one hand; the continuity, on the other. The novel concludes with 
the image of María leaving the continent behind aboard a ship headed to Europe, the so-called 
Conquest in rewind. These two images, the office tower and the ship off the American coast, 
emphasize the connection between the two objects; the chronological inversion explodes in this 
juxtaposition. Time's two arrows—one linear, the other inverted—displace each other, and the 
result is a historical Doppler effect: a compression, on one side, and an extension, on the other, of 
Argentina's past and that of the American continent. And, like one of those 'thought experiments' 
that attempts to demonstrate the theory of relativity through images of trains and observers in 
motion, Mairal's narrative makes clear History's relativity. Mairal does not do this in a 
postmodern sense; on the contrary, he animates the past, pushes it into the present. Once the 
narrative is set in motion, the reader can no longer maintain his static illusion. The reader ends up 
passing through the entirety of Argentine history to arrive at this 'blank slate', only to see that the 
beginning already carried the seeds of the end. The 'clean slate' is a slate that was wiped clean. 
Tabula rasa must always been imposed from without; in this case, the eraser is a ship off of the 
American coast. 
This is the truly post-apocalyptic content of the novel: if we invert the already inverted 
chronology, María's ship, this time arriving to the American coast, is the originary apocalyptic 
moment. The extended narrative of the Crisis ends up at the beginning of the long American 
history. The climax, which is also a first moment, becomes the apocalyptic moment. All that 
remains is to recognize American history as the history of the post. According to this formulation, 
all post-Discovery American fiction is implicitly post-apocalyptic. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  "Todo el pasado y todo el futuro / Ruina sobre ruina." The lyrics are by Charly García; Elsa 
Drucaroff cites the song in her reading of the novel. 
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This final picture, that of a ship leaving the Garray Tower behind as it pulls away from the 
American coast—the only aftertaste of the American Utopia, converted into a living ruin— 
captures the essence of a dialectical image. The constellation of the American Apocalypse surges 
forth from this image, an image that has only recently (after the Crisis) become legible.55 The 
image lies at the intersection of two axis. The vertical axis (reinforced by the verticality of the 
tower) moves from the concrete (the mud) to the abstract. The tower, the "altitude of the global 
economy" (Desierto 13) is now grounded in the mud, and at the precise location where we first 
met, in the opening pages of the novel, the protestors so reminiscent of the 2001 cacerolazos. The 
horizontal axis—the historical axis, of course—finds its expression in the vast expanses of the 
Pampas that have reclaimed the Capital. In this moment, the novel's localism collapses: the ship 
not only refers to the middle/upper class flight in the wake of the Crisis, but also the inversion of 
the nineteenth and twentieth century migratory waves, Buenos Aires as a contraband port and, 
most importantly, the ur-image of a European ship landing on American soil. Mairal's betrayal of 
his localism (and the historical infidelity of transporting the site of the so-called Discovery to the 
River Plate) is significant: it is the advent of the "now of recognizability". This time, it is not the 
Angel of History blown about by the winds of progress,56 but rather María the non-virgin who 
flees from the scene of utopia's immaculate conception in a ship whose course has been inverted, 
her muddy body the only witness to the muck of the present. 
 
IV Ruin piled atop ruin 
In Myth and Archive: A Theory of Latin American Narrative, Roberto González 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  See Walter Benjamin's The Arcades Project, especially fragments N2a,3 and N3,1. That is not 
to say this is the first, nor the only moment in which this constellation has become visible. 56	  See Walter Benjamin's "On the Concept of History."	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Echevarría offers the ambiguous concept of the Archive as the key figure for understanding Latin 
American literature. The Archive, most clearly represented by the scribe Melquíades' room in One 
Hundred Years of Solitude, is metaphorically constructed on top of the clearing left by Alejo 
Carpentier's Los pasos perdidos. For Echevarría, Carpentier's novel is crucial both as a challenge 
to the impulse to erase the past/clear the slate,57 as well as the foundation of the space—precisely 
a clearing—from which it will be possible to narrative the Archive.58 
The two post-apocalyptic novels discussed in the current chapter are strongly opposed to 
the paradoxical tendency to at once erase/clear and found, because in their status as post novels, 
they deal with remains. They break Echevarría's causal chain: instead of founding, they are 
concerned with continuity.59 Like Walter Benjamin's angel of history, both novels travel forward 
with their backs turned: Plop moves towards the future while looking back to the past; El año del 
desierto travels back over the accumulated ruins of the past while looking towards the future. But 
both texts equally resist the foundational command. In fact, each text in its own way highlights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  "Thus Los pasos perdidos dismantles the central enabling delusion of Latin American writing: 
the notion that in the New World a new start can be made, unfettered by history [...] For instead of 
being relieved of history's freight, the narrator-protagonist discovers that he is burdened by the 
memory of the repeated attempts to discover or found the newness of the New World" (Myth and 
Archive 4).	  58	  "His own story is the only one that he can authenticate, that is, his story about looking for 
stories, telling past stories, repeating their form [...] But in the writing of the novel a clearing has 
been reached, a metafictional space, a razing that becomes a starting point for the new Latin 
American narrative; the clearing for the building of Comala, Macondo, Coronel Vallejos, for the 
founding of the imaginary city containing all previous forms of Latin American narrative as well 
as the origins of the novel; a space for the Archive" (Myth and Archive 17).	  59	  It would be interesting to read El año del desierto with/against One Hundred Years of 
Solitude—a task that the similarities between the two titles almost imposes on the careful 
reader—above all if one takes Roberto González Echevarría's now canonical reading as a starting 
point. For instance, Mairal's striking localism (a characteristic that confirms his position of 
Oesterheld/Solano López's heir) contrasts with García Márquez's temporal and spatial ambiguity 
(Echevarría says: "Set against the global, totalizing thrust of the novel are these historical details 
which, without being specific, are nonetheless true in a general sense"; Myth and Archive 20); the 
young female protagonist María against the old sage Melquíades, etc. 
	   49	  
the destructive possibilities implicit within that clearing impulse. Far from creating a "clearing in 
the jungle" from which it will be possible to construct a Latin American narrative, both post- 
apocalyptic novels show us that the clearing itself is a wasteland (and, in Mairal's case, connected 
explicitly to the 2001 political/economic crisis). 
These two post-apocalyptic (and post 2001) novels do not pretend to erase anything; they 
neither search for nor attempt to make a clearing in the jungle. On the contrary: they pause to 
contemplate the actual wastelands, and in that space they find nothing more than the accumulated 
muck of an entire history. They would like break with the present—is there a more decisive break 
than an Apocalypse?—but that is an absolute impossibility. The ship returns to Europe, but this 
time María replaces Pedro Mártir, and she will not tell tales of some "good place over there", but 
rather stories of a failure. That is, if there is any language left with which to narrate anything at 
all. Are we not already speaking a post-apocalyptic language? In that case, does Rafael Pinedo 
represent the culmination of the American idiom? And fiction, nothing more than so many words 
to name the muck of the present. 
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CHAPTER 2 
UTOPIAN EMERGENCE AND THE MYTH OF AN AMERICAN BLANK SLATE 
 
"The latter end of his commonwealth forgets the beginning" The Tempest Act II scene i 
 
 This chapter investigates the relationship between utopia and America on two levels. First, 
it considers the physical location of the imaginary island in Book II of Thomas More's Utopia 
(1516), and it reviews critical claims about the role the so-called discovery of America played in 
the genesis of More's text. This includes considerations of Michel de Montaigne, Eziquel 
Martínez Estrada, and Louis Marin, among others. It then considers the broader implications of 
the connection between the concept of utopia and the American continent. This includes such 
issues as America as blank slate and Edmundo O'Gorman's "invention of America." Ultimately, 
the chapter focuses on the material aspect of utopia, and it poses the question: if we think of 
utopia not only as a commonwealth but also as a "commons," how do we account for the conquest 
and colonialism at the very heart of the concept? 
 
I Noble Savages, Forgotten Beginnings 
Where exactly is America in Thomas More's Utopia? The continent itself seems to disappear in 
the text, and that disappearance runs through much of the later critical writing about both Utopia 
and the utopian concept. This vanishing act seems rather strange, given that Book I of Utopia is 
so concerned with the process of English enclosure and of the disappearance of common land in 
the service of the growing British wool trade. Yet when the reader arrives at Book II—Raphael 
Hythlodaeus' description of the perfect island kingdom called Utopia, so different in every way 
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from the savage, brutal England portrayed in Book I—we hear very little about the history of the 
land itself, other than a brief account of King Utopos' trench-building project that separated the 
island from the mainland and inaugurated the Utopian Commonwealth, and a nebulous reference 
to Amerigo Vespucci's later American voyages. Could it be, as Shakespeare says of another 
indeterminate island, that "The latter end of his commonwealth forgets the beginning?" 
Shakespeare, too, concealed his sources. The Tempest (c. 1610) draws heavily from Michel de 
Montaigne's essay "On Cannibals" (1580), among other early New World sources. The act of 
"forgetting the beginning" could be called the foundational utopian gesture. The problem, then, is 
structural. Thus the question: what is utopia's beginning, its former forgotten end? If we linger a 
bit over Shakespeare's "American source," we see that Michel de Montaigne's writings on the 
American continent themselves exhibit a curious utopian conjugation. Montaigne wrote "On 
Cannibals" and "On Coaches" over fifty years after Thomas More's Utopia, and the Frenchman 
benefited from a richer store of American sources (both Montaigne's acquaintance/informant who 
lived ten years in Brazil and Gómora's written account of the conquest, for instance).60 Montaigne 
adds a complicated temporality—absent in More's Utopia—to his use of America. Montaigne 
indeed takes a page from Utopia in holding up the "lately discovered" continent as a mirror that 
reveals European barbarity: in the much cited passage from "On Cannibals," Montaigne asks what 
is a victor's snack of human flesh after a ceremonial battle compared to the horrors of Europe's 
religious wars?61 Yet Montaigne supplements this critique of European practices with pity for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  For more on Montaigne's sources, see The Cambridge Companion to Montaigne, Ed. Ullrich 
Langer.	  61	  "I am not so anxious that we should note the horrible savagery of these acts as concerned that, 
whilst judging their faults to correctly, we should be so blind to our own. I consider it more 
barbarous to eat a man alive than to eat him dead; to tear by rack and torture a body still full of 
feeling, to roast it by degrees, and then give it to be trampled and eaten by dogs and swine—a 
practice which we have not only read about but seen within recent memory, not between ancient 
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Amerindians' plight, and, furthermore, he conjugates this pity with nostalgia for the "Golden Age" 
of European empire. What if, he asks, Alexander the Great or some just and wise Roman emperor 
had landed upon American soil? 
Why did not so noble a conquest fall to Alexander, or to the ancient Greeks and 
Romans! Why did not this vast change and transformation of so many empires and 
peoples fall to the lot of men who would have gently refined and cleared away all 
that was barbarous, and stimulated and strengthened the good seeds that nature had 
sown there, not only applying to the cultivation of the land and the adornment of 
cities the arts of this hemisphere, in so far as they were necessary, but also 
blending the Greek and Roman virtues with those native to the country? ("On 
Vehicles" 278-9). 
Montaigne's dream of a 'gentle blending' presupposes a prior judgment of the component parts to 
be blended. His utopian hybrid—if we may call it that—substitutes Alexander the Great for 
Hernando Cortés; this move does the rhetorical work of replacing the "Black Legend" of sixteenth 
century Spanish conquest with the celebrated vision of Alexander, the just conqueror of Eurasian 
antiquity. As for conquest, so for philosophy. Montaigne poses a dream of gentle philosophical 
blending to complement his dream of gentle imperial blending: What if Plato, instead of his 
imaginary Republic or his lost Atlantis, had received news of the New World?  
They are in such a state of purity that it sometimes saddens me to think we did not 
learn of them earlier, at a time when there were men who were better able to 
appreciate them than we. I am sorry that Lycurgus and Plato did not know them, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
enemies, but between neighbours and fellow-citizens and, what is worse, under the cloak of piety 
and religion—than to roast and eat a man after he is dead" ("On Cannibals" 113). Greenblatt 
reminds us of the delicate nature of European references to American cannibalism in the light of 
the status of the Catholic mass in the wake of the Reformation. See Marvelous Possessions 136.	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for I think that what we have seen of these people with our own eyes surpasses not 
only the pictures with which poets have illustrated the golden age, and all their 
attempts to draw mankind in the state of happiness, but the ideas and the very 
aspirations of philosophers as well. They could not imagine an innocence as pure 
and simple as we have actually seen; nor could they believe that our society might 
be maintained with so little artificiality and human organization. ("On Cannibals" 
109-110) 
Montaigne's utopia thus consists of two idealized states: the European past and the American 
present. The European past has degenerated, both politically and philosophically, so as to 
represent a cruel mockery of its own tradition. Yet the European degeneration has not actually and 
contemporarily returned Europe to a state of nature, for Europe itself has discovered this actually-
existing natural state in the New World. Europe's lost Golden Age thus meets the actually-existing 
state of nature in sixteenth century America. This may be one of the purest expressions of the two 
competing utopian impulses: the temporal and the spatial. Most utopias take one approach or the 
other—Hesiod's Golden Age, so beautifully parodied by Cervantes in Don Quijote, exists in a lost 
temporality; More's island exists, his characters claim, in some spatially distant locale within a 
moment contemporary with Europe's temporality. Montaigne's originality is that he combines the 
temporal and the spatial by asking: what if, back then, those people (Plato et. al.) had gone over 
there (i.e. to America)? 
This complicates the traditional Golden Age myth, for the American present is not 
presented as the European past ("they are as we were"); rather, it is the European past itself that 
has been betrayed by the European present ("we no longer are as we once could have been"). 
America is other, and contemporary Europe is not fit for the encounter, and thus behaves with 
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barbarous cruelty. We might call this the utopian temporality of the noble savage: if only Europe's 
Golden Age (of empire and philosophy) had been present to meet the Golden Age of human 
innocence embodied by the New World. A Golden Age confronting newfound innocence: this 
was Montaigne's utopia. America does not disappear; instead, he gives us the American noble 
savage. It is only Europe's golden past that is capable of encountering American innocence; 
conversely, it is only the Amerindians who resemble Socrates in their comportment during battle. 
Early in Montaigne's meandering "On Vehicles," the author gives an approving account of 
Socrates' behavior during a military defeat. In an essay otherwise filled with harsh judgment and 
liberal condemnation, Montaigne sketches a scene of Amerindian behavior that closely resembles 
Socrates' noble and praiseworthy performance, and the author acclaims "their noble persistence in 
withstanding every ordeal and hardship, even death, rather than submit to the domination of the 
men who had so shamefully deceived them" ("On Vehicles" 278). The essay's final image—the 
Inca's subjects rushing to replace the fallen litter-bearers so the Inca is not disturbed in his throne 
during the slaughter—crystallizes the essay's main concerns: just and wise leadership, valor in the 
face of defeat, spectacle and war, and, strangely enough, vehicles in military campaigns. 
Of course, what is missing from Montaigne's account of the "state of nature" is a detailed 
description of property relations. And this is the feature that becomes perhaps the defining 
characteristic—at least for the later European political philosophers of the Enlightenment—of the 
Golden Age myth. Montaigne mentions the lack of private property in his catalogue of this 
actually-existing American Golden Age, but it is not his concern. His focus is on the juxtaposition 
of European savagery and "savage" civility; he does not focus on the origins of conflict. Here, 
then, is our paradox. As we will see below, Thomas More, in his critique of enclosure, erases the 
Amerindian and his land; Michel de Montaigne, in his critique of cruelty and barbarism, paints us 
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a noble savage yet ignores the question of land and conquest. To ask of utopia the American 
question is to overlay these two blind spots: it is the question of the American continent as 
material place. 
 
II Conquering America, Opening the European Mind 
To answer that question, we must return to a curious temporal coincidence. Speculation 
regarding a lost Golden Age preoccupied many thinkers of Greek antiquity. Plato, in his Republic 
(c. 380 BC), elaborated a perfectly ruled society, beginning from what he posited as an unrealistic 
yet necessary blank slate. In fact, Plato demands such a tabula rasa as a necessary condition for 
political philosophy: 
They'd [the philosopher-rulers] take the city and the characters of human beings as 
their sketching slate, but first they'd wipe it clean—which isn't at all an easy thing 
to do. And you should know that this is the plain difference between them and 
others, namely, that they refuse to take either an individual or a city in hand or to 
write laws, unless they receive a clean slate or are allowed to clean it themselves 
(Republic 501a). 
Among the Church Fathers, St. Augustine of Hippo tried to conjugate the infinite divide between 
the city of God and that of man (c. 420). Yet these imaginings of perfect worlds existed either in 
lost pasts or eschatological futures. It is only at the beginning of the European sixteenth century 
that utopia—both as a concept and as a place—arrives on the scene. Thomas More publishes the 
book that lends the genre its name in 1516, De optimo reipublicae statu deque nova insula Utopia 
libellus vere aureus, nec minus salutaris quam festivus, clarissimi disertissimique viri Thomae 
Mori inclytae civitatis Londinensis civis & Vicecomitis, better known as Utopia. Much has been 
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made of More's debt to Plato;62 far less of Amerigo Vespucci's crucial cameo in the text. And thus 
the temporal coincidence: More's Utopia expands Europe's vocabulary—albeit by one word—
during the exact same period that New World travel narratives were expanding European maps of 
the world.63 
 Most scholars recognize the European Conquest of the Americas as a central event in the 
development of Western philosophy, cartography, theology and politics.64 The T/O map—and all 
of its theological baggage—is thrown out of the window, and Europe makes a definitive step 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62This debt is not something More shies away from; in fact, he confronts it head on. Paul Turner's 
verse translation of the poetic front-matter sets the stakes (translation slightly modified): 
Outopia was once my name, 
That is, a place where no one goes. 
Plato's Republic now I claim 
To match, or beat at its own game; For that was just a myth in prose, 
But what he wrote of, I became, 
Of men, wealth, laws a solid frame, A place where every wise man goes: 
Eutopia is now my name. 
On More's debt to Plato, see Surtz's "Sources, Parallels, and Influences" in the Yale Edition of 
Utopia.	   63	  See, for instance, J.H. Elliot's discussion of the transposition of a temporal Golden Age to the 
geographical Utopia: "The process of transposition began from the very moment that Columbus 
first set eyes on the Caribbean Islands. The various connotations of paradise and the Golden Age 
were present from the first. Innocence, simplicity, fertility and abundance—all of them qualities 
for which Renaissance Europe hankered, and which seemed so unattainable—made their 
appearance in the reports of Columbus and Vespucci, and were eagerly seized upon by their 
enthusiastic readers. In particular, they struck an answering chord in two worlds, the religious and 
the humanist. Despairing of the corruption of Europe and its ways, it was natural that certain 
members of the religious orders should have seen an opportunity for reestablishing the primitive 
church of the apostle in a New World as yet uncorrupted by European vices. In the revivalist and 
apocalyptic tradition of the friars, the twin themes of the new world and the end of the world 
harmoniously blended in the great task of evangelizing the uncounted millions who know nothing 
of the Faith" (Elliot 25).	  64	  As will become apparent below, the term "discovery," when applied to Columbus' first 
westward voyage, is of little intellectual value; for the sake of convenience, I will use the term 
"conquest" to refer to the early contact between European and American peoples; this period 
roughly stretches from Columbus' October 1492 landing in the Caribbean to the 1572 execution of 
Tupac Amaru, and includes the fall of Tenochtitlan in 1521; although indigenous resistance to 
European rule continued well after these events (and struggles for indigenous autonomy in the 
Americas continue to this day). Needless to say, the "American continent" includes what we today 
call North, Central and South America.	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away from the "closed world" and towards the "infinite universe."65 Yet what looks like a 
decisive break to the modern observer was, in fact, a slow, painful and violent struggle over how 
to square new (and previously unthinkable) empirical observations with classical and theological 
authority. In this sense, reading More's text as a negotiation between Plato and Vespucci (or, more 
accurately, inherited authority and modern experience) is more in line with the intellectual climate 
which produced the work.66 
With this dialectical understanding of the role of the conquest of the Americas in mind, I 
would like to turn to the aforementioned temporal coincidence, although it should be clear by now 
that these two events—the conquest of the Americas and the publication of Utopia—are actually 
far from coincidental. In fact, as we will see, one could make the case of a causal relationship 
between the two. I propose to examine the often-ignored relationship between the American 
continent and the concept of utopia, not to argue in favor of some ultimate American source for 
More's satirical little book, but rather to explore exactly what role America serves in More's text 
and, more importantly, to reveal the continent's hidden presence. Ultimately, in investigating the 
land behind utopia's non-place, we will come closer to the universal core of the utopian impulse: 
the concept of the commons. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  The T/O Map is the visual depiction of Isidore of Seville's description of the physical world 
from the Etymologiae. See Alexandre Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe. 66	  Anthony Grafton, in his New Worlds, Ancient Texts, warns us about adopting a simplistic vision 
of the clash between authority and observation: "A revolution in the forms of knowledge and 
expression took place in early modern Europe. But it resulted as much from contradictions 
between and tensions within the texts as from their confrontation with external novelties. The 
ancient texts served as both tools and obstacles for the intellectual exploration of new worlds. 
These remained vital—and defined authors' representations and explanations of what they found 
as Europe moved out to West and East—until well into the seventeenth century" (Grafton 6-7); 
and later, "The discoveries provided a clinching piece of evidence to those who wished to argue 
for a new vision of history, for the superiority of modern to ancient culture. But the substance of 
that vision, ironically enough, often came from the very ancient writers whose supremacy it 
denied" (Grafton 157).	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III America as "spur" 
In the near 30-page "Sources, Parallels, and Influences" section of Edward Surtz's 
introduction to the definitive Yale edition of Utopia, the New World is mentioned in one 
paragraph. Surtz cites two sources—one certain, one probable—and a theory he deems "possible 
but hardly probable" (Yale clxxix). These are, respectively: Vespucci's Quatuor nauigationes 
(certain because Vespucci himself is mentioned in More's text); Pietro Martire d'Anghiera's early 
Decades (all of which would be collected—well after the publication of Utopia—in De orbe 
novo); and H. Stanley Jevons' theory (expanded on by others, including A.E. Morgan) that 
accounts of Incan socialism had traveled through Panama back to Europe and inspired More. 
That is to say: there is no doubt that America played a role in the gestation of Utopia, but 
there is little scholarly interest in the extent of this role.67 In a certain sense, this lack of interest is 
understandable. More's fundamental contribution to the genre is the very name he gives it, and the 
wonderful ambiguity entailed within. No longer are we stuck in the "no longer" of the Golden 
Age; More gives us place and non-place; a different now that could be Europe's future. I refer, of 
course, to the Renaissance humanist's greatest pun. Utopia: ou-topos and eu-topos; no- place and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  Like the erasure of the American continent in Utopia, the erasure of American knowledge, 
especially during the first rumblings of scientific rationality, was commonplace in Europe. In 
Measuring the New World, Neil Safier comments: "As narratives of overseas exploration 
proliferated, an impressive array of seeds, saplings, and other specimens flooded into European 
repositories, which included the burgeoning public spaces of museums, curiosity cabinets, and 
botanical gardens. Naturalists and collectors had to filter, separate, and package these materials; 
compilers and editors in turn had to 'reduce' the descriptions to their utmost 'simplicity' by 
trimming what was seen as extraneous or useless information for the printed books and 
dictionaries of nature they were producing. These two impulses of accumulation and abridgement 
reflected two extremes of Enlightenment knowledge production. Exploration and observation 
beyond European shores allowed for the 'emergence' of a 'new world' from the pens 
of heroic travelers, in the words of Rousseau, while editorial practices made possible the 'erasure' 
or diminution of that same knowledge in order to control what Chartier calls 'the accumulated 
discourses' of European philosophy" (Measuring 12). 
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good-place.68 The best of all possible places (eu) that does not exist (ou). If we insist on America, 
we do violence to the very non-place of the pun. Yet do we not do an equal violence to America if 
we insist on the sacred status of a pun? 
But More himself seems in on the joke. In the series of letters that open More's text, we 
get the definitive (non)account of the island's location. Peter Giles describes Raphael 
Hythlodaeus' discourse (the description of the island and its society that comprises Book II of 
Utopia) to Jerome Busleyden, where Giles lets it be known: 
By the way, More's a bit worried because he doesn't know the exact position of the 
island. As a matter of fact Raphael did mention it, but only very briefly and 
incidentally, as though he meant to return to the question later—and, for some 
unknown reason, we were both fated to miss it. You see, just as Raphael was 
touching on the subject, a servant came up to More and whispered something in his 
ear. And although this made me listen with even greater attention, at the critical 
moment one of his colleagues started coughing rather loudly—I suppose he'd 
caught cold on the boat—so that the rest of Raphael's sentence was completely 
inaudible. (12; Yale 22/23)69 
With that simple cough, More, Giles and the rest absolve themselves from their cartographic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Louis Marin masterfully demonstrates the wordplay: "Outopia-Eutopia: I would like to indulge 
in these terms. If on the way a number of allegories arise, consider them as part of our game. The 
no—the negation—inscribed within the name is also the most transcendent of values, the Good, 
because of the transparent inscription of an epsilon over an omicron. The name on the page's 
white space, here inaugurating the modern world, initially and simultaneously writes the 
monogram of nothingness and that lying beyond all being, or nothingness and of the good, of the 
good within nothingness" (Marin, Utopics xvi).	  69	  Throughout I will quote from Paul Turner's supremely readable translation (Penguin Classics, 
1965/2003) and give the corresponding page reference to the definitive, bilingual Yale edition of 
Utopia. The even page number refers to the Latin original and the odd number refers to the 
English translation based on G.C. Richards' 1923 version. 
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responsibility. Less the public remain unsatisfied with the account, Giles continues: 
You may wonder why no reference to Utopia appears in any geographical work, 
but this problem has been very neatly solved by Raphael himself. He says it's quite 
possible that the ancients knew of the island under another name, or else that they 
never heard of it at all—for nowadays countries are always being discovered which 
were never mentioned in the old geography books. (12-13; Yale 24/25) 
The "old geography books" are, of course, not books but a book: Ptolemy's geography (and 
Isidore of Seville's subsequent Christianization of Ptolemy that gave birth to the T/O map, 
Medieval Europe's ingenious articulation of Noah's three sons and the three known continents). 
Here we have a direct reference to the American continent—under the rubric of "discovery"— 
and it is precisely this empirical "discovery" that allows More and Giles to dismiss any worry 
over the exact location of Hythlodaeus' perfect island as slavish deference to outmoded authority. 
Although More-the-character does not mention the infamous cough, he does confirm the 
general uncertainty regarding the island's location; in a letter to Giles, More admits, "We never 
though of asking, and he never thought of telling us whereabouts in the New World Utopia is" (9; 
Yale 42/3). Note again the simultaneous affirmation of America (the New World) and its 
dismissal (we never thought of asking). In this same letter, More sets up a comparative logic with 
regard to the detail, realism and accuracy of Hythlodaeus' account. Immediately before More 
confesses his ignorance of the island's location, he also worries over the exact length of a bridge 
on that same island. His companions seem to disagree about the precise length, and More "shall 
rather tell an objective falsehood than an intentional lie—for I would rather be honest than wise" 
(Yale 40/41). In other words, this preoccupation with a trifling slip-up points to the larger lacuna, 
yet the narrative itself sets these two details on equivalent planes, as if the width of a bridge and 
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the actual location of the island were questions of the same magnitude. More's rhetorical 
prestidigitation has been extraordinarily successful over the centuries, and those who worry over 
the exact location of a self-confessed non-place find themselves grouped with sticklers who battle 
over the span of an imaginary bridge. 
At the risk of absurdity, I will compile the evidence that More's non-place is in fact 
located off of the American coast. That is to say: within the fictional framework of Utopia, More 
and his co-conspirators indubitably sought at once to mask the imaginary island's true location 
and to reveal its general whereabouts as 'somewhere over there in the New World.' Beyond the 
references made in the introductory letters (as examined above) and the overriding fact that 
Hythlodaeus accompanied Vespucci on several of the navigator's American journeys, there are 
two more punctual passages that highlight Utopia's New World location.70 
The Old World/New World division that structures the two-part text first surfaces with 
Hythlodaeus' introduction; this division is alternately coded "new nations/old nations" and "this 
hemisphere/that hemisphere."71 It then resurfaces in what must be the first instances of the crutch 
of all mediocre sci-fi writers: the one-time technology transfer. Hythlodaeus tells of a mythical 
shipwreck from the deep past of the island's history, from which the Utopians derived all of the 
European and Asian technology that was lacking on the American continent. 
According to their records, they'd had no contact whatsoever with 
Transequatorials, as they call us, until we landed there—except on one occasion, 
twelve hundred years ago, when a ship was driven off its course in a storm, and 
wrecked on the coast of Utopia. A few survivors managed to swim ashore, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Beyond the two following examples, there are at least three other passing mentions of the New 
World in the text: Yale p. 14, l.18; Yale p. 30, ll. 11-14; and Yale p. 106, ll. 19-20. 71	  Turner's translation directly says Old World and the New (19); see Yale 54/55.	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including some Romans and Egyptians, who settled there for good. [...] There 
wasn't a single useful technique practised anywhere in the Roman Empire that they 
didn't either learn from these survivors, or else work out for themselves, once 
they'd been given the first clue. They got all that from just one contact with our 
hemisphere (46; Yale 108/109). 
This tidy explanation excludes the East (both near and far) as a possible site for Utopia's location, 
since the Utopian's lack of contact with the rest of the world must have been total (save this one 
exception). Furthermore, the very necessity of a "one time only" transfer tacitly acknowledges the 
American continent's lack of technology, as reported by the early European explorers. 
 
IV Foreclosing 
The debate over the proper amount of influence to concede Vespucci or Martyr's work (or 
some other, possibly apocryphal source on America) has bothered some More scholars to the 
extent that they would deny any American connection; the two extreme positions—on the one 
hand, More based Utopia on a pre-Pizarro account of Inca communism; on the other, although 
More mentions Vespucci by name, the news of the New World had little noticeable influence on 
Utopia—seem equally improbable.72 More importantly, both miss More's sleight of hand: it is not 
that More based each and every aspect of the Utopians on some tale of New World noble savages; 
rather, it is precisely this inspiring/disappearing function the American continent plays that is of 
interest. In 1516 Europe, America is, literally, utopia: the blank slate upon which More—and 
Europe—can project its dreams. Thus we face the more pressing question: if Utopia is indeed a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  For an example of each of the two extremes, see Arthur E. Morgan, Nowhere was Somewhere: 
How History Makes Utopias and How Utopias Make History and Alfred A. Cave's "Thomas 
More and the New World," respectively.	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non-place, what does it mean that this non-place is literally superimposed over an existing land-
mass?73 
I would like to consider two very different ways of dealing with this question, as 
represented by two key twentieth-century thinkers of Utopia's American connection. Eziquel 
Martínez Estrada, Argentine writer and director of the Center for Latin American Studies at the 
Casa de las Américas in post-revolutionary Cuba, directly confronts the issue in his 1963 article 
"El Nuevo Mundo, la Isla de Utopía y la Isla de Cuba." Martínez Estrada seeks to reassert the 
centrality of the American continent for More's text. He does so through an exhaustive side-by- 
side comparison between the early texts (c. 1511) of Peter Martyr's Decades with Utopia, with the 
objective of confirming More's unacknowledged source. Yet, in the post-revolutionary fervor of 
1963 Havana, Martínez Estrada goes one step further: not only is Utopia based on this early 
description of America, but the island of Utopia itself is Cuba: "This part [of Martyr's Decades], 
the only part published before 1516 (the year of the first edition of Utopia) is, indubitably, that 
which inspired More's famous book. Utopia is Cuba."74 For the idea that Martyr may be an 
unacknowledged source, Martínez Estrada makes a convincing argument. That Utopia is Cuba, 
less so. Martínez Estrada's quick move to elevate the Cuban Revolution as the secular Revelation 
of More's sacred text actually undermines the scholar's tireless work:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  This question has guided thinkers as diverse as Edmundo O'Gorman and J.H. Elliot. For 
O'Gorman's thought, see below. Elliot says of More: "As Sir Thomas More had already shown, 
the overseas discoveries could be used to suggest fundamental questions about the values and the 
standards of a civilization which was perhaps beyond reform. But by treating the New World in 
this way, the humanists were closing the door to understanding an alien civilization. [...] The 
dream was a European dream, which had little to do with the American reality. As that reality 
came to impinge at an increasing number of points, so the dream began to fade" (Elliot 26-7, my 
emphasis).	  74	  "Esta parte de la obra, la única que se publicó antes de 1516 (año de la primera edición de la 
Utopía) es, indudablemente, la que inspiró a Moro su libro famoso. Utopía es Cuba" (Martínez 
Estrada 94). 
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Whether it be in messianic and prophetic, or in logical and deductive terms, Utopia 
effectively presents a prognosis of the natural development of the American 
historical process. It is not, in effect, a prophecy, but rather an anticipated vision, a 
"revelation" or apocalypse, like those experienced in portentous dreams or from a 
subliminal intuition of history's underlying biology.75  
We must not let Martínez Estrada's hyperbole detract from the persuasive primary-source work 
that argues More's familiarity with Martyr's early New World correspondence. What is key to 
realize is Martínez Estrada's insistence on the American continent: beyond dubious claims that 
More was preparing a socialist manifest destiny, we have here an attempt to reveal the American 
scaffolding that supports the supposed non-place.76 
Louis Marin is also familiar with this American scaffolding. The capstone essay of his 
1973 Utopics, "Disneyland: Utopic Degeneration," unfolds a devilishly insightful reading of that 
paragon of ideological spaces. Marin reads the map of Disneyland—and the visitor’s tour of the 
park—as if it were a utopian narrative. This allows Marin to advance his thesis that utopia is an 
ideological critique of ideology, only Disneyland represents the point at which utopia, made real, 
begins to degenerate. Disneyland is a real utopic space: a non-place that actually exists in time 
(present) and space (Anaheim). But utopia degenerates, it loses its critical strength and becomes a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  "Utopía contiene, efectivamente, sea en forma mesiánica y profética o lógica y deductiva, una 
prognosis del desarrollo natural del proceso histórico americano. [...] No es, en efecto, una 
profecía, la de Moro, sino una visión anticipada, una 'revelación' o apocalipsis, como en los 
sueños premonitorios o de la intuición subliminal de las biológicas de la historia" (Martínez 
Estrada 114-5; all translations my own).	  76	  Recently, Stelio Cro has returned to the More-Martyr connection, in a less ideologically- 
charged (and, regrettably, less textually rigorous) frame. Cro's recent article does not make as 
definitive a case for the Decades as source (in fact, his assertion that the character of Giles is 
based on Martyr's descriptions of peaceful Amerindians seems downright flimsy), but he makes a 
gesture towards that possibility. See "More, Erasmus, Vives and Peter Martyr: an Updated 
Comparison."	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re-presentation of a collective fantasy (Utopics 239-40). Nowhere is this more true than in 
Frontierland, where the reality of North American westward expansion experiences a double 
displacement: first, from a history of genocide, prospecting, and battles over slave states to "how 
the West was won"; then, from "how the West was won" to "how the West was FUN!" 
Yet Marin does not maintain this eye for the American continent throughout his opus. As 
opposed to Martínez Estrada, who misplaces the non-place through enthusiasm, Marin misplaces 
the non-place through omission. In one of his Greimas squares he situates More's Utopia between 
"the New World" and "Ceylon/Calicut." The passage to which he refers is obvious; it is a 
description of Hythlodaeus' travels after leaving the island of Utopia, where the Portuguese 
wanderer "turned up in Ceylon [...] from there he made his way to Calicut, where he was fortunate 
enough to find some Portuguese ships, and so, quite unexpectedly, got a passage home" (17; Yale 
50/51). Although this triangulation of Old Empire/New World/Old Colonies is indeed interesting, 
it is not pertinent to the island's location. The island itself is not mentioned in that particular 
itinerary; furthermore, on every other occasion when the island's nebulous location is mentioned, 
it is exclusively in the context of the New World (as demonstrated above). Marin invests too 
much in the travel narrative, since for him this implies a circuit and a return (a closed series); this 
in turn leads him to overemphasize Portugal, Ceylon and Calcutta while underemphasizing 
America in his account.77 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Marin's is not the only instance of misplacing the non-place. Marie Louise Berneri makes the 
same error in her 1950 Journey through Utopia, where she says: "The island of Utopia was 
supposed to have been discovered somewhere between Brazil and India" (Berneri 59). Perhaps 
this oversight in imaginary geography can be tied to her dismissive attitude towards the American 
continent itself; she argues "As has often been pointed out, the discovery of the New World gave 
a new impetus to utopian thought, but it played only a secondary role, and one can safely assume 
that had More never read Vespucci's travels he would have imagined an ideal commonwealth in a 
different setting, like Campanella or Andreae who did not bother to consult travel books before 
they described their ideal cities. The main impetus came from the need to replace the associations, 
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Marin's under-emphasis of America metastasizes into a peculiar sort of negation in his 
later essay "Frontiers of Utopia: Past and Present." Beginning from a reflection on two contrasting 
images of the Sears Tower in Chicago, Marin develops two overlapping visions of utopia, 
variously named horizon and frontier; limit and expansion; free play and closed totality. In 
continuing with his interest in the neutrality of utopia, he proposes that in the gap between these 
two visions lies "the epistemological site of the utopian fiction" (Marin, "Frontiers" 402 fn 14). 
That site, in turn, situates the utopian subject in a neutral relationship (Marin, "Frontiers" 404). 
The problem with Marin's "neutrality" is that when he locates the utopian subject in the 
indeterminate space of the neutral relationship, he implicitly defers the question of America's 
status. Marin intuitively understands this: he states that More's utopian moment joins both the 
birth and death of modernity.78 Yet that very formulation—Utopia as the simultaneous foundation 
and exhaustion of modernity—restricts the concept of utopia to/for European modernity. Thus, for 
Marin, the conquest of the Americas becomes nothing more than an analogy to describe the 
global situation post-1989: the unenclosed wasteland after the demise of the USSR mimics the 
New World in that a new opening suggests a new horizon. 
Utopia, for Marin, names this neutral space that arises on the horizon, but in neutralizing 
utopia, Marin in fact erases America. This contradicts Marin's previous arguments, where he has 
stated that utopian neutrality is "a distance or a gap that does not allow any affirmation or 
negation to be asserted as a truth or a falsehood" (Marin, "Frontiers" 411); but this does negate the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and the philosophical and religious systems of the Middle Ages, with new ones" (Berneri 56-7). 
Of course, she does not explain why that need to replace old systems was so pressing. Perhaps it 
had to do with new empirical geographical evidence that contradicted scholastic authority? 
Berneri's error is repeated by later scholars, for instance, Porter and Lukermann, who cite her in 
their 1976 article "The Geography of Utopia."	  78	  "Modernity could be characterized by the remarkable conjunction of its birth and its death. 
From this point of view, the poignant melancholic overtones of More's Utopia cannot be 
underestimated" (Marin, "Frontiers" 405 fn 21). 
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topos and the history of America itself! When Marin concludes, in 1993 "precisely at this moment 
it is worthwhile to recall the fiction of an island appearing at the dawn of a period for which the 
present time would be the twilight" (Marin, "Frontiers" 412), we must add: that island can only be 
recalled in its historical plenitude; in this sense and this sense only—the historical fullness that 
returns the truth of conquest to the myth of discovery, the reality of enclosure to the phenomenon 
of American emergence, territorial appropriation to the continent's vacant appearance—does the 
founding anticipate the end. Not through Martínez Estrada's revealed destiny, nor Marin's 
neutrality, but through something else. Marin comes close to naming this other thing when he 
proposes the collapse of the Soviet Union (understood as a communist utopia) as the force that 
shifts our cognitive map, as it were, from two "edges" buffered by a neutral zone to a frayed zone 
that negatively affirms the need for limits (enclosure): 
It is becoming a fringe structure that consists on the one side in a well-determined 
edge and on the other side in an edge fraying so as to become a chaos of frontiers 
that do not limit anything but manifest an obscure need for having frontiers, for 
making closures, linguistic, racial, nationalistic, economic 'enclosures' like those 
that are denounced in the first book of Utopia, made by the sheep breeders, that 
gave birth to the urban crowd of unemployed staring people, future criminals 
fearing neither God nor men, people precisely without frontiers (Marin, "Frontiers" 
410-11). 
It is here—with the notion of enclosure—that things begin to collapse, and the Old World/New 
World division that structures More's text itself reveals a very interesting operation. For there are 
hidden enclosures in Utopia, and this "obscure need for having frontiers" becomes most visible in 
the trench that separates the island from the American mainland. Of course, this 'will to enclose' is 
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not limited to Marin's post-Cold War context; enclosure and possession were some of the most 
important issues during the first generations of Spanish contact with the America. 
In fact, More's move—that of at once acknowledging and erasing America—was 
anticipated by Columbus himself. Stephen Greenblatt, in his study of possession and wonder in 
the New World, focuses on Columbus' formalism in his initial act of appropriation of America 
and the subsequent juridical and theological controversy.79  Through a series of formal linguistic 
acts—declaring, witnessing, naming, recording—Columbus takes possession of the New World.80 
Columbus' declarative statement "And I was not contradicted," is the crux of the matter for 
Greenblatt: "It enables him [...] to stage a legal ritual that depends upon the formal possibility of 
contradiction without actually permitting such contradiction; that is, it enables him to empty out 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  See Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World, especially Chapter III, "Marvelous 
Possessions." Greenblatt's new historicist methodology is not without problems. For instance, 
Greenblatt acknowledges that by relying exclusively on post-contact European or mestizo sources, 
he falls into a 'representational blind spot' that denies him access to authentic Amerindian self-
representation ("I have resisted as much as I can the temptation to speak for or about the native 
cultures as if the mediation of European representations were an incidental consideration, easily 
corrected for" [Greenblatt, Marvelous 7]). Yet this caveat actually ends up reconfirming the 
continent's status as a blank screen for European projection. Since the problem cannot be "easily 
corrected for," Greenblatt simply ignores it and proceeds to study exclusively what European 
representations of the New World tells us about European practices of representation. 80	  Columbus' formalism works to empty out the inhabited American landscape and clear the way 
for European possession (appropriation would not be a fitting term, since the entire act is 
premised upon the New World's uninhabited state): "We might say that Columbus's formalism 
tries to make the new lands uninhabited—terrae nullius—by emptying out the category of the 
other. [...] The ritual of possession, though it is apparently directed toward the natives, has its full 
meaning then in relation to other European powers when they come to hear of the discovery. It is 
as if from the instant of landfall Columbus imagines that everything he sees is already the 
possession of one of the monarchies he has offered to serve—Portuguese, English, Spanish—and 
he proceeds to establish the correct claim by the proper formal speech act. [...] Formalism then 
has the virtue of at once inviting and precluding contradiction both in the present and in the 
future: 'Speak now or forever hold your peace.' [...] It is one of the principal powers of narrative to 
gesture toward what is not in fact expressed, to create the illusion of presences that are in reality 
absent. For this reason, the formal acknowledgment of beings who are at the same time rendered 
silent is less discordant in Columbus's narrative, less obviously anomalous, than it is in juridical 
or theological discourse where it soon provoked eloquent and sustained protest" (Greenblatt, 
Marvelous 59-61). 
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the existence of the natives, while at the same time officially acknowledging that they exist" 
(Greenblatt, Marvelous 65). This process, which Greenblatt names "ideological forgetting," 
allows the practical European enclosure of the American continent and the imaginary foreclosure 
of its native inhabitants. Furthermore, it demonstrates the interconnectivity of these two 
manifestations: the American continent can only be enclosed and possessed after it has been 
"wiped clean." If, from the perspective of the European Renaissance, this process appears to be 
one of "forgetting," from the American continent, it resembles something much closer to 
invention. 
 
V Inventing, Enclosing 
The status of the "invented Americas" has troubled critics since its inception. Mexican 
writer Alfonso Reyes (1889-1959) reads the American invention as the concretization of utopia. 
The New World, he argues, was the desired stimulus to invigorate European political thought in 
the earliest dawn of modernity. In Última tule (a 1942 collection of essays on utopia, conquest, 
and America), Reyes advances that,  
America, it can be said without violence, was longed for and discovered (almost 
'invented') as a playing field for the overflowing of that most powerful chimaeric 
energy. America was created, discovered, by thirsty bodies and souls, by those 
who needed golden houses to quench their longing for luxury, or free consciences 
in which to plant and cultivate the idea of God and the idea of the good.81 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81"América, puede decirse sin violencia, fue querida y descubierta (casi 'inventada') como campo 
de operaciones para el desborde de los altos ímpetus quiméricos. Crearon, descubrieron a 
América los que tenían sed en el cuerpo o en el alma, los que necesitaban casas de oro para saciar 
su ansia de lujo, o conciencias libres donde sembrar e inculcar la idea de Dios y la idea del bien" 
(Reyes, "Tule" 60; all translations my own).	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The European conquest of the Americas, beyond being a geographical, political, and spiritual 
event, is also a philosophical and ideological one. The "discovery" of the continent is a discovery 
of hope; it should not be surprising that Reyes reads the emergence of this newly visible land 
mass as a utopian event.82 It becomes the missing philosophical and poetic link to finalize and 
totalize the world, and to bring hope onto the terrestrial plane. Reyes contrasts America to Plato's 
vanished Atlantis or Senaca's beyond-the-horizon Ultima Tule; the continent appears in its 
material form to fill those voids left by the classical tradition. Those voids, those disappeared 
islands or lost Golden Ages of antiquity were merely placeholders for America's surging forth: 
"Before its presence was felt, America was perceived by its absence."83 America means hope, 
America is utopia. This is not so much a picture of European ideological forgetting, as Greenblatt 
claims, but rather a prefiguration of contemporary celebrations of transculturation and cultural 
hybridity that turns the European conquest of the Americas to the New World's advantage: 
And today, faced with the disasters of the Old World, America occupies a place of 
hope. Its very colonial origin, which obliged it to search for its raison d'être 
beyond itself, has gifted the precocious continent with an international sensibility, 
an enviable elastic ability to conceive the vast human panorama in its unity and its 
ensemble.84 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Reyes writes, "El Continente se deja abarcar en una esperanza, y se ofrece a Europa como una 
reserva de humanidad. [...] La declinación de nuestra América es seguro como la de un astro. 
Empezó siendo un ideal y sigue siendo un ideal. América es una Utopía." (Reyes, "Tule" 60) [The 
Continent surges forth as hope, and it offers itself to Europe as a reserve of humanity ... The 
declination of our American is as sure as that of a star. It began as an ideal and it continues to be 
an ideal. America is a Utopia.] 83	  "Antes de dejarse sentir por su presencia, América se dejaba sentir por su ausencia" (Reyes, 
"Tule" 61). 84	  "Y hoy, ante los desastres del Antiguo Mundo, América cobra el valor de una esperanza. Su 
mismo origen colonial, que la obligaba a buscar fuera de sí misma las razones de su acción y de 
su cultura, la ha dotado precozmente de un sentido internacional, de una elasticidad envidiable 
para concebir el vasto panorama humano en especie de unidad y conjunto" (Reyes, "Tule" 61).	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Mexican historian and philosopher Edmundo O'Gorman (1906-1995) would agree that 
America is the name of some kind of hope, except that he would specify that it is a thoroughly 
European hope. O'Gorman too advances that before it was discovered, America was invented. 
Following O'Gorman's reading, Columbus, Vespucci and other European explorers, in dealing 
with the alternately unexpected or misidentified continent, invented both the concept and the 
place of "America." That is, the continent was definitively not a non-place merely awaiting 
European discovery, and the invented myth of the "discovery" itself masks the actual history of 
conquest, domination, and assimilation. That said, this invented America was not without 
significance for Europe. Indeed, its utopian emergence was precisely what Europe—especially 
Catholic Europe—needed to break through the dam of stagnant authority and theological 
backwater: 
As we will see, [the history of the invention of America] shows the first episode in 
man's liberation from his ancient cosmic prison and his age-old servitude and 
impotence, or, if you prefer, his liberation from an archaic manner of thinking that 
had already produced all of the fruit it was destined to produce. It was not a 
coincidence that America came onto the world stage as the land of liberty and the 
future, and the American man as the Western hemisphere's new Adam.85 
O'Gorman proceeds to deconstruct the myth of the discovery in order to replace that narrative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  "Porque en [la historia de la invención de América] hemos de ver, como se verá, el primer 
episodio de la liberación del hombre de su antigua cárcel cósmica y de su multisecular 
servidumbre e impotencia o, si se prefiere, liberación de una arcaica manera de concebirse a sí 
mismo que ya había producido los frutos que estaba destinada a producir. No en balde, no 
casualmente, advino América al escenario como el país de la libertad y del futuro, y el hombre 
americano como el nuevo Adán de la cultura occidental" (O'Gorman 119; all translations my 
own).	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with the more suggestive idea of an "invented" America, yet his process is completely opposed to 
that of Reyes, the later who seems only to further mystify the historical events of the conquest by 
reading them as seeds for the sprouting of a new global hope. O'Gorman's point, of course, is that 
this libratory operation for Europe—crystallized in the invention of America—had disastrous 
consequences for the American continent itself.86 O'Gorman rejects Reyes' ontological premise 
that America was always there waiting to reveal itself to a Europe in need, and this allows 
O'Gorman to pursue an entirely different line of inquiry. O'Gorman abandons any impulse to read 
America as an object that was suddenly and miraculously revealed, and in doing so, he in turn 
reveals the conceptual violence that such a posited "discovery" entails. This line of inquiry opens 
a space for the development of an American subjectivity that, while acknowledging the reality 
and violence of the conquest, does not allow itself to be made into a blank screen for others' 
projected imaginaries. 
 O'Gorman's concept of an "invented" America inspired many later thinkers to take up the 
question of the status of the American subject and its relationship to the supposedly universal and 
practically universalizing spirit of European conquest. Mexican poet and essayist Octavio Paz 
(1914-1998) glosses O'Gorman thus:  
The problem that worries O'Gorman is that of knowing what kind of historical 
entity America is. It is not a geographic region, nor is it a past, perhaps it is not 
even a present. It is an idea, an invention of the European spirit. America is a 
utopia; in other words, it is the moment of the universalization of the European 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  Even if O'Gorman's writings are explicitly more attuned to the realities of conquest and 
colonialism than Reyes', O'Gorman's project fits squarely within the logic of the Enlightenment: 
he frames his methodology in terms of the scientific method and even goes so far as to cite Kant 
in an appeal to awaken America from its dogmatic slumber (see O'Gorman section I.I). In other 
words: O'Gorman's project mobilizes the method and logic of the European Enlightenment to 
topple one of the pillars of said Enlightenment: the "discovery of America."	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spirit, when Europe sheds its historical particularities and conceives itself as a 
greater unity. O'Gorman is correct when he sees our continent as the realization of 
the European spirit, but what happens when America—as a historically 
autonomous being—confronts European reality?87 
This very question—the question of the alienated American, the projection of another's 
imagination—forms the contours of Paz's Posdata to his Labyrinth of Solitude (published in 1970 
as a response to the Mexican government's 1968 massacre on protesting students in Tlatelolco 
Plaza). It is no coincidence that Paz names this state "utopia," and the poet's reflection on the 
matter forces him to consider exactly where the American continent fits in the utopia equation. A 
later generation of Latin American philosophers have proposed new language to talk about what 
O'Gorman calls "invention." This loosely affiliated group prefers to talk about the "coloniality of 
power" and modern/colonial world systems, always insisting on what they call the "dark side" of 
European modernity. Enrique Dussel, for instance, replaces "discovery" with "covering-up":  
This other, in other words, was not 'dis-covered' (descubierto), or admitted, as 
such, but concealed, or 'covered-up' (encubierto), as the same as what Europe 
assumed it had always been. So, if 1492 is the moment of the 'birth' of modernity 
as a concept, the moment of origin of a very particular myth of sacrificial violence, 
it also marks the origin of a process of concealment or misrecognition of the non-
European (Dussel 66). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  "El problema que preocupa a O'Gorman es el de saber qué clase de ser histórico es lo que 
llamamos América. No es una región geográfica, no es tampoco un pasado y, acaso, ni siquiera un 
presente. Es una idea, una invención del espíritu europeo. América es una utopía, es decir, es el 
momento en que el espíritu europeo se universaliza, se desprende de sus particularidades 
históricas y se concibe a sí mismo como una idea universal que, casi milagrosamente, encarna y 
se afinca en una tierra y un tiempo preciso: el porvenir. En América la cultura europea se concibe 
como unidad superior. O'Gorman acierta cuando ve a nuestro continente como la actualización 
del espíritu europeo, pero ¿qué ocurre con América como ser histórico autónomo al enfrentarse a 
la realidad europea?" (Paz 183; all translations my own). 
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Like O'Gorman and Paz, Dussel recognizes the significance of this event—the encubrimiento, 
following his terminology—for the construction of the new, modern European subject: 
The experience not only of 'discovery' but especially of 'conquest' is essential in the 
constitution of the modern ego, not only as subjectivity per se but as a 'other- face' 
(teixtli, in Aztec), the essential alterity of modernity. [...] This sense of the relation 
between the conquest of America and the formation of modern Europe permits a 
new definition, a new global vision of modernity, which shows not only its 
emancipatory but also its destructive and genocidal side (Dussel 74-5). 
Aníbal Quijano goes so far as to attribute the development of this new European subjectivity to an 
imported Andean concept: 
Those first forms of a new historical consciousness, in which the beginnings of 
European reason and modernity were situated, were not only a new elaboration of 
their own [European] past. Their most powerful images, those that gave the utopias 
their immense motivating force and their longevity, were dependent above all on 
the seminal contribution of Andean rationality to the new European imaginary that 
was being constituted (Quijano 203). 
These positions, both of which seek to reclaim the authentically American base of utopian 
thought, have significant limits. The limit in Dussel's line of thought becomes apparent in his very 
conclusions. His entire critique of Eurocentrism and modernity rests on the non-European other's 
recognition of her own innocence: "the innocent victim of a ritual sacrifice, who, in the process 
of discovering itself as the innocent may now judge modernity as guilty of an originary, 
constitutive, and irrational violence" (Dussel 76, my emphasis). What is uncovered through 
Dussel's critique of the so-called discovery's process of covering-up is the innocence
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American victim. This logic of victimization is itself problematic; as Dussel well knows, post- 
modern and neo-liberal logic is much more comfortable adjudicating competing rights claims 
than confronting emancipatory demands for equality.88 By positing an "innocent" victim, Dussel 
ends up enacting his own sort of encubrimiento, for he presents a monolithic, continent-wide state 
of victimhood. This is a problem on two counts: first, the invocation of "innocence" appeals to 
some neutral observer, when in fact it is the innocent victim himself, according to Dussel, who 
becomes modernity's judge. In practical terms, such claims are adjudicated by the supranational 
organizations such as the United Nations that are the very legacy of modernity itself; in this way a 
politics based on identity claims of victimhood very easily falls back into the modern legacy it 
seeks to escape. Second, Dussel's invocation of "ritual sacrifice" itself indicates a blind spot in his 
argument: the very "innocent victims" he highlights themselves participated in pre- Columbian 
imperial dynamics (both the Aztec and the Incan empires, for instance), some of which included 
literal sacrifice as imperial ritual. In Dussel's account, we cannot see the encounter between 
several American and European empires—each based on a particular theory of sacrifice—
encountering one another, but rather we see a static tableaux of the European executioner and the 
innocent American sacrificial victim. 
Yet there is a powerful appeal in Quijano's insistence on an Andean source for the concept 
of utopia, and other thinkers have been drawn to the problem. That other thinker of the American 
invention, Alfonso Reyes, was tempted by a similar argument: referring to Peruvian thinker Luis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  For an account of the limits of identity politics in the context of Latin American cultural 
studies, see Alberto Moreiras' The Exhaustion of Difference. For a penetrating critique of logics of 
victimization and injury in the North American context, see Wendy Brown's States of Injury. 
Nonetheless, the violent excesses of the European Conquest of the Americas must be stated as a 
historical fact. In J.H. Elliott's words, "In the battle between European dreams and American 
reality, the dreams win out." In other words: any possible conception of an American utopia— 
whether historical or imaginary—must take into account the empirical events of the conquest.	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Eduardo Valcárcel (1887-1991), Reyes suggests, "The simple thought that More's imagination 
coincides 'in a full eighty percent' with Incan reality astounds the erudite Peruvian. Could it not be 
possible, he asks, that the English Chancellor had somehow come into possession of the secret 
reports of some explorer who arrived to Peru before Pizarro?"89 Arthur E. Morgan, in Nowhere 
was Somewhere: How History Makes Utopias and Utopias Make History, does exhaustive 
bibliographic work to present textual comparisons between accounts of Incan socialism and 
More's Utopia that prove impossible to dismiss. 
Although I am arguing that the conquest of the Americas is the fundamental event beneath 
the expansion of the European horizon named "utopia," these arguments that European 
social/political utopias arise from an initial European contact with Andean rationality simply do 
not work out in Thomas More's case. Even if the most tenuous claims of Andean influence prove 
true in early sixteenth century Europe, there is no way that More—in 1516—could have had a 
detailed enough account of Andean rationality for that particular cosmovision to afford the 
concept of utopia (and its subsequent European imaginaries) a "seminal contribution."90 Yet like 
Martínez Estrada's primary source work, the side-by-side comparisons amassed by Morgan, 
Valcárcel, and others are too compelling to ignore. 
The solution to this riddle, however, is as interesting as the Gordian knot it slices. It is not 
that Thomas More poetically amplified whispers and rumors of Incan communism to serve as the 
model society for his witty little book; rather, it is that Inca Garcilaso de la Vega—author of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  "Al erudito peruano le asombra que la sola imaginación de Moro coincida 'en un ochenta por 
ciento' con la realidad de las cosas incaicas. ¿No será posible—se pregunta—que el Canciller de 
Inglaterra haya poseído sobre aquellas tierras informes secretos de algún explorador que llegó al 
Perú antes de Pizarro?" (Reyes, "No hay tal lugar" 366).	  90	  According to William H. Prescott, Pizarro received his first reliable accounts of the Inca 
Empire in 1522, when Andagoya returned to Panama after abandoning an unsuccessful journey 
into Western South America. See History of the Conquest of Peru 114.	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Comentarios reales and the most cited source throughout the centuries for descriptions of the 
Tahuantinsuyo—wrote his 1609 description and vindication of Incan communism using More's 
text as a model and guide. According to Margarita Zamora, the similarities between Inca 
Garcilaso and Thomas More's narratives are "an essential and intentional component of 
Garcilaso's discourse" (M. Zamora, Language 130). More's Utopians were a model pagan society; 
indeed, it was the only model of a pagan society in the Christian tradition that could bridge the 
intercultural gap and render the Tahuantinsuyo intelligible to Garcilaso's European audience.91 
Garcilaso assembles the fragments of an Incan history within the framework of More's pagan 
utopia; as Zamora argues, Garcilaso realizes utopia in American history: 
[Garcilaso] turns fiction into history by making 'Nowhere' into somewhere. 
Contrary to the view that the Comentarios reales is a fictionalized or novelesque 
account of Tahuantinsuyu, Garcilaso's use of the Utopian model can only be 
understood as an attempt to reconstruct Utopia as a concrete historical entity, a 
localizable point in time and space. The strong messianic overtones that Garcilaso 
reads into the Utopian fragment are an essential part of this process since it allows 
him to inscribe Tahuantinsuyu into a providentialist historical schema (M. Zamora, 
Language 142). 
Thinkers who have noticed a striking similarity between More's Utopia and descriptions of the 
Tahuantinsuyo have indeed stumbled upon a chain of causal influence; it is only the direction of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  According to Zamora, "the Utopian sociopolitical model was the only one available at the end 
of the sixteenth century that presented a contemporary pagan civilization in a favorable light. [...] 
Only Thomas More in the Utopia had developed an elaborate sociopolitical model of an 
imaginary native American civilization. The Utopian model set an important precedent by 
rendering a pagan New World culture both intelligible to a European readership and acceptable, 
even praiseworthy, within the context of Christian humanist ideology" (M. Zamora, Language 
131).	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the causal chain that they misread. More read Martyr, Garcilaso read More. This is what a 
transatlantic and interdisciplinary reading of More allows us to see: it is not that More had some 
mythical Andean source that reached the Old World in advance of that Old World's contact with 
the Andes. On the contrary, More's Utopia was one of the Inca Garcilaso's sources; when the 
Comentarios reales became the canonical historical source of Incan history, More's presence 
became erased much as America-as-source has become erased in our accounts of Utopia. 
Regardless of these strangely parallel textual and interpretive errors, there is a further 
conceptual error in moves like Quijano's that posit a pre-modern Andean utopia as the ultimate 
source of the European concept. The trap Quijano falls into is that of insisting this Andean utopia 
actually existed. Why wouldn't the "authentic" Andean utopia be just as much a promise as the 
later European versions? And if not, how does one account for the double penetration-erasure of 
the American utopia (More reading Martyr, Garcilaso reading More)? 
 
But perhaps Quijano points towards a more revealing coincidence. His vision of a truly 
American utopia is nurtured by the early twentieth century Peruvian thinker José Carlos 
Mariátegui. According to Quijano, Mariátegui sketches the outline of a potential American utopia 
that rejects the imposed binary of an intrusive state or unregulated private interests.92 Yet it is in 
Mariátegui's overarching and uncompromising belief—most clearly stated in his Siete ensayos de 
interpretación de la realidad peruana—that Perú's problems fundamentally reduce to the problem 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  Quijano traces the twentieth century American-utopian lineage through José María Arguedas 
back to Mariátegui; it is from Mariátegui, Quijano argues, that the Peruvian novelist Arguedas see 
the possibility that "experience of the Andean communities before their adaptation to 
mercantilism shows the possibility of a communal form of the private, of "civil society," or 
institutions outside the state." It is this historical experience that conditions "New social practices 
founded on reciprocity, on an assumption of equality, on collective solidarity, and at the same 
time on the freedom of individual choice and on a democracy of collectively made decisions, 
against all external impositions" (Quijano 215). 
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of land. Mariátegui opens his third interpretative essay, "The Land Problem," thus: 
We are not satisfied to assert the Indian’s right to education, culture, progress, 
love, and heaven. We begin by categorically asserting his right to land. This 
thoroughly materialistic claim should suffice to distinguish us from the heirs or 
imitators of the evangelical fervor of the great Spanish friar [Las Casas], whom, on 
the other hand, our materialism does not prevent us from admiring and esteeming. 
The problem of land is obviously too bound up with the Indian problem to be 
conveniently mitigated or diminished. Quite the contrary. As for myself, I shall try 
to present it in unmistakable and clear-cut terms.93 
Any attempt to advance towards—or to return to, as Dussel and Quijano seem to argue—an 
American utopia must grapple principally and fundamentally with the status of the material land 
of the continent. This was Mariátegui's overarching thesis, and that thesis continues to operate in 
Quijano's thought. Beyond Mariátegui, however, the communal solution that Quijano advances—
the material, American answer to others' utopian visions—returns us directly to Thomas More. 
Specifically, we return to More's thinking about the relationship between Book I and Book II of 
Utopia. 
If there is one fundamental change between the British Isles described in the first book and 
the island of Utopia, as described in the second, it would be the ownership of land. In discussing 
the ongoing process of land enclosure in Book I, More is at his satirical best. It is England's sheep, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  "No nos contentamos con reivindicar el derecho del indio a la educación, a la cultura, al 
progreso, al amor y al cielo. Comenzamos por reivindicar, categóricamente, su derecho a la tierra. 
Esta reivindicación perfectamente materialista, debería bastar para que no se nos confundiese con 
los herederos o repetidores del verbo evangélico del gran fraile español, a quien, de otra parte, 
tanto materialismo no nos impide admirar y estimar fervorosamente. Y este problema de la tierra -
cuya solidaridad con el problema del indio es demasiado evidente-, tampoco nos avenimos a 
atenuarlo o adelgazarlo oportunistamente. Todo lo contrario. Por mi parte, yo trato de plantearlo 
en términos absolutamente inequívocos y netos" (Mariátegui, Textos Básicos 68, translation 
mine). 
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"which used to require so little food, [who] have now apparently developed a raging appetite, and 
turned into man-eaters. Fields, houses, towns, everything goes down their throats" (25; Yale 
64/65). Those who kick peasants off the common land—nobles, gentlemen and abbots—are "no 
longer content to lead lazy, comfortable lives, which do no good to society—they must actively 
do it harm, by enclosing all the land they can for pasture, and leaving none for cultivation" (35; 
Yale 66/67). From here, More—through the voice of Hythlodaeus—builds up a trenchant critique 
of land enclosure, wool oligopoly, the common poverty that these two events bring, and the 
misguided penal system erected to suppress and criminalize that poverty. This section culminates 
in perhaps the most famous line of Book I: "You create thieves, and then punish them for 
stealing!" (27; Yale 70/71). 
This vision of enclosure turning "farmland into a wilderness" (25; Yale 64/65) presents a 
sort of anticipatory rebuttal to John Locke, who in 1690, will argue that it is precisely unenclosed 
land that is wilderness and waste.94 Enclosure creates wasteland in England; Utopian 
communism is the ingenious solution that attacks the root cause of the problem. Yet the situation 
is not so transparent, for the Utopians themselves colonize lands that would otherwise be "idle and 
in waste" (Yale 136/7). And, we must not forget, Utopia is an island only because of Utopos'—the 
conquering king of lore—project to cut a channel through the fifteen-mile isthmus connecting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  In his Second Treatise, Locke consistently posits America as a blank slate on which liberalism 
will be written. In section 49, for instance: "Thus, in the beginning, all the world was America, 
and more so than that is now; for no such thing as money was anywhere known." Timothy Sweet 
sees Thomas More as an early precursor to this tendency to read American land as waste and thus 
disappropriate Amerindians of the territory on which they live: "The Utopian economic base 
(which resembles that of agrarian England in important respects) is replicated on this 'waste' land. 
Such a view of colonization established an assumption that would become crucial in legitimating 
the appropriation of indigenous Americans' land: the natives are assumed not to cultivate the 
land" (Sweet 403). I elaborate upon this theme in the third chapter, "Appropriation and Enclosure 
in the New World."	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Utopia to the mainland (Yale 112/113). On this point, Fredric Jameson is most illuminating.95 In 
a review of Marin's Utopics called "Of Islands and Trenches," Jameson reminds us that this trench 
is Utopia's absolute boundary, its fundamental and peremptory disjunction (Jameson, "Trenches" 
20). In terms of geography, then, the uncommon non-place where all is held in common looks 
across the channel at the American continent, the island's own frontier, a blank slate for 
expansion, as an endless supply of raw materials and wilderness land. That trench maybe be an 
absolute ideological boundary separating the Utopians from the Americans, but it is a frontier 
inasmuch as it is a horizon of expansion. 
In essence, the island of Utopia repeats its foundational conditions through its colonial 
expansion.96 Yet the terms from Book I now experience an ironic displacement in Book II. In 
Book I, English enclosure turns land into waste; in Book II, Utopian expansion turns wasteland 
into the common. Wasteland, to the Utopians, means land that has not been brought under 
common Utopian rationality. Here, then, are the traces of Utopia's forgotten beginning. The 
perfect island posits its own blank slate on the American mainland, much as King Utopos—the 
builder of trenches—wiped his homeland's slate clean with a massive public infrastructure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  See Jameson's "Morus: The Generic Window" in Archaeologies of the Future.	  96	  Jeffery Knapp attacks the problem of Utopian colonialism from the perspective of England's 
troubled relationship with the New World. He writes, "Yet, instead of canceling the accusation 
that the colonialism of Utopia is either equivocal or ambivalent, this difference between European 
and Utopian expansionism seems to confirm the charge. For More advocates colonialism only 
when it is associated with negatives, when it both derives from Nowhere and seeks, in the 
Utopian stipulation, land inane ac uacuum, idle and waste. And then not even these two negatives 
can turn colonialism into a fully English option. The Utopians choose wasteland "on the mainland 
nearest them"; as the Yale editors of Utopia point out, the nearest mainland to England was 
Europe, "but where were the waste places?" (More, CW 4:416). The answer is: in the opposite 
direction." (Knapp 24-5). Knapp here focuses on colonization when he should actually be 
focusing on enclosure; America as unenclosed and waste (a rhetorical strategy picked up by 
Locke) in relation, not to England's failed colonial enterprises (because 1516 is way to early to 
bemoan American colonial failure), but rather in relation to the ongoing enclosure in England. 
Knapp mentions enclosure in passing at the end of the section, but he misses More's own ironic 
reversal of the concepts of waste and enclosure. 
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project. From this perspective, the poem that opens More's volume reads quite differently: "Plato's 
Republic now I claim / To match, or beat at its own game; / For that was just a myth in prose, / 
But what he wrote of, I became." In Utopia, America becomes the blank slate, the tabula rasa that 
Plato's philosopher-kings insist on as the baseline for political philosophy. 
This is More's paradox: he constructs his critique of enclosure upon the erasure of the 
American continent. The cartographic opening that, in turn, opens newfound lands upon which 
Europe can develop its Enlightenment reason arises only via the geographic erasure of a 
continent. More, the great parodist of English enclosure, actually ends up foreclosing America in 
the articulation of his critique. Yet there still exists something timeless, placeless—uchronic, 
utopic—about this imaginary island and the tradition it births. We can understand the urge to 
ground More's satirical text in the reality of Andean communism, to prove some kind of 
historical, material basis for the rational and inevitable expansion of a just collective society. Yet 
just as an excessive fidelity to utopia's neutrality can blind us to the positive and negative 
conditions that allow the concept to enter the world, so too can an excessive fidelity to utopia's 
materiality encourage us to petrify a presumed actually-existing utopian moment as a lost Golden 
Age. What, then, is utopia's universal core? It is a claim that exceeds More, that animates 
Mariátegui, that energizes an entire tradition of real American responses to utopian Americas 
dreamed by others.97 It is this very claim to an unenclosed commons, a radical equality that insists 
on the inclusive right of culture, land and life. As Marin warns, this concept's exhaustion becomes 
apparent in its earliest formulations: if this claim becomes petrified, it encourages the totalitarian 
impulse, the persistent and seductive attempt to finally and ultimately enclose life, land and 
culture. There is always a danger that the utopian horizon will foreclose upon itself, that utopian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  See Adorno's Guaman Poma: Writing and Resistance in Colonial Peru.	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dreams will erase material realities. But this is precisely what America spurs. When we account 
for America, it turns our concept of utopia inside-out, it opens the enclosed, it insists on the 
commons. We reveal the continent that More made vanish, and by doing so, we open the concept 
of utopia once again to those material dreams that ground themselves in struggles over the topos 
itself. More's Utopia is a defense of the English commons and a satire of the excesses of 
enclosure; when we connect that project with the portrait of the perfect republic in Utopia's 
second book, it is not a stretch to say that Utopia is a defense of the commons. If enclosure is the 
erasure of the commons, and More's utopian textual operation erases America in its positing of a 
blank slate, an examination of that process of enclosure and appropriation in the New World 
seems to be of the essence. This will be the task of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
APPROPRIATION AND ENCLOSURE IN THE NEW WORLD 
 
"In the beginning, there was fence..." Jost Trier, quoted in Schmitt's Nomos p. 74 
 
In the beginning, there was fence. So says Carl Schmitt in his Nomos of the Earth. Yet was 
there ever, and will there ever be, a moment in human history without fences? What exactly 
begins with the fence, with enclosure? That is the question I will address in this chapter, and I will 
focus on how a constellation of Andean thinkers have used chronicles, fiction, journalism, and 
theoretical inquiry to answer it. I begin with the novelist Manuel Scorza, whose Redoble por 
Rancas narrates the arrival of a fence in a Peruvian community. What is the connection between 
that fence and the community? I then continue to analyze the relationship between fence-as- 
concept and the conquest of the Americas. This line of questioning leads me to consider the role 
of fence and enclosure—especially enclosure in the Americas—in John Locke's theory of 
property. Although Locke uses America as a certain kind of blank slate over which liberalism will 
unfold, his own sources betray a very different America. This America—in the Andes, 
especially—is grounded in the material reality of conquest. Yet if this reality counters Locke's 
American blank slate with a history of appropriation, it also participates in its own species of 
utopianism, namely, a Golden Age of Incan communism. One could say this process substitutes a 
land problem for an identity problem: the insistence in an unenclosed Incan commons actually 
rests upon a closed, homogenous identity. Is it possible to conceive of a commons that is both 
materially and subjectively open? 
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I Fence Arrives 
Manuel Scorza (Lima, 1928; Madrid, 1983), in his 1970 novel Redoble por Rancas, gives 
us the origin story of a very particular fence. No fence, no enclosure, is created ex nihlio. In 
Rancas, the tiny, high altitude, subsistence agricultural community in the Peruvian Department of 
Cerro de Pasco, the Fence arrives.  
Redoble por Rancas tell, in essence, two stories. Each story is told in alternate chapters, in 
what has best been described as a narrative double helix. The first story, told in the odd- 
numbered chapters, is that of the impending, and finally frustrated, confrontation between Héctor 
Chacón "el Nictálope" and Judge Montenegro. The second, told in the even-numbered chapters, is 
that of the parallel confrontation between the comuneros of Rancas and the multinational Cerro de 
Pasco Corporation; the latter's presence manifested through the corporation's goons and the 
anthropomorphized fence they install in the cover of darkness.  
Scorza's novel is the first installment in his five-part cycle La guerra silenciosa which, in 
its totality, attempts to represent the struggles of the inhabitants of the Department of Cerro de 
Pasco as they fight to recuperate control and ownership of their communal lands from the 
Peruvian government and multinational mining interests. In the novelistic cycle, Scorza 
fictionalizes and dramatizes historical events that took place in Cerro de Pasco between the late 
1950s and the mid 1960s.  
Until recently, most of the critical attention directed towards Scorza's work developed 
under the rubric of neoindigenismo. Scorza's cycle narrates the intrusion of multinational capital 
into the life of communally-orientated villages in the Andes; in this aspect, the novels fall into the 
category of Latin American indigenismo: literature written by Western-educated Latin Americans 
that take as their subject matter the native population, in Scorza's case, the Peruvian Amerindians. 
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Yet Scorza incorporates much of the formal innovation that marked the Latin American Boom: 
novels like Gabriel García Márquez's Cien años de soledad which, through narrative 
experimentation and stylistic modes such as magical realism, found an international audience and 
solidified a recognizable and marketable "Latin American aesthetic." 
Thus the critical appraisal of Scorza's work, particularly that of La guerra silenciosa, has 
revolved around the questions of narrative heterogeneity and the problem of subaltern 
representation. In Antonio Cornejo Polar's estimation, La guerra silenciosa is a fundamentally 
heterogeneous work, in that it employs Western narrative forms in order to tell an Andean (i.e. 
non-Western) story.98 Others have questioned whether Scorza's "strange" elements arise 
organically from an Andean cosmovision or whether they are imported from the internationally 
successful magical realist novels; in other words: whether Scorza merely imposes the imported 
model of magical realism on Andean reality, or whether the "fantastic" events he narrates have 
some organic connection to the Andean world he represents.99 
But this does not seem to be the most interesting line of criticism with which to approach 
Scorza's work. What is worth rescuing from Rancas is the arrival of the Fence. In the novel, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  Cornejo Polar describes the essential aspects of indigenismo: "su heterogeneidad conflictiva, 
que es el resultado inevitable de una operación literaria que pone en relación asimétrica dos 
universos socioculturales distintos y opuestos, uno de los cuales es el indígena (al que 
corresponde la instancia referencial), mientras que el otro (del que dependen las instancias 
productivas, textuales y de recepción) está situado en el sector más moderno y occidentalizado de 
la sociedad peruana. Esta contradicción interna reproduce la contradicción básica de los países 
andinos" (Cornejo Polar, "Neoindigenismo" 550). 99	  An exception to this is Natalio Ohanna's reading of Rancas that faults Scorza for his 
"homogenizing tendency," which Ohanna locates in Scorza's utilization of literary techniques 
associated with the international style of the Boom. Ohanna seems to have a different 
understanding of "heterogeneity" even though he quotes extensively from Cornejo Polar: Ohanna 
believes that Peruvian novelists must intentionally produce heterogeneous narratives in order to 
represent Peru in narrative, and he ultimately points toward the testimonio as the literary form 
most adequate for this task. Other theorists of Peruvian heterogeneity understand the causal chain 
to flow in the other direction: it is the heterogeneity of Andean life that manifests itself—even in 
unintentional ways—in Peruvian literary production. Thus heterogeneity is not the goal of 
Andean literary production, it is an analytic category used to understand literary phenomena. 
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Fence itself becomes a character; indeed, it becomes the principle antagonist of the second 
narrative thread, parallel to Judge Montenegro—the greedy and corrupt sub-official—in the first 
thread. Scorza presents the Fence as an invading organism that rips a tear through the fabric of 
communal Andean life, yet what is more interesting is that the novel details the Fence's arrival in 
the community. The Fence first appears in an inchoate state, transported via that other hallmark of 
modernity's late arrival to savage frontier: the railroad.100 The train "vomits" forth a group of 
unknown men, men who we later learn, after some speculation and rumors, work for the Cerro de 
Pasco Corporation, a multinational mining company. The men unload rolls of wire; after a brief 
lunch, they begin digging post holes. At first, the ranqueños watch, amused, at the Fence (from 
this point on in the story, always capitalized as a proper noun) wraps its way around Huiska, one 
of the barren peaks in the region: "Huiska is a barren peak. It hides no minerals. It has no water. It 
refuses to even grow the most miserable grass. Why enclose it? With its barbed- wire necklace 
Huiska looked like a cow shoved into a corral. The comuneros almost died laughing" (Drums 24, 
translation slightly modified).101 
Soon, however, the comuneros' laughter dies down, as the Fence grows kilometers daily 
and devours everything in its path. It becomes a voracious worm that gobbles up lakes, peaks, and 
even towns. Locals must now walk kilometers along the length of the fence simply to traverse 
their villages: "Now the land, all the land, was growing old as a spinster behind a fence that no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  Scorza makes the requisite nod to Cien años de soledad: "En Rancas nunca sucedió nada. 
Mejor dicho, nunca sucedió nada hasta que llegó un tren" (Rancas 171). 101	  "El Huiska es un cerro pelado que no esconde mineral, ni ojo de agua, ni tolera el más mísero 
pasto. ¿Para qué encerrarlo? Con su collar de alambre el Huiska parecía una vaca metida en un 
corral. Se murieron de risa" (Rancas 179). All translations are Edith Grossman's (Drums for 
Rancas). The page number in the body of the text refers to Grossman's translation; the page 
number in the footnote refers to the original Spanish in the Cátedra edition. 
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man's feet could follow. The closest villages were days away" (Drums 181).102 Sheep, trapped 
within the confines of the enclosed land, begin to die of starvation: "The highway to Cerro de 
Pasco was a sixty-mile-long necklace strung with dying sheep. Starving herds chewed the last 
blades of grass growing on the narrow strips of land tolerated by the Fence on either side of the 
highway. That grass lasted two weeks. The third week the livestock began to die. By the fourth 
week one hundred eighty sheep had died; by the fifth, three hundred twenty; by the sixth, three 
thousand" (Drums 73).103 
Strangely enough, as the Fence transforms from eyesore to existential threat to the 
comuneros, it becomes increasingly invisible to the upper classes of the Department. In one of 
Scorza's more Márquez-esque flourishes, he described a "blindness epidemic" that ravages the 
rich folk of the Department: 
No one ever learned why an epidemic attacked Cerro de Pasco. An unknown virus 
infected the eyes of its citizens. Apparently the victims enjoyed perfect vision 
except for a mysterious partial blindness that made certain objects invisible to 
them. A patient affected by the disease, who was able to describe, for example, the 
spots on a sheep half a mile away, could not see a fence at a distance of one 
hundred yards (Drums 159-60).104 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	   "Ahora la tierra, toda tierra conocida, envejecía soltera detrás de un cerco que los pies de 
ningún human eran capaces de seguir. Los pueblos más cercanos distaban jornadas" (Rancas 
342). 103	  "La carretera a Cerro de Pasco era un collar de cien kilómetros de ovejas moribundas. Rebaños 
famélicos rascaban las últimas matas en las estrecheces que, a cada lado de la carretera, toleraba 
la imperiosidad del Cerco. Ese pasto duró dos semanas. La tercera el ganado empezó a morir. La 
cuarta semana fallecieron ciento ochenta ovejas; la quinta, trescientas veinte; la sexta, tres mil" 
(Rancas 232).	  104	  "Nunca se supo por qué una epidemia azotó Cerro de Pasco. Un desconocido virus infectó los 
ojos de los habitantes. Aparentemente, las víctimas gozaban de la integridad de su visión, pero un 
novedoso daltonismo les escamoteaba algunos objetos. Un enfermo capaz de señalar, por 
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As Scorza spins out the absurd tale over several pages, he suggests—reporting rumors overheard 
amongst the town gossips—that the blindness was caused by a fruit-born virus from peaches and 
plantains imported from the Amazon; since the poor comuneros could not afford such delicacies, 
this explained their immunity to the disease. And thanks to the convenient blindness of almost all 
of the officials in the Department, the Fence continues to grow, and the comuneros find 
themselves radicalized to the point of political action. At that point, the comuneros do indeed 
become visible to the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, but only in the form of targets: the novel ends 
with the Corporation's massacre of the protesting commoners. 
Yet for all of its feigned invisibility, the Fence brings a new sense of order and measure to 
Cerro de Pasco. As Rodriguez Ortiz has observed, it is the one object capable of universalizing, 
equalizing, and quantifying the indefinite proliferations of geographic names: 
Especially for a reader unfamiliar with Peruvian geography, the plurality of names 
and the geographic breadth creates a certain reality effect by way of an ambiguity 
that synthesizes the many distinct spaces: Rancas, Yanacocha, Yurscayan, 
Huariaca, Tambopampa, Huancayo, Cauta, Piscapuquio, are a few of the 
recognizable names that upon first glance appear to presuppose their (rarely 
indicated) geography proximity, but also the wide open space of rhetorical effects 
in the text. All of these multiple spaces become one thanks to the limiting presence 
of a fence erected by the mining company, and what becomes singular and reduced 
in its configuration (an anonymous company run by foreign capital and capitalists) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ejemplo, las manchas de una oveja a un kilómetro, era incapaz de distinguir un cerco situado a 
cien metros" (Rancas 321).	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imposes a limit upon what is in reality unlimited.105 
Of course, the question of whether that unlimited and overlapping world needed to be limited and 
measured is of another order. 
The Fence does the work of enclosure: not only does it serve as the visual reminder and 
material codification of that line between mine and thine, but furthermore it creates a new metric 
that robs the land of its social past and erases the history of communal practices that had 
previously constituted the place. In pretending that the communal lands were available for 
enclosure and appropriation in the first place, the fence creates its own myth of wilderness, 
wasteland, and frontier that it posits and erases. 'Before my arrival,' Scorza's anthropomorphized 
Fence seems to proclaim, 'there was an infinite, immeasurable, and unknowable expanse of 
wilderness. I bring reason and measure.' So says the Fence, but the Fence—even as it tames the 
slovenly wilderness—gives neither of bird nor of bush. Indeed, it is Wallace Stevens' "Anecdote 
of the Jar" that seems best to reflect the process Scorza dramatizes: 
I placed a jar in Tennessee, And round it was, upon a hill. 
It made the slovenly wilderness 
Surround that hill. 
 
The wilderness rose up to it, 
And sprawled around, no longer wild.  
The jar was round upon the ground  
And tall and of a port in air. 
 
It took dominion every where.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  "La pluralidad de nombres, especialmente para el lector ajeno a la geografía peruana, la 
amplitud geográfica crea un especial efecto de realidad por medio de una ambigüedad que 
sintetiza lo distinto: Rancas, Yanacocha, Yurscayan, Huariaca, Tambopampa, Huancayo, Cauta, 
Piscapuquio, son algunos de los nombres identificables después de un rastreo que pareciera 
presuponer su cercanía (indicada pocas veces) geográfica o mensurable, pero también el espacio 
abierto de efectos retóricos en el discurso del texto. En el fondo todas esas localidades llegan a ser 
una sola por la presencia limitante de un cerco tendido por la compañía minera, y lo que es uno y 
reducido en su configuración (una compañía anónima con capitales, capitalista y cabezas fuera del 
Perú) impone una limitación a lo realmente ilimitado" (Rodriguez Ortiz 106; my translation).	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The jar was gray and bare. 
It did not give of bird or bush,  
Like nothing else in Tennessee.106 
 
What Scorza shows is that the "wilderness," the commons land of the comuneros is precisely not 
slovenly, and that "dominion," or in this case, enclosure, robs the land of its fecundity. Fence can 
only measure itself; in drawing the line of measure, it erases the community. Enclosure is always 
a process; if fence can ever serve as origin, it is only via some form of appropriation and erasure. 
Yet some critics interpret Rancas and La guerra silenciosa as a whole as a literary failure, 
especially in light of the author's stated intentions in the prologue to produce "the exasperatingly 
real account of a lonely battle"107 and his position as more of a "witness" than a "novelist."108 
According to these critics, Scorza works himself into a (static, non-dialectic) corner while trying 
to negotiate the two distinct traditions of the indigenista novel, on the one hand, and the Boom 
novel, on the other. So while he may employ a savage irony in the portrayal of the real injustices 
suffered by the comuneros (the blindness epidemic, for instance), the fantastic/magical realist 
register in which he operates leave Scorza without any way to attack the concrete contradictions 
he details. Losada sees this process as ultimately culminating in an ahistorical position that robs 
Scorza's characters of any agency: "Scorza is not interested in action, but rather in singular 
moments, almost fully independent of context, that give a static tableaux of a spiritual situation 
[...] He does not establish a unity of action, but rather moments independent of any action, or 
actually a series of superimposed moments that, in sum, make up an dehumanized state of 
indefinition; not a life but rather an Erlibnis."109 This critique, then, is as political as it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anecdote_of_the_Jar>.	  107	  "la crónica exasperantemente real de una lucha solitaria" (Rancas 149).	  108	  "Más que un novelista, el autor es un testigo" (Rancas 149).	  109	  "No le interesará la acción sino diversos momentos, independientes casi del contexto, que 
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aesthetic: from his "heterogeneity" (to use Cornejo's formulation), Scorza can only approach "the 
people" i.e. the comuneros from an ahistorical position that appeals to timeless myth and fantasy 
in the explanation of reality. 
Moraña takes this line of criticism even further: she accuses Scorza's work of ideological 
folly. Scorza's cycle—as exemplified in Rancas—presents an ideological justification of defeat; 
according to her reading, the mythical-fantastic, far from deconstructing the dominant ideological 
vision (represented by the arrival of the Fence, the train, and the Cerro de Pasco Corporation), 
rather superimposes that ideological vision on the comueros themselves. The very cyclical and 
fantastic nature of the novel cycle—where each attempt at organized resistance ends with a 
massacre—in a sense conforms to dominant ideology because it presents defeat itself as the 
inevitable and timeless confirmation of an eternally recurrent myth. In a word: it is power itself, 
according to Moraña, that becomes mythologized in Scorza's novels. Expanding on Loasada, she 
advances: "'It is a vacillating, distant, and troubled petty bourgeois consciousness which produces 
a mythic conceptualization of power and solidifies history and class struggle in the neutral plane 
of fantasy."110 
In Moraña's reading, the neutralization of struggle is, again, an ideological operation. This 
position seems to posit a different location from which an escape from ideology is possible; it 
would not be, then, a question of telling better stories but rather of correct empirical confirmation. 
How to correctly represent the comuneros' struggle against the Fence? This question directly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
muestran estáticamente una situación espiritual [...] No establece la unidad de la acción, sino 
momentos independientes de ésta, o mejor, momentos superpuestos que constituyen, todos, un 
mismo estado indefinido, deshumanizado, no una vida sino una vivencia" (Losada 110-111, my 
translation). 110	  "'Es la conciencia de la vacilante, lejana, e inquieta pequeña burguesía' que produce una 
conceptualización mítica del poder y estatiza la historia y la lucha de clases en el plano neutral de 
la fantasía" (Moraña 185, my translation).	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attacks the problem of narrating the story of a historical defeat while maintaining open the 
possibility of radical change. And, as I develop in the course of this project, that problematic 
involves revealing the appropriation and enclosure (or, in Marxist terms, the primitive 
accumulation) that lies beneath and behind utopian projections onto American soil. Yet the 
second part of the problem—insisting on the possibility of radical change—also functions within 
a utopian logic, although a utopian logic that remains open to the possibility of radical change 
cannot be based on any kind of previous enclosure. So the question becomes: can there be a 
utopian concept of commons that is not based on enclosure? 
Moraña, of course, does not argue that Scorza's novel participates in any kind of 
enclosure; her point is that Scorza's myth-making forecloses the possibility of radical change by 
removing Rancas and the comuneros from history itself. One could argue, however, that Scorza's 
presentation of power is mythologizing because the Fence itself is a mythological creature: it 
creates its own origin story by erasing the past and imposing itself as the only proper way to 
measure and understand the very world which it has brought into being. In understanding Fence 
as an act of appropriation and erasure, we uncover enclosure as both the flip side to utopia and its 
enacting gesture. Given the structural link between utopia and enclosure,111 perhaps Louis Marin's 
formulation is pertinent: utopia is best understood as an ideological critique of ideology.112 
Scorza's novel is valuable in that it makes visible the appropriation and enclosure that unroll 
themselves with each kilometer of the Fence. The Fence, analogously, represents the erasure of 
the comuneros' land; more generally, Fence erases the commons. For better or for worse, Scorza 
does not counter the dystopian Fence and the Cerro de Pasco Corporation behind it with a utopian 
appeal to a Golden Age of Incan communism (an appeal that, as we shall see, has made various 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  See chapter two, "Utopia Emergence and the Myth of an American Blank Slate."	  112	  See "Disneyland: Utopic Degeneration" in Louis Marin's Utopics.	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appearances in post-Conquest Andean life). Scorza does, however, insist that there is something 
before the existence of Fence, and he names that thing community. 
 
II Conquest and Nomos 
Scorza's literary intervention is indubitably political. He is concerned with a particular 
injustice: that of a liberalizing state and a multi-national corporation presenting the communal 
lands of the Andean highlands as a blank slate to be enclosed and improved. Yet the question of 
Fence opens up to an ontological problem at the heart of the process of appropriation and 
enclosure in the New World. Simply put: does Fence precede community? Rancas highlights how 
a specific community—the comuneros—precedes the arrival of a particular Fence; but what of 
Fence-as-such? Is the idea of an unenclosed commons a utopian fantasy, a mythologized 
ideology? To consider this broader question, I will turn to one of the more problematic yet 
important thinkers of the emergence of the New World: Carl Schmitt. Although Schmitt has not 
been traditionally recognized as a key thinker of the conquest of the Americas, he is one of the 
few theorists of international law to insist on the centrality of the emergence of the New World— 
both as location and as concept—to the development of the modern era of secular nation-states. 
Thus his importance; he is a problematic thinker because he, like many of the philosophers and 
legal scholars he cites, actually ends up erasing and concealing America in his account of the 
nomos of the Earth. 
Schmitt's key point in the first sections of The Nomos of the Earth in the International 
Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum is that land appropriation is the primeval act of all possible 
law. It is the relationship between this assertion and the historical act of sixteenth-century land 
appropriation in America that I will examine in detail, but first, a brief outline of Schmitt's overall 
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project in Nomos. That project takes the form of a historical and philosophical investigation into 
the origins and developments of the European concept of international law, yet it also serves the 
function of a eulogy for the passing of that order in the wake of two World Wars. Schmitt believes 
the "bracketing of war" within the European order of nation-states to be the chief, heroic 
accomplishment of international law and global politics in the modern era; the disintegration of 
that system and the seeming vacuum (in the late 1940s, but still visible today) it left represent, 
consequently, the most significant challenge to the maintenance of world peace since the religious 
and civil wars that plagued Europe during the period of Medieval anarchy. The text has four 
major sections. The first advances the centrality of land appropriation as the ontological, 
historical, and legal ground for any political/social ordering of human life. The second section 
argues for the centrality of the sixteenth-century land appropriation of the Americas as the 
foundational and defining moment of what will develop into the Jus Publicum Europaeum, or the 
European concept of international law based on the "bracketing" of war. The third section details 
the functioning of that particular nomos, both in legal and philosophical terms. The final section 
documents the disintegration of the European Spatial Order and imagines what possible nomos 
could take its place. 
As Schmitt argues that any spatial order has at its root a division of land, the priority he 
gives to the act of enclosure is understandable. Indeed, Schmitt opens his text with a direct appeal 
to the mythological foundation of law and justice in the land itself. Justice and law arise from the 
earth in a threefold fashion, he states: First, the law within the earth—the earth's inner measure—
is the justice of growth and harvest. Second, the natural demarcation of human cultivation—the 
tilled soil, the rotated crops—is the law manifest upon the earth. Finally, fences visualize human 
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power and domination: Fence is the law sustained above the earth.113 
Yet Schmitt does not settle on the mythical invocation of original appropriation, nor does 
he posit a "state of nature" as an intellectual construct. No, he declares, appropriation is a 
historical event: "Not only logically, but also historically, land-appropriation precedes the order 
that follows from it. It constitutes the original spatial order, the source of all further concrete order 
and all further law. It is the reproductive root in the normative order of history" (Nomos 48). Thus 
appropriation is at once the primeval source of order and, in any given circumstance, the 
particular historical event and legal fact (Nomos 46) that gives rise to radical legal title: 
Nomos is the immediate form in which the political and social order of a people 
becomes spatially visible—the initial measure and division of pasture-land, i.e., the 
land-appropriation as well as the concrete order contained in it and following from 
it. In Kant's words, it is the 'distributive law of mine and thine,' or, to use an 
English term that expresses it so well, it is the 'radical title.' Nomos is the measure 
by which the land in a particular order is divided and situated; it is also the form of 
political, social, and religious order determined by this process. Here, measure, 
order, and form constitute a spatially concrete unity. The nomos by which a tribe, a 
retinue, or a people becomes settled, i.e., by which it becomes historically situated 
and turns a part of the earth's surface into the force-field of a particular order, 
becomes visible in the appropriation of land and in the founding of a city or a 
colony (Nomos 70). 
To the logical, legal, and historical primacy of Fence, we might add the ontological priority that 
Schmitt affords it. In short, Schmitt's answer to the question we have posed is clear: Fence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  See "Law as a Unity of Order and Orientation," Nomos 42-9.	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absolutely precedes community. So, then: what was before Fence? 
Given Schmitt's dual interest in land-appropriation—as mythological origin and the root of 
the normative order of history—it is not surprising that he turns to the conquest of the Americas 
as the prime example of originary appropriation. For it is the European conquest of the Americas 
that makes a truly global spatial order possible: "The originally terrestrial world was altered in the 
Age of Discovery, when the earth first was encompassed and measured by the global 
consciousness of European peoples" (Nomos 49). The emergence of America in European 
consciousness allows for a planetary concept of a spatial order based on scientific measurement; 
in fact, scientific measurement will prove to be the most powerful justification in Schmitt's 
argument for the European conquest itself. 
Schmitt's invocation of the European conquest of the Americas as the key moment in the 
shift from a medieval-mythological to a modern-scientific consciousness is not a claim uniquely 
his own; Koyre's thesis of the shift from a closed world to an infinite universe presents a popular 
version of that same argument.114 Yet for Schmitt, there is a particular and uniquely European link 
between discovery, conquest, and measurement which, when combined, results in a just land-
appropriation capable of sustaining a new nomos. As Bruno Bosteels points out, when Schmitt 
posits the European conquest of the New World as the legendary, unrepeatable historic event that 
stands as the paragon of authentic land appropriation, his only justification lies in the assertion of 
the empirical success of European conquest.115 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  See Alexandre Koyre, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe. 115	  "All that Schmitt has to offer by way of an answer [for the legitimacy of European land- 
appropriation in the Americas], however, seems to be the success and lasting force of actual fact, 
followed by a circular reassertion of the premise behind his geopolitical ontology: 'not every 
invasion or temporary occupation is a land appropriation that founds an order. In world history, 
there have been many acts of force that have destroyed themselves quickly. Thus, every seizure of 
land is not a nomos, although conversely, nomos, understood in our sense of the term, always 
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When reduced to its core, Schmitt's argument sounds rather brutish and banal: Europe 
conquered and measured America,116 while America neither conquered Europe nor measured its 
own continent to the (nascent, modern) standards of European science. Therefore America could 
never have conquered Europe nor measured its own land. Since land must be conquered and 
measured (how else to understand appropriation?) in order to establish any nomos whatsoever, the 
ex post facto empirical European superiority justifies European conquest and enclosure itself.117 
That is not to say the Schmitt dismisses the complex problem of justification and 
reciprocity; on the contrary, he dedicates a substantial section of Nomos to Francisco Vitoria, one 
of the key Spanish participants in the sixteenth-century debate over the justification of the 
conquest and the ontological status of the Amerindians. Schmitt argues that Vitoria is a key 
transitional figure, a theologian who represents Medieval Christianity's final attempt to found 
international law in justa causa doctrine. For Schmitt, the shift from justa causa—just cause—to 
justus hostis—just enemy—is the seed that flowers into the European Spatial Order.118 Only 
when the European powers worry about the ontological status of the enemy, as opposed to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
includes a land-based order and orientation' (Nomos 80). How long should a brutal use of force 
last, one is tempted to ask, before it qualifies as a legitimate act of founding law? There more 
important question, however, remains: Who is to say?" (Rasch 302).	  116	  "The originally terrestrial world was altered in the Age of Discovery, when the earth first was 
encompassed and measured by the global consciousness of European peoples" (Nomos 49). 117	  In Schmitt's own words, "It was an achievement of newly awakened Occidental rationalism, 
the product of an intellectual and scientific culture that arose in the European Middle Ages, with 
the necessary assistance of systems of thought that had reconstituted classical European and 
Arabic thinking in Christian terms, and had molded it into a great historical power. [...] Thus, it is 
completely false to claim that, just as the Spaniards had discovered the Aztecs and the Incas, so 
the latter could have discovered Europe. The Indians lacked the scientific power of Christian- 
European rationality. It is a ludicrous anachronism to suggest that they could have made 
cartographical surveys of Europe as accurate as those Europeans made of America. The 
intellectual advantage was entirely on the European side, so much so that the New World simply 
could be 'taken,' whereas, in the non-Christian Old World of Asia and Islamic Africa, it was 
possible only to establish subjugated regimes and European extraterritoriality" (Nomos 132).	  118	  "The ability to recognize a justus hostis is the beginning of all international law" (Nomos 52).	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theological and/or moral reasons for war, can war itself be "bracketed" within Europe. 
Vitoria fascinates Schmitt because the Spanish theologian sketches out a preliminary 
theory of universal reciprocity that gestures towards a justus hostis concept of war, but he does so 
from within the medieval framework of justa causa. Schmitt describes this strange intermediary 
position as Vitoria's "Scholastic objectivity." Christians and non-Christian, Vitoria argues, are 
equals in legal terms, and thus there is no direct right to appropriate the non-Christian lands of the 
New World. But Vitoria, according to Schmitt, goes even further: there is no ontological newness 
in the New World: "[Vitoria's] ahistorical objectivity goes so far that he ignores completely [...] 
the humanitarian concept of 'discovery' so laden with history in the modern view. From a moral 
standpoint, the New World for him was not new, and the moral problems it entailed could be 
handled by the immutable concepts and standards of his scholastic system of thought" (Nomos 
106). In other words: Vitoria arrives at true humanistic universality only by denying the event of 
the New World.119 
Schmitt, of course, takes the opposite position: the conquest is a truly singular event that 
inaugurates a new nomos. For Schmitt, reciprocity and objectivity are tied inextricably to Vitoria's 
scholastic position, and this blinds Vitoria to the newness of the New World. Yet Schmitt 
sacrifices Vitoria's attractive concept of universality, and thus Schmitt finds himself in the 
awkward position of consistently advancing claims for a "European" international order, i.e. an 
international order that does not recognize reciprocity between European nations and non- 
European nations (and thus dubious in its claim to be truly inter-national). As Schmitt himself 
argues, legal claims based on discovery "lay in a higher legitimacy" (Nomos 132); Schmitt rather 
cryptically suggests that said legitimacy lies in Europe's superiority, whether technological, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  119	  In this point, Vitoria finds an unexpected ally in Guaman Poma, who famously proclaimed 
"There was no conquest." 
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religious, moral, or some combination of the three. 
 
III Discovery or Enclosure? 
The reason Schmitt’s argument ultimately collapses into a brute claim of superiority is due 
to his use of “discovery” as a key analytic term in his understanding of the emergence of the 
European spatial order. Schmitt, as we have seen, dismisses Vitoria’s concept of reciprocity as a 
ludicrous anachronism; instead of proposing the hypothetical of a Amerindian “discovery” of 
Europe, Schmitt insists on the historic particularities of the ‘only discovery that ever was’: the 
“unrepeatable historical event” of the Americas.120 In this view, it is discovery as political- 
technological fact which grants the common European title of acquisition in the New World; 
Schmitt, against any form of “reciprocal” thinking—whether Scholastic like Victoria or 
modern/relativistic—asserts the “common European origin” of American land-appropriation. 
Yet it is here that Schmitt stumbles as a historical thinker. As Patricia Seed has argued, 
Europeans established colonial rule in the New World through a series of distinct ceremonial 
practices that carried enormous and varied—even within the emerging European international 
order—political meaning. Seed contrasts the Iberian logic of “discovery” with the English logic of 
improvement; Schmitt strategically ignores this distinction in order to focus on the transition in 
juridical and legal logic from a scholastic concept of justa causa to a modern concept of justi 
hostes. This transition in the ways European colonial powers formalized their claims of 
possession in the New World has implications for Schmitt’s own argument, and any other 
theorization of the process of enclosure and appropriation in the Americas. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  “Unrepeatable” with the following qualification: “Only in fantastic parallels can one imagine a 
modern recurrence, such as men on their way to the moon discovering a new and hitherto 
unknown planet that could be exploited freely and utilized effectively to relieve their struggles on 
earth” (Nomos 39).	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Seed outlines a general development in the ceremonies of possession that moves from the 
earliest Spanish claims based on the Requerimiento (a Scholastic juridical exercise that has its 
origins in the Spanish reconquest of the Iberian peninsula from Moorish occupation) through 
Portuguese claims based on navigational technology up to English arguments based on the 
enclosure and improvement of “waste” lands.121 It is the English concept of “improvement” that 
will come to dominate—over and above the Iberian claims of “discovery” that Schmitt seeks to 
emphasize—the legal register in which appropriation is understood in international law.122 
According to Seed, "sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century Englishmen usually 
constructed their right to occupy the New World on far more historically and culturally familiar 
grounds: building houses and fences and planting gardens. [...] Building the first house was 
critical to the initial stages of English settlement in the first place because of their cultural 
significance as registers of stability, historically carrying a significance of permanence missing 
even elsewhere in continental Europe" (Seed 18). That is to say: "Englishmen shared a unique 
understanding that fencing legitimately created exclusive private property ownership in the New 
World" (Seed 20). “Fencing” was synonymous with “improving;” both terms implied a process of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  See her Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640. In 
addition to the sections on the Spanish, Portuguese, and English examples discussed above, Seed 
also dedicates a chapter to French colonial possession that focuses on ceremony and performance, 
as well as a chapter to Dutch navigational techniques that develop from and ultimately replace 
Portuguese possession claims based on scientific superiority. 122	  Seed also illuminates a contrast between Portuguese-Dutch claims based on an immaterial 
conception of what today we would call proprietary technology, on the one hand, and the 
materially grounded English claims of improvement and enclosure of the land, on the other; this 
contrast is perhaps one of the earliest examples of the split between material and immaterial 
concepts of property that I will study in the second half of this dissertation. She argues, “Like 
modern technology or intellectual property rights, the Portuguese claimed a right to monopolize 
access to regions unattainable without the techniques they had pioneered” (Seed 102), and, later, 
“The Portuguese claims, repeatedly voiced in international conflicts, that they had right to a 
commercial monopoly on the seaborne trade with the new lands was an explicit claim that 
because of their vast expenditures on developing the science and technology of high-seas 
navigation, they had a just right to compensation” (Seed 130).	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the private enclosure of land for the purpose of sedentary agriculture (Seed 30). 
The very concept of  “improvement,” which will become the backbone of John Locke’s 
theory of property, rests on the logic of the American blank slate.123 More specifically, it rests on 
the early modern visions of the New World as a "localized" state of nature where man acted as 
wolf to man (according to Thomas Hobbes), or a living relic of the prehistory of society (as in 
John Locke's theory of property). In Locke’s Second Treatise, particularly, America exists as a 
pre-political wasteland to be enclosed and improved; it is in this spirit that Locke famously and 
enigmatically affirms “In the beginning, all the world was America.”124 As with Thomas More’s 
Utopia, America appears as a blank slate to be enclosed and cultivated. Yet the temporality of 
Locke’s utopian “state of nature” is quite distinct from More’s perfect non-place. 
More presents his island as a parallel world, and this parallel structure frames More’s 
entire text. On the European side, corresponding to Part One of Utopia, More sketches a satire of 
English enclosure; on the American side—Part Two—he erects a perfect contemporary society. 
These two worlds exist in the same historical instant: one of More’s primary contributions is 
bringing the myth of a lost Golden Age of humanity into a politically and historically 
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  Schmitt recognizes the role that the enclosure of the American continent plays in the English 
political theories of possession. Speaking of Thomas Hobbes, Schmitt states: “Hobbes obviously 
was influenced not only by the creedal civil wars in Europe, but also by the New World. He 
speaks of the 'state of nature,' but not at all in the sense of a spaceless utopia. His state of nature is 
a no man's land, but this does not mean it exists nowhere. It can be located, and Hobbes locates it, 
among other places, in the New World” (Nomos 96); regarding Locke: “Given the historical 
evaluations of Locke's doctrine of the state of nature and his model of society, also keep in mind 
the remarkable statement (made by an alleged rationalist at the beginning of the 18th  century) that 
best elucidates the historical and spatial context of his thought: 'In the beginning, all the world 
was America.' The astonishing transformation of consciousness that occurred toward the end of 
the century also affected notions of the state of nature and of their location in America: the New 
World” (Nomos 97). 124	  Schmitt calls Locke's statement that "In the beginning, all the world was America" a 
"remarkable" one because it condenses the growing early modern belief that America existed as a 
free zone to be appropriated. See Nomos 97.	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contemporary moment. John Locke, writing a century and a half later,125 returns to a mythical 
invocation of a past state of humanity in the construction of his theory of property and politics. 
But Locke, like More, leans heavily on the New World as an empirical fact in the construction of 
his argument. For Locke, Amerindians do not represent a parallel model of human organization, 
nor does the “discovery” of America serve as a heuristic tool to clear the philosophical slate. 
Instead, Locke looks to the descriptions of pre-Columbian American societies as a historical relic, 
as a petrified record of the pre-history of Europe. Locke’s utopia, which he calls the “state of 
nature,” is not satirical; on the contrary, Locke uses the idea of a pre-political America as a 
justification for European enclosure, at once justifying European appropriation in the New World 
and grounding the liberal theory of property on an invisible process of primitive accumulation. 
In the fifth chapter of his Second Treatise, commonly called "On Property," Locke 
purports to show how individuals can justly divide up what "God gave to mankind in common" 
without any express contract (Second Treatise § 25). That is to say, he must demonstrate a method 
of individual appropriation that historically predates organized/political society (which, for Locke, 
is based on an expressed contract). He begins by affirming, following various Biblical passages, 
that "Every man has a property in his own person." This implies that each person owns his/her 
own labor, and thus, "Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and 
left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby 
makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state nature placed it in, it hath 
by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men. For this 
labour bring the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what 
that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others" (§ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	  Locke published the Second Treatise, which contains the essay “On Property,” in 1689, 
although the date of composition remains a point of contention. 
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27). 
Locke elaborates that the hunter-gatherer appropriates through the labour of 
hunting/gathering: "That labour put a distinction between them and common: that added 
something to them more than nature, the common mother of all, had done; and so they became his 
private right"; and "The labour that was mine, removing them out of that common state they were 
in, hath fixed my property in them" (§ 28). This becomes his most primitive model for justifying 
private property: the appropriation of naturally occurring things through human labour. Whenever 
he invokes the "primitive" hunter/gatherer model, he has been implicitly referring to America. He 
quickly makes this reference explicit: "Thus this law of reason makes the deer that Indian's 
[Amerindian's] who hath killed it; it is allowed to be his goods who hath bestowed his labour 
upon it, though before it was the common right of everyone" (§ 30).126 
He then moves on to the more complex model of land appropriation. Man can appropriate 
the land itself through improvement, i.e. agriculture (§ 33); he names this process of agricultural 
appropriation enclosure: "He by his labour does, as it were, enclose it from the common" (§ 32). 
Enclosure via improvement continues as long as there is sufficient wasteland to be appropriated, 
and the model of wasteland is, again, America.127 He categorically states: "Thus in the beginning 
all the world was America" (§ 49). Even in John Locke's present, America continued to be 
"wasteland" available for improvement and appropriation. Indeed, Locke's entire theory of land 
appropriation through agricultural improvement rests upon the existence of a vast "wasteland" 
called America, sparsely populated by pre-political savages and available for almost unlimited 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  This "primitive appropriation" is limited by spoilage: "As much as anyone can make use of to 
any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in: whatever is 
beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others" (§ 31).	  127	  It is the invention of money via compact that allows man to get beyond the spoilage provision. 
The advent and function of the money economy is the main concern of the second half of "On 
Property" (§ 36-51). 
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appropriation by political—read: European—individuals. 
James Tully has described in detail the use Locke makes of America in the Second 
Treatise. The process is two-fold: first, Locke delegitimizes the existing forms of Amerindian 
political organization by positing a “so-called natural system of individual self-government.” 
Instead of a recognizable polity, Locke sees atomized hunter-gatherer individuals living in nature. 
This move, according to Tully, dispossesses Amerindian governments of their political authority, 
which in turn effectively preempts any attempt to negotiate land appropriations through treaties 
with sovereign nations. After Locke has delegitimized Amerindian political organization, he uses 
a similar strategy to delegitimize Amerindian claims to American land: “The Amerindian system 
of property over their traditional territory is denied and it is replaced by a so-called natural system 
of individual, labour-based property, thereby dispossessing Amerindians of their traditional lands 
and positing a vacancy which Europeans could and should use without the consent of the first 
nations" (Tully, "Property" 151). 
In effect, Locke's argument takes the form of a strange inversion of More's Utopia: The 
Amerindians live without private property in a primitive, pre-political utopia, and they actively 
need political European societies to colonize and enclose American lands in order to make 
politics a possibility (Tully, "Property"152). America may represent a savage utopia to Locke, but 
only in so far as utopia is equivalent to an apolitical wasteland.128 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  128	  Tully describes the ideological stakes of Locke's argument: "It seems clear, therefore, that the 
central sections on labour, value, and commodities are designed to legitimate and to celebrate the 
superiority of English colonial market agriculture over the Amerindian hunting, gathering, and 
replacement agriculture that it forcibly displaced. The destruction of centuries-old native 
American socio-economic organizations and the imperial imposition of commercial agriculture is 
made to appear as an inevitable and justifiable historical development. It is justified, according to 
Locke, because native Americans had no rights in the land, consented to the market system in 
agreeing to the use of money, and desired the change because the use of money changed their 
motivation. Furthermore, they are better off because the European market system produces 'more 
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Yet is America solely a wasteland to be colonized? It is not exactly clear what Locke 
means when he invokes America, nor is it clear if he is consistent in his own understanding of the 
word. In "On Property," Locke relies heavily on a vision of hunter-gatherer and non- sedentary 
agricultural societies in North America in his description of the originary "American" state of 
nature. But elsewhere, Locke makes direct references to Inca Garcilaso de la Vega's Comentarios 
reales in response to the rhetorical question "where are or ever were there any men in such a state 
of nature?"129 One can find examples of contemporary states of nature, Locke suggests, in the 
Peru that Garcilaso so thoroughly describes. In fact, a quick scan of the catalogue of Locke's 
library reveals that Locke had, in either English or French translations, copies of Gómara's 
History of the Conquest of New Spain and General History of the West Indies, Acosta's Natural 
and Moral History of the Indies, Las Casas' History of the West Indies, along with Inca 
Garcilaso's Royal Commentaries and History of Florida.130 
It is not ignorance, then, the leads Locke to ignore the significant pre-Columbian civil and 
political societies organized in Mesoamerica and the Andean region in his assertion that "Thus in 
the beginning all the world was America" (§ 49). According to Barbara Arneil, Locke makes 
deliberate omissions of relevant information from his source material. She argues, "Locke's 
descriptions of natural man, while drawn from accounts of Amerindians, were forced into a 
theoretical framework demanded by both the needs of his political philosophy and his moral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
conveniences'—a manifestly partial standard that continues to be issued down to this day to 
measure and legitimate the non-native soci-economic systems on North America" (Tully 
"Property"162).	  129	  "The promises and bargains for truck, &c. between the two men in the desert island, 
mentioned by Garcilaso de la Vega, in his history of Peru; or between a Swiss and an Indian, in 
the woods of America; are binding to them, though they are perfectly in a state of nature, in 
reference to one another: for truth and keeping of faith belongs to men as men, and not as 
members of society" (Second Treatise § 14).	  130	  See The Library of John Locke, Eds. Harrision and Laslett. 
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judgment of civil man; what did not fit was ignored" (Arneil 33).131 Locke's theory of property, 
founded upon a particularly English style of agricultural labour, at once excludes the Amerindian 
hunter-gatherer and the Spanish miner from any defensible claim to improvement, enclosure, or 
property (Arneil 102-3). For Locke, then, only enclosure of wasteland is capable of producing 
political space; this happens by appropriating a pre-political and utopian state of nature. The pre-
political state of nature, in turn, exists in the Americas.132 But Locke's own sources do not agree 
with his assessment of America as a pre-political, property-less state-of- nature. In fact, the very 
sources Locke employed have been mobilized to create an entirely opposite American utopia. 
Against Locke's delegitimization of Amerindian political sovereignty, these American utopians 
insist on a space that precedes European enclosure. 
 
IV Mariátegui's Inca 
Alberto Flores Galindo's In Search of an Inca (1986) is the most comprehensive critical 
study of this counter-colonial utopian tendency in the Andes. According to Flores Galindo, the 
Andean utopian tradition is connected to an identity. This identity finds its basis in an idealized 
concept of the Inca; as such, the Incan utopia breaks with More, as it returns non-place to a past 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  131	  Arneil details the example of Locke's use of Acosta; Locke, arguing against Filmer's elevation 
of hereditary monarchy to the best form of political organization, cites Acosta to argue that 
governments natural evolve towards consent and election. Yet Acosta actually chronicles many 
examples of American monarchy that arose from previous democracy. See Arneil 33-43. Vicki 
Hsueh, in a recent series of articles, compares Locke's vision of the Amerindian as expressed in 
the Second Treatise with the image sketched his notebooks and correspondence in his capacity 
proprietary administrator of colonial affairs.	  132	  Klausen has expanded this positions to its ultimate consequences: “Lockean liberalism not 
only thus enables and justifies settler-initiated colonialism; it ideologically requires it insofar as 
natural liberty relies on the availability of open space for full actualization” (“Room Enough” 
762) and “Lockean liberalism thus not only justifies the colonization of America but, furthermore, 
requires America’s open spaces for the realization of natural liberty’s potentiality” (“Room 
Enough” 768).	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Golden Age. Flores Galindo explains, "The Andean utopia was the project—or, better yet, 
projects—that confronted [Andean] reality, an attempt to reverse dependency and fragmentation, 
to search for an alternative path in the encounter between memory and the imaginary: the 
rebuilding of Inca society and the return of the Inca ruler. It was an effort to find in the 
reconstruction of the past a solution to their identity problems" (In Search 5). Far from Thomas 
More's pun about a perfect and non-existent place, the Incan utopia became ever-more locatable: 
it resided in the historical memory of Tahuantinsuyo. Flores Galindo elaborates: 
Andean people previously reconstructed the past and transformed it into an 
alternative to the present. This was and is a distinctive feature of the Andean 
utopia; the ideal city did not exist outside history or at the remote beginning of 
time. On the contrary, it was a real historic fact that had a name (Tahuantinsuyo); a 
ruling class (the Incas); and a capital (Cuzco). Andean people changed the 
particulars of this construction to imagine a kingdom without hunger, without 
exploitation, and where they ruled once again. It represented the end of disorder 
and darkness. Inca became an organizing idea or principle (In Search 27). 
In reaction to the nightmare of conquest and colonization, an inverted dreamworld 
emerged, and it was a world that preceded European enclosure. The imperial and expansionist 
policies of the brief pre-Colombian Incan hegemony became, in the popular imagination, a period 
of abundance, equity, equality, and health (In Search 53). This vision of an empirical historical 
Golden Age represents an imaginary response to a real conquest; one effect has been to put into 
high relief the political and ideological nature of interpretations of Incan and pre- Colombian 
history. 
The heterodox Peruvian Marxist José Carlos Mariátegui made one of the more subtle and 
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exciting uses of the myth of an Incan Golden Age. Mariátegui's thought, if anything, was 
grounded in the concrete historical situation of early twentieth-century Peru. Yet he realized the 
centrality of myth in the discourse of political and social change. In his "El hombre y el mito" 
("Man and Myth," 1925), Mariátegui reveals what he believes to be the universal consensus of 
any investigation into the "world crisis": "Bourgeois civilization suffers from a lack of a myth, of 
a faith, of a hope. That lack is the expression of its material bankruptcy."133 Furthermore, it is 
only myth that can animate man in a historical sense: "Myth moves man in history. Without myth 
man's existence lacks historical meaning. History possesses man and illuminates him with a 
superior belief, with a super-human faith; the rest of humanity is the anonymous chorus of this 
drama."134 
So, in Mariátegui's view, it is only a myth that can give human beings the orientation and 
strength necessary to follow a path of historical change; that is, to make history. And, for 
Mariátegui, "making history" had a clear and unambiguous meaning in his contemporary Peru: 
the inauguration of Peruvian socialism. 
Mariátegui constructed this myth throughout his extensive writings in registers as diverse 
as correspondent columns in periodicals, addresses to labor and political organizations, and 
editorials in his own publication, Amauta. His thought is eminently dialectical, combining the 
animating vision from the past with a revolutionary vision for the future. He conjugated a 
Marxist-based interpretation of Peruvian reality with a Sorelean-inflected promise of a coming 
revolution, while drawing inspiration from a Golden Age myth, and always keeping open a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  "La civilización burguesa sufre de la falta de un mito, de una fe, de una esperanza. Falta que es 
la expresión de su quiebra material" (Textos básicos [TB] 9, all translations my own).	  134	  "El mito mueve al hombre en la historia. Sin un mito la existencia del hombre no tiene ningún 
sentido histórico. La historia la hacen los hombres poseídos e iluminados por una creencia 
superior, por una esperanza super-humana; los demás hombres son el coro anónimo del drama" 
(TB 10).	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pathway between materialism and an Andean spiritual-magical sensibility. Thus, his vision of the 
Incan utopia rests in the background, shadowed by his commitment to a materialist analysis of 
contemporary Peruvian reality; it is this commitment—which effected his break with the Third 
International over issues of imperialism and race—that insulates Mariátegui from any charges of 
advancing a simplistic return to the golden past of Incan communism.135  
And yet, this Golden Age acts as ballast, lending gravity and equilibrium to his demands 
for Peruvian socialism. In perhaps his most famous revolutionary slogan, Mariátegui affirms: 
"Certainly, we do not wish that socialism in America be an imitation and a copy. It must be a 
heroic creation. We must, with our own reality and our own language, bring Indo-American 
socialism to life. This is a mission dignified enough for a new generation."136 Immediately 
preceding this expression of revolutionary independence and fidelity to the Peruvian situation 
(and not often included in the quotable aphorism), Mariátegui states, "The most advanced 
communist organization, primitive, recorded by history is the Incan."137 It is this mythical past, 
that of the world's first and most advanced communist society, which gives weight to the 
twentieth-century Andean revolutionaries. Incan communism, however, is not to be a model; it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135	  Flores Galindo accounts for Mariátegui's understanding of pre-Colombian Incan society: 
"Although Mariátegui did not write extensively about Inca society, arguments about agrarian 
communism were central to his work at large. According to him, the Incas did not use slaves, 
their society was not feudal, and the term 'socialist' was a blatant anachronism. Their society 
combined state organization, collective appropriation of goods and products, and developed 
agriculture. It was not primitive communism but rather agrarian communism. This suggested a 
peculiar historical formation: while Europe marched from slavery to feudalism, collectivism 
persisted in the Andes. The Spanish interrupted that history, but the collapse of the Inca state did 
not destroy ayllus, kinship groups whose silent and prolonged struggle persisted through peasant 
communities" (In Search 182-3).	  136	  "No queremos, ciertamente, que el socialismo sea en América calco y copia. Debe ser creación 
heroica. Tenemos que dar vida, con nuestra propia realidad, en nuestro propio lenguaje, al 
socialismo indo-americano. He aquí una misión digna de una generación nueva" (TB 127).	  137	  "La más avanzada organización comunista, primitiva, que registra la historia, es la inkaica" 
(TB 127). In my translation, I have remained faithful to the juxtaposition—if not the outright non-
sequitur—of "advanced" and "primitive."	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rather a guiding force that propels Peruvians forward in the knowledge that communism already 
reigned in the Andes. This is not without irony, as Mariátegui's understanding of pre-Colombian 
society looks very different than historical accounts such as Rostworowski's;138 his dedication to 
contemporary Peruvian reality and devotion to the coming revolution perhaps blinded him to the 
thoroughly imperial and authoritarian nature of the short-lived pre-Colombian Inca hegemony.139 
Perhaps the best way to understand the Incan side of Mariátegui's myth is to relate it to 
Walter Benjamin's concept of a dialectical image. Indeed, Aníbal Quijano has argued that 
Benjamin may be the "heterodox Marxist" who most closely resembles Mariátegui.140 For 
Benjamin, the dialectical image occurs when a historical moment snaps into a contemporary 
political setting, and the conjunction forms a "constellation" in which history awakens subjects 
and creates a moment of political possibility. The 'coming into focus' of a previous historical 
moment does not show history 'as it really was,' but rather crystalizes into a "now of 
recognizability" (Arcades Project N3,4 p.463). That is, an image—such as that of Incan 
communism—attains legibility at a particular time: this coming together into a constellation is 
itself the "dialectical image," and it is in the "now of recognizability" that an otherwise "archaic" 
image like that of Incan communism or ayllu democracy becomes "genuinely historical" (N3,1 p. 
463). Benjamin also expresses this idea that a Revolution can "quote" a previous historical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  138	  See Maria Rostworowski, History of the Inca Realm. 139	  When Mariátegui does address the unpalatable nature of Incan society to the contemporary 
revolutionary, he has this to say: "Teocrático y despótico fue, ciertamente, el régimen inkaico. 
Pero este es un rasgo común de todos los regímenes de la antigüedad" (TB 90).	  140	  In his introduction to Mariátegui's Textos básicos, Quijano argues, "El proceso de la reflexión 
mariateguiana puede ser emparentado más bien con el de Walter Benjamin, no solamente por esa 
peculiar tensión de una racionalidad que se niega al reduccionismo, sino también porque en 
ambos la revolución es pensada como una cuestión de redención, sin que esto desemboque, sin 
embargo, en un territorio extraño a la propia historia. De ese modo, en ambos, la materialización 
de la igualdad social, de la solidaridad, de la reciprocidad, del amor al prójimo, en la vida 
cotidiana de la sociedad, no se refiere a—ni depende de—ningún poder religiosos institucional" 
(TB x).	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moment in his Thesis on the Concept of History; in either case, the quotation is no simple 
repetition or recuperation, but rather an activation that allows current political actors to connect 
with a timeless spirit of struggle against oppression: 
It's not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present its light 
on what is past; rather, image is that wherein what has been comes together in a 
flash with the now to form a constellation. In other words, image is dialectics at a 
standstill. For while the relation of the present to the past is a purely temporal, 
continuous one, the relation of what-has-been to the now is dialectical: is not 
progression but image, suddenly emergent.—Only dialectical images are genuine 
images (that is, not archaic); and the place where one encounters them is language. 
Awakening." (N2a,3; p 462) 
Similarly, Cornejo describes the interaction between revolution and historical tradition in 
Mariátegui's thought: "Only from a revolutionary position is it possible to vindicate tradition and 
convert it, not into a museum piece, but rather into living history."141 
 
But Mariátegui faced a problem that was foreign to Benjamin: the persistence of the 
colonial encounter and the racially-charged feudalism it entailed. Thus, Mariátegui's famed Siete 
ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana, dedicated as it was to the empirical situation in 
inter-war Peru, presented a developed criticism of Peru's persistent and anachronistic feudal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  141	  "Sólo desde una posición revolucionaria es posible reivindicar la tradición y hacerlo como 
historia viva y no como pieza de museo" (Aire 187). Coronado also describes a similar operation 
in Mariátegui's thought: "For Mariátegui, Amauta described a project that distanced itself from the 
remote past at the same time that it renewed and deployed the forms it found therein. Thus the 
journal would take Incan history as a point of departure, but the past would not be its destination. 
In a move that characterizes Mariátegui's political positioning of culture, his choice of this title 
culls from the ashes of an old civilization the kindling necessary to ignite a new one" (Coronado 
28). 
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economy and society. The overarching problem, Mariátegui states, is the latifundio; but the 
solution is not the liberal-democratic one of breaking up the latifundios into small lots. The 
division of the large landholdings into smaller individuals lots, to be cultivated and managed by a 
new class of small landholders, is not "utopian, nor heretical, nor revolutionary, nor Bolshevik, 
nor avant-garde, but rather orthodox, constitutional, democratic, capitalist, and bourgeois."142 Like 
the Marxist he claims to be, Mariátegui rejects this liberal-individualist solution as antiquated 
given the global conditions of social and political revolution. Peru, furthermore, holds a distinct 
advantage over other colonial nations submerged in the feudal remnants of a neo- colonial 
situation: "The survival of the comunidades and various practical elements of socialism in 
indigenous agriculture and daily life."143 
The survival of the comunidad offers a provisional answer to that question Carl Schmitt 
was incapable of asking and that John Locke was successful in distorting: what preceded 
European enclosure of the New World? Mariátegui turns to Luís Valcárcel—one of the founders 
of the Peruvian indigenismo movement—to sketch an account of the Incan commons: "In the 
indigenous tradition, the earth is the common mother: from her entrails come not only the fruits of 
sustenance, but also man himself. The earth distributes all good. The cult of Mama Pacha is on 
par with sun-worship, and as the sun belongs to nobody in particular, neither does the planet."144 
Mariátegui separates the authoritarian aspect of Tahuantinsuyo from the socio-economic aspect. 
The authoritarian aspect of Incan rule is offensive to liberal sensibilities, Mariátegui concedes. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  "utopista, ni herética, ni revolucionaria, ni bolchevique, ni vanguardista, sino ortodoxa, 
constitucional, democrática, capitalista y burguesa" (TB 69).	  143	  "la supervivencia de la comunidad y de elementos de socialismo práctico en la agricultura y la 
vida indígenas" (TB 70).	  144	  "La tierra en la tradición regnícola, es la madre común: de sus entrañas no sólo salen los frutos 
alimenticios, sino el hombre mismo. La tierra depara todos los bienes. El culto de la Mama Pacha 
es par de la heliolatría, y como el sol no es de nadie en particular, tampoco el planeta lo es" (Luis 
Valcárcel, quoted in TB 71).	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But then, he adds, why should a Marxist worry about offending liberal sensibilities? "To view the 
abstract idea of freedom," he reminds his readers, "as consubstantial with a specific, concrete 
image of freedom—daughter of Protestantism and the Renaissance and the French Revolution—is 
to fall into an illusion that rests upon the slight, although not disinterested, philosophical 
astigmatism of the bourgeoisie and its democracy."145 Incan communism was indeed 
authoritarian, but it was also communism. And just as the contemporary socialist is capable of 
embracing bourgeois liberalism's authentic contributions to the cause of human liberation while 
simultaneously rejecting those liberal-bourgeois elements hostile to socialism, so too can the 
contemporary socialist draw from the Incan experience in crafting a truly modern, truly Peruvian 
social order. 
And Mariátegui clearly explicates those elements of liberal-bourgeois society that must be 
overcome. In fact, the nominal liberalism of the Peruvian Republic does not even represent a 
threat to the neo-feudal order. The specific constellation of Peruvian liberalism during the 
Republic (inaugurated after the successful conclusion of the early 1820s struggle for 
independence from Spain) had neither the political power nor the will to confront the persistent 
feudal organization of society, yet the Republic could easily expropriate the indigent members of 
the comunidades. This is Mariátegui's critique of the liberal Republic: impotent against the large 
landowners, it turned its attention to agrarian reform of the indigenous comunidades. Yet this so- 
called land reform merely enclosed commonly-held lands, redistributed those lands into the hands 
of the propertied class, and converted the indigenous residents into de facto serfs. (TB 86).  
Thus the major problem of his contemporary Peru is a land problem. The cause of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  145	  "Consustanciar la idea abstracta de la libertad con las imágenes concretas de una libertad con 
gorro frigio—hija del Protestantismo y del Renacimiento y de la Revolución Francesa—es dejarse 
coger por una ilusión que depende tal vez de un mero, aunque no desinteresado, astigamtismo 
filosófico de la burguesía y de su democracia" (TB 89).	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misery and wretchedness of Peru's indigenous population is, concretely, a continuous and 
unabated act of land appropriation. Mariátegui systematically rejects any other "exclusive and 
unilateral criteria"; any "administrative, juridical, ethnic, moral, educational, ecclesiastical" 
explanation because the "Indian problem" reduces fundamentally to an economic injustice. That 
injustice goes by the name appropriation, which is synonymous with the existence of feudalism in 
contemporary Peru. The persistence of comunidades and communal practices within indigenous 
spheres only highlights that things could be otherwise. It is not that Mariátegui advocates a return 
to this pre-Colombian Golden Age (he says so explicitly throughout his writings), but rather, he 
seeks to mobilize the already-existing structures of a community- oriented anti-capitalist practice 
(for instance, the ayllu form of social organization) in order to further his goal of an 
autochthonous Peruvian/Andean socialism.146 
The comunidades, then, stand against the Lockean idea of an American wasteland. Thus 
Mariátegui can speak of an indigenous agrarian revindication, and he realizes the mythical 
register in which the Golden Age of Incan communism must resonate. The myth, for whatever 
historical inaccuracy, also has the pragmatic and expedient value of, as Cornejo Polar argues, 
destroying the oppositions between, on the one hand, the blunt cosmopolitanism of the Comintern 
with the nativism of the Peruvian indigenismo tradition, and between an indigenous traditionalism 
and a program of modernization, on the other (Aire 189-90). It gives direction and purpose to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  146	  For example, "El comunismo no supone, históricamente, libertad individual ni sufragio 
popular. La autocracia y el comunismo son incompatibles en nuestra época; pero no lo fueron en 
sociedades primitivas. Hoy un orden nuevo no puede renunciar a ninguno de los progresos 
morales de la sociedad moderna. El socialismo contemporáneo—otras épocas han tenido otros 
tipos de socialismo que la historia designa con diversos nombres—es la antítesis del liberalismo; 
pero nace de su entraña y se nutre de su experiencia. No desdeña ninguna de sus conquistas 
intelectuales. No escarnece y vilipendia sino sus limitaciones. Aprecia y comprende todo lo que 
en la idea liberal hay de positivo: condena y ataca sólo lo que en esta idea hay de negativo y 
temporal" (TB 90).	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Peruvian struggle.147  
According to Cornejo, Mariátegui's insistence on an Andean modernity is his primary 
contribution to political and social thought; furthermore, his thesis can be extrapolated to posit the 
existence of multiple modernities, each modernity developing from and responding to a dialectic 
between local and global conditions.148 
Cornejo believes the identity of Mariátegui's modern (or modernizing) subject to be open 
and in construction. But in answering the Lockean/Schmittean question of what precedes 
enclosure, Mariátegui falls into an identitarian trap. For if what preceded enclosure is a commons, 
it must be understood as an Incan commons. As much as Mariátegui tries to ground himself, 
literally, in the land, his vision of Peru's socialist future is profoundly marked by the problem of 
indigenous identity. He justifies the legitimacy of the unenclosed commons through an appeal to a 
specific mythical construct; as Peruvian history attests, even Mariátegui's carefully constructed 
appeal to an Incan Golden Age can quickly collapse into a closed and reactionary identity that 
only serves to exacerbate conflicts and further fracture an already heterogeneous order. 
The problem of land and the problem of identity are never too far apart. As Flores Galindo 
reminds us, the Incan utopia—in whatever its iteration—is always fundamentally an identity-
based utopia. When Mariátegui orients this Incan utopia towards a defense of a pre- conquest 
commons, he substitutes the enclosure of land with the enclosure of a particular subject. If 
socialism and community precede latifundismo and enclosure, that unenclosed community is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  147	  Mariátegui describes the revindication: "La lucha de los indios contra los gamonales, ha 
estribado invariablemente en la defensa de sus tierras contra la absorción y el despojo. Existe, por 
tanto, una instintiva y profunda reivindicación indígena: la reivindicción de la tierra. Dar un 
carácter organizado, sistemático, definido, a esta reivindicación, es la tarea en que la propaganda 
política y el movimiento sindical tiene el deber de cooperar activamente" (TB 253). 148	  On multiple modernities, Cornejo advances, "La tesis mariateguiana propone una alternativa 
antidogmática: no hay una sino muchas modernidades, y varias maneras de llegar a ese punto, y 
dentro de aquéllas es insensato no incluir la opción de imaginar y realizar una modernidad de raíz 
y temple andinos" (Aire 190).	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nonetheless a particular community based upon a specific identity: hence, the descriptor "Incan" 
communism.149 
In other words, Mariátegui's appeal to an open commons collapses upon itself, and that 
collapse has its inevitable origin in his identitarian move to enclose the Incan commons within 
one set identity. In insisting on an agrarian commons that precedes the imperial enclosure of so- 
called wasteland, Mariátegui answers our original question: what precedes Fence? His answer, 
however, relies on a common subject under the banner of a mythological Inca. This rhetorical 
move merely shifts the question to a subjective register: can there be a truly common subject 
without Fence, without the foundation of an already-constituted identity? Is Cornejo's heterotopia 
of multiple modernities with their respective subjects-in-construction an impossibility? Or do we 
see in Mariátegui's work the early stirrings of some future subject-to-come? 
 
V Arguedas and the Heterogeneous Subject 
That question, of the subject-to-come, has played out on the battlefield of one of 
Mariátegui's inheritors and admirers, José María Arguedas. The concepts of utopia, community, 
and subjectivity run through both Arguedas' own work and the critical debate that surrounds it. 
Arguedas—novelist, poet, and anthropologist—famously grew up speaking Quechua in the 
Andes, although he is not of indigenous descent. His work has become a focal point for theorists 
of mestizaje, transculturation, heterogeneity, and other themes of post-colonial scholarship.150 
Perhaps his best-known statement on the topic of his cultural hybridity comes in the final chapter 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  149	  I explore the problem of commons and essentialism in chapter five, "Copyleft as Training 
Ground: The Digital Horizons of Intellectual Property." See also Jean-Luc Nancy, The 
Inoperative Community.	  150	  For a comprehensive bibliography of both Arguedas' own work and criticism current until 
1992, see El zorro de arriba y el zorro de abajo, critical edition coordinated by Eve-Marie Fell.	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of his incomplete, posthumously published novel, El zorro de arriba y el zorro de abajo (1971). 
In that tragic and disconcerting chapter, titled " Diary: Final Entry?" Arguedas addresses the 
homological split in his own biography that mirrors the nature of Peruvian society; the chapter is 
extremely dark in tone, as it effectively became a suicide note (Arguedas committed suicide in 
late 1968, shortly after writing "¿Último diaro?"). Yet even in his despair over Peru's tragic 
situation and his perceived insufficiency as a novelist, Arguedas manages to celebrate Peru's 
complicated ethnic and social constitution: in Peru, nuestra patria, "any man no longer shackled 
and brutalized by selfishness can joyfully experience all of the homelands" (Foxes 260).151 
Needless to say, that passage is an obligatory quotation for any Arguedas scholar 
interested in the questions of identity, nation, and subjectivity. Less frequently quoted, however, 
is the sentence that immediately follows and, in a way, completes his idea: "How are the barbed- 
wire boarders, Comandante? How long will they endure? Just as those servants of the gods—the 
gloomy darkness, threats, and terror that were raised up and heightened—are being weakened and 
worn away, so are those borders, I believe."152 Barbed-wire fences that weaken and corrode: 
Arguedas, like Scorza, also understands Fence to be a key concept in interpreting his 
contemporary reality. Yet while Scorza's novel unmasks Fence to reveal the original appropriation 
that lies behind Fence's own Schmittean origin story, Arguedas' work can be said to understand 
Fence as the ontological condition of a heterogeneous Andean subject. This expression only 
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  "cualquier hombre no engrilletado y embrutecido por el egoísmo puede vivir, feliz, todas las 
patrias" (Zorros 246). All English translations from The Fox from Up Above and the Fox from 
Down Below, trans. Frances Horning Barraclough.	  152	  "¿Cómo están las fronteras de alambres de púas, Comandante? ¿Cuánto tiempo durarán? Igual 
que los servidores de los dioses, tiniebla, amenaza y terror, que las alzaron y afilaron, creo que se 
debilitan y corroen." 
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becomes more clear in Arguedas' later work.153 
In his 1968 acceptance speech for the Inca Garcilaso de la Vega prize, Arguedas once 
again employs the image of a "closed-off" or "fenced-off" people in his description of Peruvian 
society. In accepting the prize named after the "modern" defender of Quechua culture, Arguedas 
sketches a picture of two cultures in Peru: the dominate culture of the oppressor—the legacy of 
the Conquest—and the dominated, isolated Quechua culture. In Arguedas' estimation, Quechua 
culture is walled-off, and he names the dominant culture los cercadores—the enclosers. "I am not 
acculturated," he proclaims, for acculturation would mean restricting life to the enclosed world 
within the oppressor's walls. Arguedas' literary mission, however, was to "transform into written 
language what I was as an individual: a strong living link, capable of being universalized, 
between the great, walled-in nation and the generous, humane side of the oppressors" (Foxes 
268).154 Like Mariátegui before him, Arguedas looks towards a future where the best of all 
cultures rise above and beyond the divisions and borders that the worst of each culture creates. 
"Aculturation" is unilateral, according to Arguedas: aculturation would mean, then, the perfect 
completion of Fence. What Arguedas lived and wrote, later critics articulated in the language of 
post-colonial theory. A dominant imperial culture that "celebrates" difference merely allows 
Fence to be decorated with so many symbols of a vanished, unarmed past, now rendered 
politically impotent and finding its expression mainly in tourism and the international market for 
so-called "authentic" indigenous culture. Instead, Arguedas calls for the destruction of Fence, 
tearing down the wall that encloses and separates. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  153	  For an excellent overview of Arguedas' development as a novelist, and how the idea of 
heterogeneity gains an increasingly rich and complex expression in his work, see the final section 
of Corjeno Polar's Literatura y sociedad en el Perú: La novela indigenista.	  154	  "convertir en lenguaje escrito lo que era como individuo: un vínculo vivo, fuerte, capaz de 
universalizarse, de la gran nación cercada y la parte generosa, humana, de los opresores" (Zorros 
257).	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That position, of course, begs the question: if Fence is indeed the current ontological 
condition of Andean subjectivity, what would a post-Fence subject look like? Without borders, 
there would be no heterogeneity, as the very concept of the heterogeneous depends upon a 
division, a distinction between two non-identical elements. Yet Arguedas, the "happy devil" who 
lives, cheerfully, all of the patrias within one patria, is far from homogeneous or self-identical. 
So Arguedas looks for something beyond fence, and this point is precisely what some of his most 
vocal critics ignore. 
For instance, the Peruvian novelist, former (unsuccessful) presidential candidate, and neo-
liberal apologist Mario Vargas Llosa, who prologued the early international editions of Arguedas' 
novels, views Arguedas as the primary representative of what he calls "archaic utopianism." At its 
heart, the phenomenon Vargas Llosa names "the archaic utopia" is a belief in "the resurrection of 
a past mythically embellished with elements assimilated from the 'dominant' culture and the 
creative fantasy of writers and artists."155 The utopia is archaic because it proposes a return: the 
resurrection of a mythical past. Like Mariátegui's critics, Vargas Llosa understands Arguedas as 
preaching a return, when really the novelist and anthropologist is groping to feel the contours of a 
subject-to-come in the darkness of a possible post-Fence Peru.156 One imagines that Vargas Llosa 
misreads this "resurrection" into Arguedas' novels because Vargas Llosa is actually quite happy 
with the contemporary Peruvian reality of neoliberalism, and acculturation represents the cultural 
path towards Vargas Llosa's own utopian vision of a "modern" Peru. "Neither Indian nor White," 
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  "la resurrección de un pasado míticamente embellecido con elementos asimilados de la cultura 
'dominante' y la fantasía creadora de los escritores y artistas" (Vargas Llosa 248). 156	  Again, it is important to remember that Arguedas' thought is significantly indebted to 
Mariátegui; the mythological and theological registers of which most closely resemble Benjamin's 
concepts of the dialectical image and history as ruin. To speak of a simple "resurrection" of a past 
Golden Age in Arguedas' work is to ignore not only the novelist's own understanding of 
Mariátegui, but also to advance a deaf and blind reading his fiction.	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he states, "neither Indigenous nor Hispanic, the Peru that is emerging with apparent longevity still 
remains a mystery; the only thing we can be assured of with absolute certainty is that it will look 
nothing like the images that José María Arguedas described—or rather, fabulated—in his literary 
work."157 In other words: anything but that, anything but what Arguedas had in mind. But this is 
just a deferral of the problem, a belief that a more complete "acculturation" will effectively solve 
the indigenous problem through total assimilation, reducing difference to a matrix of consumer 
preferences within the framework of a "completed" process of modernization.158 
Of course, this scenario of a "completed modernity" is precisely what Arguedas feared 
most. Furthermore, Vargas Llosa is wrong: the Andean utopia best imagined by Mariátegui and 
Arguedas is not closed and archaic. It is, rather, open and heterogeneous. That does not mean it is 
without its own contradictions. And those contradictions become most clear when we consider 
that subjective and identitarian elements of that utopia. Cornejo Polar's reading of Arguedas 
draws our attention to just those elements. "Subject and discourse," he says, "are acutely 
pluralized and the novel as such transforms into a space where all lose their secure and definite 
identities, and instead share—not without conflict—a socialized and oscillating semiosis."159 
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  "Ni indio ni blanco, ni indigenista ni hispanista, el Perú que va apareciendo con visos de durar 
es todavía una incógnita de la que sólo podemos asegurar, con absoluta certeza, que no 
corresponderá para nada con las imágenes con que fue descrito—con que fue fabulado—en las 
obras de José María Arguedas" (Vargas Llosa 335).	  158	  For a further exploration of acculturation, transculturation, and cultural difference in general, 
see Alberto Moreiras' reading of Los zorros in his The Exhaustion of Difference. For a critique of 
Vargas Llosa's celebration of neoliberal Peru, see Gareth Williams' chapter "Of Pishtacos and 
Eye-Snatchers: Neoliberalism and Neoindigenism in Contemporary Peru" in his The Other Side of 
the Popular, along with Juan E. De Castro's recent article "Mario Vargas Llosa versus 
Barbarism."	  159	  "Sujeto y discurso se pluralizan agudamente y la novela como tal se transforma en un especio 
donde uno y otro pierden sus identidades seguras y definidas y comparten, no sin conflicto, una 
semiosis socializada y oscilante" (Aire 215). The fact that this agonistic, "socialized and 
oscillating semiosis" is represented as between distinct subjects in Scorza's novel (as opposed to 
	   123	  
Cornejo sees this tendency most clearly exhibited in Arguedas' 1958 novel Los ríos profundos. 
The scene where the bilingual narrator reflects upon his childhood memory of first touching the 
Incan wall in Cusco is emblematic. The narrator remembers being consumed by the phrase puk'tik 
yawar rumi, "boiling stone of blood." That disjunctive, heterogeneous phrase—rock boiling in 
liquid form, the liquid water of the title's Deep Rivers transforming into boiling blood—literally 
erupts from his mouth. Cornejo then spins out this moment of transculturation into a greater 
theory of Arguedas' utopia. It is neither archaic, pace Vargas Llosa, nor the dream of a perfect 
cosmic harmony between man and world, pace classic utopians, but rather plural, multiple, and 
contradictory: "It would be possible to read the Arguedian utopia not in terms of a conciliatory 
synthesis, bur rather in those of multiple, indeed contradictory, pluralities that do not abdicate in 
the face of the troubling desire to be many beings, live many lives, speak many languages, inhabit 
many worlds."160 
Yet if we conceive of the Arguedean iteration of the Andean utopia in purely linguistic 
and subjective terms, we risk forgetting Mariátegui's fundamental lesson: the horizon of the 
problem must always touch the land itself. If the Andean utopia is to remain open to 
heterogeneity, without enclosing any particular identity as such, can this model function on the 
material level as well? Can a commons exist simultaneously in the material and the subjective 
sphere? 
In bouncing between subject and land, the question becomes one of essentialism: how to 
understand a right to the commons that is not based on an essentialist identity? There are those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
within a subject in Arguedas' novels) may explain why Scorza has become foil to Arguedas in 
postcolonial readings of Andean heterogeneity (see above).	  160	  "Sería posible leer la utopía arguediana no en términos de síntesis conciliante sino de 
pluralidad múltiple, inclusive contradictoria, que no abdica frente al turbador anhelo de ser 
muchos seres, vivir muchas vidas, hablar muchos lenguajes, habitar muchos mundos." (Aire 217).	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who would reject outright any concept of a right to the commons—whether articulated in terms of 
a land-based claim for communal land or a subject-based claim for a multiple identity forever in 
construction—because the very concept of a "right" is hopelessly entangled in the liberal account 
of possessive individualism.161 That is to say: the very form in which a demand for the commons 
could possibly be articulated is itself a subject of great debate. If that demand is to be articulated 
as the revindication of a certain kind of right, however, it must be expressed in a way that remains 
at once open to the kinds of multiple and heterogeneous subjects that Cornejo finds expressed in 
Arguedas, and grounded in the material realities of whatever local situation. These conditions 
suggest a very particular kind of universalism: a universalism that does not demand a stable, 
homogeneous subject, nor a central, essential identity. Today, that universalism seems to rally 
under the name "multitude." Perhaps, as a myth, "multitude" seems more palatable to a universal 
audience, as opposed to an Andean mythology under the banner of the Inca. Still, it is not clear 
that the "multitude," as a concept, manages to resolve the tensions and contradictions that Fence 
erects.162 
Furthermore, contemporary enclosures have created, literally, a new frontier to 
appropriate. These new enclosures happen in the digital realm, yet the problems of history and the 
subject, so visible in the Andean case, have not simply disappeared. They, like the concept of the 
commons itself, have simply leapt from the material realm of land and primitive appropriation to 
the immaterial sphere of the new global communications networks. This will be the subject of the 
next chapters. 
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  See, for instance, Arianna Bove's essays on www.gerneration-online.org.	  162	  For my reading of Hardt and Negri's Empire-Multitude-Commonwealth trilogy, chapter four, 
"The Commons, Between Literature and the City."	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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE COMMONS, BETWEEN LITERATURE AND THE CITY 
 
 This chapter investigates the shifting nature of creative and artistic work in the 
contemporary globalizing and networked moment. The commons—a key term in historical 
struggles over enclosure, land appropriation, and colonialism—has been reappropriated and 
rearticulated as a concept bound to creative endeavors, especially in the realm of aesthetics. I first 
examine the contested nature of the commons as concept. Then I discuss some of the implications 
of the concept of a cultural commons in an age of globalization. Finally, I study several examples 
of cultural production from Latin America that exemplify divergent strands of thinking the 
relationship between property and creativity. What these project share is an ecological vision of 
creativity, whether that understanding manifest itself through plagiarism as an act of creative 
circulation, or recycling as a gesture towards opening a literary commons. I use the concept of 
unmanageability to talk about these phenomena; we can also understand them as contemporary 
projects that open up virtual space while reaching out into the material city. It is through these 
practices—practices which the current order can only understand as unmanageable—that we find 
the commons, exposed. 
 
I The Digital Commons: A Case of Blind Men and an Elephant 
 In the previous chapter, I discussed the commons at great length. The commons is a form 
of economic, social, and ecological organization based around collective land use. The political 
valence of a commons, as we saw in the Mariátegui's case, is actually ambivalent: it can represent 
an authoritarian, even tyrannical mode of political organization (as in the Incan case), or it can 
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represent a democratic, socialistic organization (as in the case of the post-revolutionary Peru 
which Mariátegui theorized). The commons is opposed to the process of enclosure; indeed, it is 
the political and economic process of enclosure that erases the commons through privatization of 
a shared community resource. 
 The concept of the commons has also found currency in contemporary debates over the 
architecture of the digital universe. The basic design of the Internet—the "network of networks," a 
collection of computers and electronic devices that all share the basic, non-proprietary Internet 
Protocol Suite (TCP/IP)—has been viewed by many as a commons; yet when we talk about the 
Internet, we jump from a material concept of the commons based in land to an immaterial concept 
of a commons based on shared protocols and connectivity. As long as it remains clear that the 
Internet is a metaphorical commons based on shared infrastructure that is both material property 
and immaterial things (protocols, ideas, intellectual properties), that concept is useful to employ. 
 In part because of the contemporary emphasis on the concept of immaterial commons, and 
in part because of the early utopian visions of the Internet and its communistic horizon of 
possibilities, the concept of the commons has crossed with the concept of the common, singular. 
The common tends to be used in philosophical discourse when dealing with the problem of 
community (as in the work of Nancy, Blanchot, and, recently, Esposito) or with the question of 
communism (Badiou, Hardt and Negri). As I am concerned with the shift from the material to the 
immaterial conception of the commons, I will use the term in the plural save for when I am 
discussing the work of theorists who explicitly invoke the common in its singularity.163 
 In thinking through the implications of digital culture on creative production, I will be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  163	  I directly address Hardt and Negri's notion of the common below; for my readings of Nancy, 
Blanchot, and Esposito, see chapter five, "Copyleft as Training Ground: The Digital Horizons of 
Intellectual Property."	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drawing primarily from two distinct yet overlapping models for conceiving what has been called 
the realm of immaterial production or networked society. In the broadest of terms, these two 
models can be called, respectively, the liberal and the radical models of the commons.164 In order 
to give a sketch of the general contours of the debate, I will use three recent texts as examples of 
these positions: Yochai Benkler's The Wealth of Networks, James Boyle's The Public Domain, 
and Hardt & Negri's Commonwealth. What is at stake in all of these texts is the status of human 
creative activity in an era dominated by information flows and new technologies of social 
relations. 
 Benkler's The Wealth of Networks (2006) aims to be a treatise on the nature of the 
emerging networked information economy (NIE). In this sense, the audacity of the title is no mere 
overreach; Benkler intends to describe a new sphere of human production beyond the market 
sphere that captured Adam Smith's attention in late eighteenth-century Europe. As the NIE 
expands and develops, it does so at the expense of the Industrial Information Economy (by 
Industrial Information Economy, Benkler means the large-scale manufacturers that have 
dominated North American capitalism: the various iterations of the centralized Ford assembly line 
adapted to the particular needs of an industry). Information, Benkler argues, has always been 
different from the other commodities produced by capitalism, and now new technological 
innovations free information from the limits and logic of material production. Radically 
distributed, nonproprietary peer production is the emergent relation of production best suited for 
the NIE.165 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  164	  This distinction is merely expedient, and there exist other, divergent models that bisect the 
liberal/radical division, for instance, the libertarian and anarchic traditions.	  165	  A critique of the concept of peer is necessary, but it falls outside the scope of the present text. 
One must consider the dual nature of the word peer: it at once implies radical inclusion (as in a 
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 Furthermore, he says, the NIE—and the nonproprietary model of peer production on 
which it is based—enhances human autonomy by carving out social realms beyond the market 
sphere. Benkler's work is exciting, and he tempers his descriptions of the emerging NIE with a 
skeptical approach towards what he calls techno-utopianism.166 Yet this methodological 
commitment creates a blind spot in Benkler's thought. Benkler celebrates the enhanced individual 
autonomy that arises from increased social and collaborative production beyond the realm of the 
market, but he does not think about the implications such a networked model of social production 
has on the status of the autonomous possessive individual subject assumed by market-based 
liberal thought. Instead, Benkler doubles down on liberalism.167 It is from this position—that of 
the committed techno-liberal—that he considers the conflict between emerging social practices 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
jury of one's peers, the legal sine qua non of a democratic judicial system) and absolute exclusion 
(as in peerage). These two poles, if theorized, lead to a larger critique of the concept of 
community. 166	  This skepticism becomes especially clear when he discusses the NIE's effect on democracy 
and the public sphere. Benkler insists that the techno-utopian baseline of "everyone a 
pamphleteer" is spurious; instead, he sets up an entire comparative methodology against the 
commercial mass media model that rose to dominance with the Industrial Information Economy. 
One might say that Benkler rejects speculation about the possible in favor of the iron rule of the 
actual.	  167	  Benkler's position is most visible when he outlines the methodological concerns of his project. 
Describing his individualist and economic methodological orientation, he posits, "If we are indeed 
seeing the emergence of a substantial component of nonmarket production at the very core of our 
economic engine—the production and exchange of information, and through it of information-
based goods, tools, services, and capabilities—then this change suggests a genuine limit on the 
extent of the market. Such a limit, growing from within the very market that it limits, in its most 
advanced loci, would represent a genuine shift in direction for what appeared to be the ever-
increasing global reach of the market economy and society in the past half century" (Benkler, 
Wealth 18-19). This shift, however, is not radical enough to call into question the very subject 
posited by the liberal market economy; Benkler continues, "I am concerned with human beings, 
with individuals as the bearers of moral claims regarding the structure of the political and 
economic systems they inhabit. [... Benkler's position] is concerned first and foremost with the 
claims of human beings as human beings, rather than with the requirements of democracy or the 
entitlements of citizenship or membership in a legitimate or meaningfully self-governed political 
community" (Benkler, Wealth 19). Note here the naturalization of the liberal possessive individual 
as the human being as such.	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like nonproprietary peer production and "the political and judicial pressures to form an 
institutional ecology that is decidedly titled in favor of proprietary business models" (Benkler, 
Wealth 470). On the one hand, he can talk about this conflict in the language of data- driven 
analysis (this makes up a significant portion of his book) and suggest practical, policy- driven 
interventions to, as he argues, enhance human autonomy. On the other hand, Benkler is incapable 
of explaining why liberalism is the best way to think of nonmarket/nonproprietary human 
production.168  
 Indeed, based on the evidence Benkler presents, the reader is likely to be persuaded that 
there is a fundamental incompatibility between the proprietary, market based model of a liberal 
economy and the nonmarket, nonproprietary sphere of information. Yet what is this information 
sphere? Benkler tends to conflate information and culture; this is a tendency he shares with many 
of the liberal theorists of the networked economy. As a result, Benkler talks about culture in a 
way that a) seems confined to a screen-mediated culture, and b) overestimates the novelty of its 
existence in a networked world. For instance, when Benkler affirms that in the NIE, "culture is 
becoming more democratic: self-reflective and participatory" (Benkler, Wealth 15), the other side 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  168	  For instance: "The emergence of a substantial nonmarket sector in the Networked Information 
Economy offers opportunities for providing better access to knowledge and information as input 
from, and better access for information outputs of, developing and less-developed economies and 
poorer geographic and social sectors in the advanced economies" (Benkler, Wealth 130); in other 
words: there is an economy beyond the liberal market, and its existence will play a crucial role in 
global development. Yet Benkler gives no reason why liberalism is the best set of assumptions to 
think such a nonproprietary, collaborative mode of production. Benkler's position also, it should 
be noted, allows him to begin his argument "given the Internet," and thus avoid the question of 
the global digital divide (which he brushes off as a "transitional problem"). At its worst moments, 
Benkler's entire argument collapses under the weight of its own circularity: a world with enough 
individuals networked to one another via portable digital devices will create a world in which 
enough people will be networked together so as to engage in nonproprietary, nonmarket peer 
production. Yet Benkler talks very little about nonproprietary nonmarket solutions for the 
physical infrastructure of that vision, especially in those parts of the world on the other side of the 
digital divide.	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of this assertion is that culture previously was unreflective and monolithic. In his account, this 
increasingly democratic culture arises because "nonmarket behavior is becoming central to 
producing our information and cultural environment" (Benkler, Wealth 56; my emphasis). Of 
course, this perspective only considers pre-NIE culture produced within the sphere of market 
relations; Benkler ignores the wealth of nonmarket cultural manifestations that predate any 
networked information economy: fan fiction, story telling around a campfire, an impromptu dance 
party.169 
 By wrapping the NIE in a layer of newness, Benkler nullifies any cultural production that 
existed beyond the reach of the market before the emergence of the NIE. That is to say: Benkler's 
pre-NIE vision of culture is confined to those cultural artifacts produced and disseminated by the 
industrial-style mass media. Additionally, by subsuming culture into the broader sphere of 
information, Benkler produces a model that reduces cultural production to the transmission of 
binary data over a network. These moves allows him to dodge many of the problematic questions 
surrounding the concept of culture, including but not limited to the ways in which culture has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  169	  Furthermore, Benkler leads himself to a methodological dead end when he compares the 
screen culture of the Industrial Information Economy with the Massive Multiplayer Online Game 
(MMOG) culture of the Networked Information Economy. He compares the experience of 
watching a television screen with playing a MMOG such as Second Life: "The two models 
assume fundamentally different conceptions of play. Whereas in front of the television, the 
consumer is a passive receptacle, limited to selecting which finished good he or she will consume 
from a relatively narrow range of options, in the world of Second Life, the individual is treated as 
a fundamentally active, creative human being, capable of building his or her own fantasies, alone 
or in affiliation with others" (Benkler, Wealth 136). Such an approach is disingenuous on two 
acounts: 1) Benkler compares the worst of pre-Internet screen culture (Hollywood blockbusters 
and network TV programming) with the richest/most immersive offerings of Internet screen 
culture like Second Life; 2) film—and, to a lesser extent, television— presupposes a world beyond 
the screen; MMOGs like Second Life strive to erase the border between world and screen. This 
leads to two fundamentally different forms of aesthetic experience that must be theorized in more 
detail before they can be fruitfully compared. And, it must be noted: Benkler's near-exclusive 
focus on screen-mediated culture leaves him stunningly incapable of addressing issues of the 
body's role in the production of culture and information.	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been produced historically over the ages, and the connections between cultural manifestations and 
the material environment in which such manifestations circulate. Benkler's insistence on the 
exceptional nature of information is important—the property status of ideas and information has 
always been a problem for liberalism—but he fails to ask the central question: if the structures of 
liberal society developed in support of a proprietary economy of material production, and the 
emergence of nonproprietary social production represents a fundamental shift in human 
productivity, why should those liberal structures carry over naturally to what he calls the 
Networked Information Economy? 
 
 James Boyle's work is much more interested in investigating the moments when liberal 
models of subjectivity fail to provide coherent accounts of cultural phenomena. Boyle is perhaps 
best know for his 1996 book Shamans, Software, & Spleens: Law and the Construction of the 
Information Society, an early investigation into the way "information society" conceives 
information and the paradoxical results of such conceptions. Boyle explains, "The 'problems' I 
refer to are problems in the realm of ideas, paradoxes, or tensions in our assumptions, brought to 
the surface when the subject is information. To put it more specifically, as a form of wealth, a 
focus of production, and a conception of value, information is a problematic category within our 
most basic ways of thinking about markets, property, politics, and self-definition" (Boyle, 
Shamans xi). 
 Boyle is also much better equipped to deal with issues of cultural production than Benkler, 
as Boyle is not invested in the newness of peer production. Instead of approaching the problem as 
new and emergent, Boyle is open to the possibility that new technological developments can 
reveal how creative production has always functioned; when, in his 2008 book The Public 
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Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind, he discusses how law deals with the concepts of 
originality and authorship in the case of recorded music, he advances that, "Our theories of 
aesthetics are poorer than the creativity they seek to describe" (Boyle, Public Domain 155; see 
also 135 and 193). 
 Accordingly, Boyle has produced one of the stronger critiques of the Romantic conception 
of authorship in the liberal tradition.170 The Romantic author can be read as the creative 
possessive individual. If this model of creative subjectivity is incapable of accounting for the 
empirical realities of artistic production, Boyle looks towards an account of cultural production 
grounded in a shared pool of human creative labor; following others, he calls this shared resource 
of human creativity alternately the commons or the public domain.171 But the status of the 
commons is shifting in Boyle's work, and he seems to be most comfortable with the concept when 
the commons is restricted to a resource at the level of society-wide access. Such a position makes 
a commons effectively indistinguishable from State-owned or "public" property (Boyle, Public 
Domain 39). In this view, a strong guiding metaphor when talking about the commons would be a 
public road: a road is available to all, yet its use is not unrestricted (think speed limits, driver's 
licenses, etc.). For Boyle's purposes, such a metaphor fails on two accounts, one of which Boyle 
would freely admit, and another which he appears to ignore. First, Boyle is concerned with the 
status of intellectual property in contemporary society; the immaterial nature of IP is, of course, a 
question that has plagued legal thinkers and creative practitioners since the popularization of the 
printing press, if not before. A road, as a material object, is not entirely suited to a comparison 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  170	  See "Copyright and the Invention of Authorship" in Shamans, Software, & Spleens. Boyle's 
account draws on Martha Woodmansee's groundbreaking work; for more on Woodmansee, the 
Romantic author, and copyright, see below.	  171	  The practical interchangeability of the two terms is most evident in the title of Boyle's 2008 
book The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind. 
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with something like the general plot outline of two star-crossed lovers' narrative (the ur-narrative 
that gives us, for instance, Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet). Or, if you will: traveling along a road 
is a different experience than navigating humanity's river of stories. Boyle is keen to these 
differences, and he explores them throughout his work. What Boyle misses, however, (and this is 
the second failure of his metaphor) is the fact that the commons and the public domain do not 
completely coincide. In talking about the "commons of the mind," Boyle makes it seem as if the 
commons are some form of State property donated to a community at large (and since Boyle is 
mainly concerned with society-wide commons, that community becomes more or less equivalent 
to the "public"). But this notion of the commons is at odds with Benkler's concept. Benkler asserts 
that what is common lies beyond the proprietary-based logic of the market, and thus, the 
commons is constitutively not property of any kind. In other words: the commons is neither State 
nor private property (Benkler, Wealth 60-1). 
 The two liberal thinkers get tripped up by the problematic concept of property as it applies 
to the products of creative labor. Both appeal to a notion of the commons—as either the realm of 
non-proprietary peer production or a resource open to society at large—yet both struggle at the 
moment of conceiving an alternative form of ownership right that is based neither in possessive 
individualism nor the absolute sovereignty of the state. This impasse—the place where liberal 
theories of property break down when confronted by nonmarket and/or collaborative creative 
production—is precisely the starting point for radical left theorists of the common.172  
 
 One of the baseline assumptions of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's recent 
Commonwealth (the final installment in their Empire-Multitude-Commonwealth trilogy) is that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  172	  It is interesting to note the shift from a plural (commons) to the generic singular (common) in 
the move from the liberal to the radical left tradition.	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the common, as they understand it, is an object of neither public nor private property.173 In a 
sense, this is a shared affinity with Benkler's position, but Hardt and Negri strive not to 
incorporate non-propriety social production into a liberal economic model, but rather to unfold a 
total critique of the "Republic of Property." This task directs them towards Marxist critiques of 
property like those of C.B. Macpherson, who insists that common property is fundamentally 
different from both private property and state property.174 The question then becomes how the 
common can reproduce and expand itself. Hardt and Negri state their project thus: "Socialism and 
capitalism, [...] even though they have at times been mingled together and at others occasioned 
bitter conflicts, are both regimes of property that exclude the common. The political project of 
instituting the common, which we develop in this book, cuts diagonally across these false 
alternatives—neither private nor public, neither capitalist nor socialist—and opens a new space 
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  Indeed, the common's very status as an object is an open question, since the relationship 
between the common and the multitude is one of subjectivity producing itself: "The multitude 
makes itself by composing in the common the singular subjectivities that result from this process 
[of biopolitical production]" (Hardt & Negri x).	  174	  Macpherson first reminds us that property is a right, not a thing: a right to exclude others, a 
right claim "that will be enforced by society or the state, by custom or convention or law." 
(Macpherson, Possessive 3) In this sense, private property seems to be the most straightforward of 
these enforceable rights claims: it is my right to exclude you from using or appropriating some 
thing. Yet the case becomes more complicated when we consider artificial persons such as 
corporations, for the artificial-corporate person too claims private property rights. State property 
is a corporate right to exclude, only now in the Hobbesean sense of the state as an artificial 
person. The reason that State property differs from common property lies in the empirical 
realization that the State can exclude persons from claims to State property: "the state, in any 
modern society, is not the whole body of citizens but a smaller body of persons who have been 
authorized (whether by the whole body of citizens or not) to command the citizens" (Macpherson, 
Possessive 5-6). Thus, paradoxically, it is common property—the very kind of property least 
visible in the market-based society of possessive individualism, that is the most "unadulterated 
kind of property." Macpherson explains: "Common property is always a right of the natural 
individual person, whereas the other two kinds of property are not always so: private property 
may be a right of either a natural or an artificial person, and state property is always a right of an 
artificial person" (Macpherson, Possessive 6).	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for politics" (Hardt & Negri ix).175 
 Hardt and Negri describe the current global social organization (what they have called, in 
previous co-authored works, "Empire") as the "Republic of Property." This Republic shares many 
of the descriptive properties of Macpherson's naturalized market-based possessive individualism. 
It is the very act of naturalization—positing the basic elements of capitalist society as an eternal, 
naturally occurring a priori—that Hardt and Negri seek to critique. This critique—a 
transcendental critique of the transcendent structure of property—appropriates Kant's framing of 
the Enlightenment—sapere aude!—to ask the question of property. In other words, the slogan of 
Commonwealth could be dare to ask the question of property! (Hardt & Negri 15-21). 
 Property, it turns out, is mainly a question of productive bodies. But not exclusively. To 
account for this split, Hardt and Negri divide the common into two separate spheres. On the one 
hand—and this is the sphere historically associated with talk of commons and enclosure—there is 
the common of natural resources: land, water, fisheries, air, etc. On the other hand, there is the 
common of the "endlessly creative resources of social production." They call these two notions of 
the common, respectively, the natural and the artificial common.176 There is an apparent analogy 
between the two commons: as primitive accumulation is to the natural common, so is biopolitical 
exploitation to the artificial, or social, common (Hardt & Negri 139). 
 The structural analogy allows Hardt and Negri to explore biopolitical expropriation, or, to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  175	  For other sections that discuss common property as neither public nor private, see 
Commonwealth 88; 281-90; 302; 311, 320.	  176	  Hardt and Negri make the distinction between the two notions of the common in the preface: 
"By 'the common' we mean, first of all, the common wealth of the material world—the air, the 
water, the fruits of the soil, and all nature's bounty—which in classic European political texts is 
often claimed to be the inheritance of humanity as a whole, to be shared together. We consider the 
common also and more significantly those results of social production that are necessary for the 
social interaction and further production, such as knowledges, languages, codes, information, 
affects, and so forth" (Hardt & Negri viii). They return to this distinction at crucial moments in 
the text. See, for instance, 111; 137-9; 171; 250.	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use Boyle's terminology, the "second enclosure movement," with a much more critical eye than 
Benkler. Where Benkler advances a naive affirmation of biopolitics ("In these two great domains 
of life—production and consumption, work and play—the networked information economy 
promises to enrich individual autonomy substantively by creating an environment built less 
around control and more around facilitating action," Benkler, Networks 138-9), Hardt and Negri's 
account reveals capital, in its biopolitical guise, as a rent-seeking parasite appropriating the 
surplus of human creative labor. Hardt and Negri's investigation of the autonomy of social 
production reveals the common in a way neither Benkler nor Boyle can. 
 Yet the very split in the common that allows Hardt and Negri to discuss biopolitical 
expropriation strangely duplicates the paradox at the heart of liberal models of intellectual 
property (or, in Hardt and Negri's account, immaterial labor). And so for all of the effort to 
distance themselves from market-based possessive individualism, the radical thinkers end up in a 
position of uncomfortable proximity. By Part Three of their text—the fulcrum between the 
philosophical/historical and the economic/political sections of the book—Hardt and Negri find 
themselves at the starting point of almost all of the liberal critiques of contemporary IP. Namely, 
Thomas Jefferson's 1813 letter to Isaac McPherson, where Jefferson produces what will become 
the defining metaphor of the circulation of creative labor: "He who receives an idea from me 
receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives 
light without darkening me."177 
 
 And so we have blind men describing an elephant: Boyle is unable to see the commons 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  177	  Quoted in Commonwealth 139. See also: Boyle's chapter "Jefferson Writes a Letter," The 
Public Domain; Jefferson's letter is central to almost all contemporary critiques of the legal 
structure of IP. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, and Lawrence Lessig, 
The Future of Ideas. 
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separate from the State but he certainly feels the paradox; Benkler searches for communism 
within or beside liberalism; Hardt and Negri undertheorize liberalism's fundamental division 
between material and immaterial labor and thus reproduce it. 
 Both the liberal and the radical models bring important elements to the discussion. The 
liberal model, although invested in legal norms, does have its utopian impulse. This impulse asks 
how can we update/revise our legal structure so that new technologies can best facilitate our 
liberal democratic vision? The radical model asks how do these new technologies reshape power 
dynamics in a society, with the understanding that the society in question may no longer be 
constituted as a liberal, democratic, or capitalistic one. The radical model is shaped by a utopian 
impulse, too; it can be expressed as such: what new potentials for social and economic 
organization emerge with these new technologies, and how can those potentials be harnessed to 
create a more perfect society? 
 We can see that in all cases, the problem is one of property: what these accounts share is a 
consensus that new technological developments have laid bare the fundamental contradiction in 
liberal accounts of property. As the Newtonian account of the universe's mechanics was 
acceptable until technological developments enhanced human perception and sensibility to realms 
where the Newton's assumptions broke down, so it seems that our contemporary technologies of 
social production reveal the limits and paradoxes of Lockean models of property.178  
 Liberal accounts such as Benkler's, as I have argued, focus on the new. In the remainder of 
this chapter, I would like to move away from examples such as computer games and software in 
order to de-emphasize the newness factor. Instead, I will look towards modes of cultural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  178	  Locke's position can be summarized as follows: possession occurs when human labor extracts 
an object from the commons. An apple in the commons belongs to no one while on the tree; 
whoever mixes his labor—the act of picking the apple—with that common resource thus 
appropriates it. See John Locke, "On Property," Second Treatise of Government.	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production that have always been in tension with the market in order to gain a better 
understanding of how such creative commons function, and what kind of social/political/legal 
organizations most clearly promote, in Hardt and Negri's Spinozism, felicitous common 
encounters. 
 
II Geniuses and Romantics: The Gift of the Market 
 That is not to say that culture is insulated from the market. Indeed: the relationship 
between the cultural practitioner and the market has been one of the central preoccupations of 
modern and postmodern times. And no cultural producer is more attuned to this conflict than the 
(aspiring) professional artist. 
 In his influential 1979 book The Gift: Creativity and the Artist in the Modern World, 
Lewis Hyde poses that conflict thus: "If a work of art is the emanation of its maker's gift and if it 
is received by its audience as a gift, then is it, too, a gift?" He then complicates this question, 
admitting that,"Any object, any item of commerce, becomes one kind of property or another 
depending on how we use it. Even if a work of art contains the spirit of the artist's gift, it does not 
follow that the work itself is a gift. It is what we make of it." (Hyde, Gift xvii). The separation of 
the creative and the economic spheres led Hyde's book to be celebrated by a certain kind of artist, 
ridiculed by a certain kind of entrepreneur, and dismissed by literary critics.179 The theory of gift 
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  It is interesting to note that Hyde himself has come to realize the limitations of this work, and 
it has led him to his current research into intellectual property and the commons. In the 2007 
preface for the 25th anniversary edition of The Gift, Hyde writes, "We've witnessed the steady 
conversion into private property of the art and ideas that earlier generations thought belonged to 
their cultural commons, and we've seen the commodification of things that a few years ago would 
have seemed beyond the reach of the market" (Hyde, Gift xii). See also the recent New York 
Times Magazine article on Hyde's interest in the concept of the commons ("What is Art For?" 14 
November 2008).	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exchange and cultural circulation became central to influential members of the 1990s Free 
Software and hacking communities.180 In a way, Hyde's work anticipates Benkler's, as both are 
committed to imagining a non-scarcity or even anti-scarcity economy of social circulation. If we 
focus on Hyde's account of the gift as that which is "consumed" in its very circulation, and his 
subsequent affirmations that "only that which is passed along remains abundant," (Hyde, Gift 26) 
or that "the passage of the gift increases its worth" (Hyde, Gift 45), we are already close in spirit 
to Benkler's concept of non-proprietary peer production. 
 Yet Hyde's account of the conflict between the artist and market society, even if it offers 
spiritual comfort to practitioners, does not spend much time considering the material conditions 
that make someone like an "artist" possible. Hyde ultimately understands the "gift" as 
transcendental illumination: the artist is "gifted" (as is obvious from his initial framing of the 
question "If a work of art is the emanation of its maker's gift and if it is received by its audience 
as a gift, then is it, too, a gift?"). That is the primary gift; all other gifts—any aesthetic objects to 
be exchanged, say—are secondary gifts, products of the first. This two-step differentiation is how 
artists can participate in an abstract exchange economy based on money: as long as the artist is 
faithful to his/her primary gift, any objects produced via that ultimate pursuit may enter into the 
world. Like Jesus (the most divine of all gifts in the Christian tradition), the art object is destined 
to be mistreated once in the realm of human society. But the artist-creator is exculpated from such 
secondary effects. 
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  See, for example, Eric Raymond's "Homesteading the Noosphere," in The Cathedral and the 
Bazaar, where Raymond analyzes hacker culture "as a gift culture in which participants compete 
for prestige by giving time, energy, and creativity away" (Raymond 65). Lately, in techno-liberal 
circles, talk of "gift economies" has given way to a concept of an "attention" economy. The 
foundational assumption is that human attention is a scarce commodity; the fact that "attention" is 
easily quantified (hit counts, page views, etc.) may explain its current popularity among techno-
liberal circles. See, for example, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attention_economy>.	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Again, we see the material/immaterial division, although in a slightly different incarnation. The 
artist receives an immaterial gift; the fruit of this gift is the material art object. What are the 
origins of this omnipresent division? 
 
 One is tempted to say that the artist and the market have always existed in a relationship of 
tension and contradiction. But this kind of naturalizing move—the always that implies an 
immutable baseline—is precisely the locus of the problem. And since Michel Foucault posed the 
famous question What is an author? (in part as a response to Roland Barthes' earlier 
announcement of the "Death of the Author"), the historical contingency of the "author function" 
has become a topic of broad speculation. Martha Woodmansee is one of the thinkers who has 
taken up Foucault's call for a historical account of the birth of the author-function. Her 1994 book 
The Author, Art, and the Market: Rereading the History of Aesthetics presents a convincing 
historical account of the vexing material/immaterial divide in creative objects.  
 Woodmansee traces the growth of art's "disinterested" age and the concurrent "deification" 
of the art object as one of complete self-sufficiency.181 According to Woodmansee, Karl Philip 
Moritz's theory of the art object as the disinterested bearer of an intrinsic aesthetic value—a 
theory that predates Kant's 1785 Critique of Judgment by five years—arises from a concrete 
dilemma in the developing art world. The rise of a literate middle class and improved technology 
for the reproduction and distribution of literature led to a massive increase in demand for reading 
material in Germany in the later half of the XVIIIth century. This rising demand did not coincide 
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  The following two paragraphs draw heavily on, respectively, the first and second chapters of 
Woodmansee's book, "The Interests in Disinterestedness" and "Genius and the Copyright." 
Woodmansee focuses on a series of German and English thinkers whose thought forms the 
foundations for contemporary aesthetic philosophy: Mendelssohn, Moritz, Goethe, Kant, Schiller, 
Fichte, Edward Young, Wordsworth, among others.	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with the kind of literature that aesthetic thinkers such as Moritz and Schiller believed the public 
should have been reading. Accordingly, Moritz's valorization of aesthetic perfection over the 
reader's pleasure "arms his own and all difficult writing against the eventuality of a hostile or 
indifferent reception" (Woodmansee, Market 32). Moritz carved out a space for the newly 
relevant category of the "artistic genius" to flourish; this space was, via the categories of 
disinterestedness and autonomy, sufficiently insulated from the tastes and demands of the middle 
class reading public. 
 Aesthetic recognition, however, was not enough. The genius had to contend with the 
market, for he was now a professional creator. It is here that Edward Young's 1759 essay 
Conjectures on Original Composition—which, according to Woodmansee, was better received in 
Germany than in Young's native England—proves key. The role of the author was drifting away 
from its Renaissance conceptualization, which viewed him as, at once, a skilled manipulator and 
craftsman of words, and as the inspired recipient of external motivation. Young's concern with the 
production of newness and originality in the aesthetic realm, Woodmansee advances, minimized 
the craftsmanship element of literary production and internalized the locus of inspiration. It is in 
this vision of the author's originality that the aesthetic philosophers found a foothold for the 
literary ownership necessary for the professionalization of the author. In an era of rampant and 
condoned literary piracy and non-existent legal protections of an author's financial interests, the 
defense of originality was a first step towards establishing some form of literary propriety, yet 
there was more work to be done. Amidst much skepticism that a person could have any property 
claim in an idea, Fichte, in his Proof of the Illegality of Reprinting: A Rationale and a Parable 
(1793) stepped in to explain how "ideas, once communicated, could remain the property of their 
originator" (Woodmansee, Market 51). Fichte argued that the creative work transcends its 
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physical foundation, and that such a work was intentional and not merely physical. The material 
aspect of the work—a book, say—may be sold, but the form—the content—remains the exclusive 
property of the author. This proprietary claim is based solely in the originality of the author's 
intention: "The copyright laws [Urheberrecht] enacted in the succeeding decades turn upon 
Fichte's key concept, recognizing the legitimacy of this claim by vesting exclusive rights to a 
work in the author insofar as he is an Urheber [originator, creator]— that is, insofar as his work is 
unique or original [eigentümlich], an intellectual creation that owes its individuality solely and 
exclusively to him" (Woodmansee, Market 52). 
 Beyond the content/form division lies yet another contradiction that has only recently 
become clearly visible. The Romantic posture brings together two models of subjectivity: the 
possessive individual on the one hand, and the singular genius on the other. It was through the 
possession of individual genius that the Romantics articulated their nascent defense of intellectual 
property. Yet this singular, genius, creative individual also claims, following the general 
orientation of the Romantic movement, to be the voice of the people, of the folk. These 
conflicting claims—an absolute genius bearing individual rights claims who simultaneously 
speaks for an entire people—previews the problems of representation that become most visible in 
the light of poststructuralist and postcolonial critiques of representational practice in politics and 
aesthetics.182  
 This combination of an individual genius, located at the pinnacle of a hierarchy of cultural 
representation, as best expressed by Fichte, is exceedingly hostile to any concept of the common 
or peer production. This is why the figure of the "Romantic Genius" has become one of the main 
ideological targets of the Free Culture movement in all of its orientations. Whereas Thomas 	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  My thanks to Cornell University's European History Colloquium, and especially Steve 
Kaplan, Duane Corpis, and Taran King, for drawing out this point. 
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Jefferson and some of the Framers of the US Constitution sought to balance the potential 
monopoly power of absolute authorship against their understanding of information and ideas 
gaining value through circulation and access, contemporary content distributors in their multi-
national incarnations have adopted the absolutist position of the original creator as the non- 
negotiable standard for international IP regimes. In the account of those pushing for ever-greater 
enclosures, the Enlightenment/Romantic model of the author is completely adequate to describe 
human creative production. This makes sense: any regime that seeks to enclose the commons—in 
either material or immaterial form—will care not if its concepts erase the commons. Armed with 
historical accounts such as Woodmansee's, the enemies of enclosure are confident that the liberal 
model has come unhinged and will betray its own instrumentality: as the legal fiction of absolute 
creative paternity came into being with technological and social developments (printing and the 
demands of a rising middle class readership, respectively), so will it wither away with the rise of 
the technological and social developments that Benkler heralds. Yet information and culture seem 
to be stuck in a vortex. Culture becomes a source of rent and an expedient tool at the service of 
politics. Hyde's comfort to artist-creators about the inevitable commodification of their work does 
not provide a critical position from which to understand such procedures. 
 George Yúdice provides such a critical position. In his 2003 The Expediency of Culture: 
Uses of Culture in the Global Era, Yúdice advances a thesis that culture in our global age has 
fallen under a logic of management that mirrors global capital's relationship to natural resources: 
"When culture is touted as a resource, it departs from the Gramscian premise that culture is a 
terrain of struggle and shifts strategy to processes of management" (Yúdice 279).183 Is this the 
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  Yúdice continues, "Compatible with neoliberal reconversions of civil society, culture as 
resource is seen as a way of providing social welfare and quality of life in the context of 
diminishing public resources and the withdrawal of the state from the guarantees of the good life. 
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way to resolve the material/immaterial split at the heart of liberal conceptions of property? For we 
see the two sides of the common—cultural and natural resources—subsumed under the same 
rubric of management.184 
 Who, then, manages culture? The same organizations, it turns out, that seek to manage 
natural resources: regional and national governments, supra-governmental organizations, non- 
governmental organizations (NGOs), and private foundations. The form of cultural management 
takes the form of that closest at hand to global capital: "As powerful institutions like the European 
Union, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and the major 
international foundations begin to understand culture as a crucial sphere for investment, it is 
increasingly treated like any other resource" (13). Following the neoliberal logic that governs 
such institutions, "culture for culture's sake, whatever that may be, will never be funded, unless it 
provides an indirect form of return. [...] The 'bottom line' is that cultural institutions and funders 
are increasingly turning to the measurement of utility because there is no other accepted 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
What we have commonly thought of as the often contentious new social movements have made 
common cause with international foundations and many government agencies in creating a 
'collaborative' civil society. This tendency is global and local at the same time and indeed marks a 
new development in conceptualizing the scope of culture, politics, and agency" (Yúdice 279-80).	  184Yúdice is very keen to this problem: "It is not always easy to make both—sociopolitical and 
economic—aspects of cultural management jibe without problems or contradictions. Consider, for 
example, that in accepting Western forms of law in order to protect their technologies (e.g., 
engineering of seed varieties) and cultural practices (e.g., aboriginal dream paintings), non-
Western peoples may undergo even more rapid transformation. If a particular technology or ritual 
is not currently included as a form of protectable property, the recourse to Western law to ensure 
that others do not make profits therefrom almost certainly entails the acceptance of the property 
principle. What will it mean when non-Western forms of knowledge, technology, and cultural 
practices are incorporated into intellectual property and copyright law? Will the sale of 
'inalienable' culture become something akin to the sale of pollution permits in the United States, 
whereby companies that reduce their air emissions can sell the rights to emit those air pollutants? 
Increasingly, in cultural as in natural resources, management is the name of the game" (Yúdice 2). 
For more on the collision of the international IP regime and indigenous cultural traditions, see 
Rosemary Coombe's recent work, for instance, "Intellectual Property Regimes of Neoliberal 
Governmentability: Locating Community Subjects and their Traditions," Contexts of Invention 
(Eds. Biagioli, Jaszi, Woodmansee, University of Chicago Press, forthcoming).	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legitimation for social investment" (Yúdice 15-6). 
 What Yúdice calls the "expediency of culture" is the collapse of "what in modernity 
belonged to emancipation on the one hand, and to regulation on the other." He continues, culture 
"is called on to resolve a range of problems for community, which seems only to be able to 
recognize itself in culture, which in turn has lost its specificity. Consequently, culture and 
community are caught in a circular, tautological reasoning" (Yúdice 25). 
 Yúdice's position is a more pessimistic presentation of what others have called 
"information environmentalism" or an "ecology of the commons." If the common is conceived, in 
both its natural and artificial form, as nothing more than 'that which is managed,' the common 
disappears as a productive force. It is precisely when something becomes unmanageable that it 
reveals itself as the common: industrial pollution of the environment reveals the interconnected 
web of an ecosystem that is no respecter of persons or nations.185 This is why the rapid transfer of 
digital files over peer-to-peer networks has fundamentally disturbed the current IP regime: as it is 
constituted, the dominant conception of IP would criminalize the basic cultural activities 
remixing, content-sharing—of a generation of so-called digital natives.186 In a word: for Benkler's 
Industrial Information Economy, file sharing has become absolutely unmanageable. 
 Unmanageability, in this context, can be seen as distinct from the kinds of shocks 
described by Milton Friedman, Jeffery Sachs, and Naomi Klein.187 In Klein's account, a shock is a 
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  The classic example is Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, where pesticide use, through its negative 
consequences, actually reveals the ecological truth that then condenses and consolidates itself into 
the political force called "the environmental movement."	  186	  On the criminalization of remix culture and legal solutions to the problem within the liberal 
property model, see Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid 
Economy.	  187	  See Naomi Klein's The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism for a critical account 
of Friedman's free market economics, especially the "shock program" he and other Chicago 
school economists recommended in Pinochet's Chile. 
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traumatic event—either natural or man-made—that hegemonic powers take advantage of in order 
to institute neoliberal and/or free-market reforms. In other words, Klein's thesis is that power 
manages catastrophic events in order to further consolidate hegemony. 
 The unmanageable is precisely not an acute crisis to be taken advantage of. Peer 
production may have been catastrophic for the hegemony of traditional record labels or political 
orders based on censorship and absolute media control, but neither the Recording Industry of 
America Association nor Arab and North African autocrats (so far) have capitalized on these 
catastrophes. The unmanageable elements tend to arise from sites otherwise abandoned that no 
else else cares to manage, and through the mobilization of unmanageability, something like a 
commons emerges. For, to borrow Hardt and Negri's term, the Republic of Property is 
constitutively incapable of dealing with a true commons, so a commons' emergence can only be 
experienced within the Republic of Property as an unmanageable event. In this sense, what is 
unmanageable for Property is also an opening for new critique of that order, and an extension of 
the general horizon of possibilities for political association and aesthetic production.188  
 Our question then becomes: if culture can only escape neoliberalism's capture by 
becoming unmanageable, and if the common becomes visible through these moments of 
unmanageability, what are the kinds of aesthetic objects that can set this procedure into motion, 
and who are the subjects capable of producing them? 
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  It must be said that no phenomenon is absolutely and eternally unmanageable. For instance, 
anarchist squats and community gardens that arise in urban spaces abandoned by Capital 
eventually run the risk of becoming reintegrated into the neoliberal order when/if Capital returns. 
For an account of this process, see "Creative Sabotage in the Factory of Culture: Art, 
Gentrification and the Metropolis" in Matteo Pasquinelli's Animal Spirits: A Bestiary of the 
Commons. Tiqqun is an example—there are many others—of a group that seemed dedicated to 
remaining unmanageable at any cost. Of course, the Situationist International and early avant- 
garde groups are key reference points in this practice.	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III Constructing the Unmanageable: Bolivia construcciones 
 The twentieth century has certainly seen its share of artistic and cultural movements 
dedicated to making culture itself unmanageable. Dada, Situationism, Festivals of Plagiarism, 
early Hip Hop, and The Pirate Bay have all, in their own ways, undertaken projects of 
destabilizing the liberal or neo-liberal orders in which they found themselves functioning. In 
literature, it would appear that plagiarism as a deliberate technique functions as one of these 
strategies to produce aesthetic objects that cannot be managed; when plagiarism-as-technique has 
appeared, its practitioners have generally pointed to notions of intertextuaity, re-writing, creative 
transformation, and the like, and thus gestured towards an understanding of creativity based more 
on circulation than on ownership. Such instances exploit the liberal impasse—the abyss between 
material and immaterial property, between a printed book and the ideas contained within—to 
reveal the common: that surplus of human creativity which possessive individualism cannot 
possibly manage. 
 The digital moment has only made these issues more pressing, as every single instance of 
accessing a digital file involves the copy and transfer of binary code amongst components of a 
networked communication system. Yet for the moment, I would like to explore two decidedly 
analog examples of literary appropriation and circulation in Latin America in order to see how 
such practices interact with and reveal something like a commons.  
 Plagiarism seems to be a strictly defined term, yet in truth it is a minefield that requires 
careful and deliberate navigation. Perhaps the simplest provisional definition would be "improper 
citation." The impropriety of an extended citation was precisely the issue in Argentina in 2006, 
when a prize-winning novel, Bolivia construcciones, was revealed to contain significant and 
unaccredited passages lifted more or less verbatim from the Spanish novelist Carmen Laforet's 
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1944 Nada. 
 Bolivia construcciones is an impressionistic novel, of some 87 chapters—few longer than 
two pages—that tells the story of a group of Bolivian immigrants living in contemporary Buenos 
Aires. The immigrants are mostly construction workers, and the novel chronicles their 
interactions with each other, with native-born Argentines of all classes, and with the urban fabric 
of the city itself. The book is attributed to Bruno Morales, pen name of the Argentine journalist- 
turned-novelist Sergio Di Nucci. Upon its release, the novel was heralded as a playful, 
compelling, and literarily significant exploration of the existence of a relatively invisible and 
marginal sector of the urban population. It was awarded the prestigious 2006-07 Premio de la 
novela by Editorial Sudamericana and La Nación. Several months after Morales/Di Nucci 
accepted the prize and its purse, a nineteen-year-old blogger posted to the publishing house's 
website revealing the undeniable similarities between Di Nucci's novel and passages from 
Laforet's Nada.189The blogosphere lurched into action; by the final count, thirty continuous pages 
of Di Nucci's two hundred page text came directly from Laforet's novel; these pages represented 
the climax of the novel, and the only observed changes were strictly superficial: changing of 
character and street names, along with some substitutions of Peninsular slang with more 
Rioplatense-sounding turns of the phrase. As a result, the judges revoked the prize, a group of 
authors, literary critics and professors penned an open letter in support of Di Nucci, and the 
question of the role of plagiarism and "sampling" was once again front and center in Argentine 
intellectual life, if only for a few months. 
 In fact, Di Nucci's act takes up a long and turbulent tradition of plagiarism in Argentine 
letters. Many bloggers of the Bolivia construcciones affair commented on the connection—with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  189	  The website www.nacionapache.com.ar has compiled an exhaustive online bibliography of the 
scandal. See the links at <http://www.nacionapache.com.ar/archives/1512>. 
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varying levels of approval—to Jorge Luis Borges' well-known story "Pierre Menard, Author of 
the Quixote." Borges' story, of course, is a touchstone for a proliferation of twentieth century 
post-structuralist theories of the death of the author; furthermore, Menard himself announced a 
technique that Borges would adopt throughout his entire opus: that of "deliberate anachronism 
and erroneous attribution." Such a technique cannot but undermine the literary economy of 
Modernist citation (one only has to compare T.S. Eliot's exhaustive footnotes following "The 
Wasteland" with Borges' lost volume of the Anglo American Cyclopedia in "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis 
Tertius"), it also destabilizes the Romantic concept of the author that, as Woodmansee and others 
have argued, leans heavily on the concepts of originality and propriety. 
 Much less had been made of the connections to Di Nucci's closer predecessor, Ricardo 
Piglia. In the mid-1970s, in a period of radicalization that immediately preceded the 1976-83 
Dirty War, Piglia published a collection of stories called Nombre falso. The centerpiece of the 
collection was Piglia's "Homage to Robert Arlt." That text surpasses Borges at his own game. 
Piglia narrates a literary detective story, the search for an unpublished manuscript by the early 
twentieth century Argentine writer Roberto Arlt; reproduced within the "Homage" are the 
narrator's field notes, sections of Roberto Arlt's notebooks, extended meditations—mostly 
contained within long and meandering footnotes—on the concepts of originality and authorship, 
and finally the object of the detective's investigation: Arlt's unpublished manuscript, a short story 
titled "Luba." But, of course, things are not as they seem; the unpublished story is actually a 
plagiarized translation of Leonid Andreyev's "The Darkness," the quotations that pepper the 
narrator's field notes are falsely attributed, and unattributed passages burst forth from the text. The 
sum total of Piglia's project is a total assault on the logic and economics of literary production in 
bourgeois society; his goal is clearly revolutionary, and he launches a bomb into the heart of the 
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concept of literary originality. The text is like a self-destructing letter mailed to Woodmansee's 
Romantic Genius, and the letter bears Ricardo Piglia's authoritative signature. 
 This does not seem to be Di Nucci's fight. Where Piglia attacks authorship, Di Nucci takes 
appropriation as a given. Where Piglia tangles himself in Argentine literary history and leftist 
politics, Di Nucci reaches for the most unlikely of sources (that is, the mid-century Spaniard 
Laforet). Josefina Ludmer (to whom, incidentally, Piglia dedicated "Homage to Roberto Arlt") 
has used Bolivia construcciones as an example of what she calls "post- autonomous literature." In 
Ludmer's reading, the 'autonomy' that is superseded in post-autonomous literature is the autonomy 
of the aesthetic object itself. This kind of literature (which still relies on the authority of the 
author's name, as evidenced by Ludmer's bibliography that includes Cesar Aira, Francisco 
Vallejo, and Mario Bellatin, among other Latin American novelists) works through two 
movements of erasure. First, novels such as Bolivia construcciones erase the border between the 
economic and the literary; second, they erase the border between fiction and reality.190 Encounters 
with such post-autonomous aesthetic objects force the reader to confront the very conditions of 
possibility of literature as such. The reader can take one of two paths: "The reader can see the 
change in the status of the literary, and consequently a different episteme or a different mode of 
reading appears. Or the reader can ignore or deny such a change, and consequently categories like 
'good' and 'bad' literature, or simply 'literature' and 'not literature' continue to exist."191 Clearly, for 
Ludmer, the second path represents a failure of the reader, even if that reader passes off the 
failure to the text itself. The concept of 'post- autonomous literature' helps us confront how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  190	  Reinaldo Laddaga has advanced a similar thesis; see Espectáculos de realidad: Ensayo sobre 
la narrativa latinoamericana de las últimas dos décadas.	  191	  "Dicho de otro modo: o se ve el cambio en el estatuto de la literatura, y entonces aparece otra 
episteme y otros modos de leer. O no se lo ve o se lo niega, y entonces seguiría habiendo 
literatura y no literatura, o mala y buena literatura" (Ludmer Tesis VIII; my translation).	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different Di Nucci's project is from the radical celebration of plagiarism. Sergio Di Nucci, or 
Bruno Morales, or Carmen Laforet...whoever it is, that author is not looking to advance a 
withering away of the author through the subversive proliferation of cribbed textual fragments. If 
Piglia's Nombre falso forces the reader to ask, who? it would seem that Di Nucci demands that his 
reader, staring at the book itself, ask what? It is precisely that calling into question of the aesthetic 
object itself that makes such an object unmanageable. 
 
 My own reading, up to this point, has mimicked the general tenor of the novel's critical 
reception: much more has been made of the plagiarism than of the novel itself. And even if I am 
sympathetic to Ludmer's thesis, I am not yet ready to jettison my traditional modes of reading. 
The teenage blogger's "discovery" of the lifted passages—itself a chance event—leads me to ask: 
what would this novel be without that discovery? It would have continued to be, to begin with, a 
prize-winning novel. Yet perhaps we as readers would have been more focused on Di Nucci's 
staging of the problems of representation. Di Nucci maintained that the title itself, Bolivia 
construcciones, was enough of a clue to exculpate the author from any charges of plagiarism.192 
We can agree that the title is indeed strange: not "Bolivian Constructions" nor "Constructing 
Bolivia"; the two Spanish words are incommensurate. "Constructions Bolivia," the title a 
mismatch in number, a mixture of singular and plural, with "Bolivia" almost an adjective 
modifying "Constructions," but not quite because it is out of place and out of agreement. The two 
nouns exist uncomfortably side-by-side. And there is the problem of the author's name itself. 
Sergio Di Nucci, an almost textbook example of an Argentine name of Italian extraction, recedes 
(Di Nucci's name only appears on the inside flap of the dust jacket) while Bruno Morales, a name 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  192	  Daniel Link had what in hindsight appears to be a properly nihilistic solution to the entire 
affair: Di Nucci needed simply to dedicate his text A Nada, "to nothing."	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both generically Bolivian and evocative of Evo Morales, the indigenous President of that country, 
dominates the book's cover. It is as if Morales' fictional tale would have been meaningless if 
published under any name but a false one. 
 This concern with the problematic nature of representation continues throughout the text 
itself. In one of the brief sketches, the characters encounter a German filmmaker. An Argentine 
friend of the protagonist introduces the filmmaker with the proud declaration, "He knows that I'm 
not a petty bourgeois."193 As the filmmaker records footage for his documentary (a documentary 
on, the reader supposes, the conditions of immigrants and workers), a Bolivian woman, fishing 
some olives out of a glass jar, worries that, "This man is going to think we don't know what a fork 
is."194 The protagonist gives us two images from that otherwise "unmemorable" day: the 
filmmaker's delight upon seeing an Italian painting reproduced on a tin of jam ("He thought that 
was 'admirable,' and proof he was in a country of the highest class"); and the "more complicated" 
moment when, after a round of laughter sweeps the table, the German comments, "You have such 
a sad story, yet you somehow manage to conserve a bit of happiness." After an awkward pause, 
the Bolivian woman replies, "Ay no, why do you think that we have a sad story?"195 
 This little scene, reported faithfully by Bruno Morales, separates the author himself from 
those patronizing others who come to document brief moments of dignity in a world otherwise 
comprised entirely of suffering and sadness. According to Graciela Speranza's reading of the 
novel, such scenes move the reader away from a constellation of plagiarism and authorship and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  193	  "—Él—y lo señalaba—sabe que no soy un pequeño burgués" (Morales 93; all translations my 
own).	  194	  "—Este hombre—se refería al alemán—va a pensar que no conocemos los tenedores" 
(Morales 93). 195	  "Le pareció 'admirable', y la prueba de que estaba en un país cultísimo. [...] –Tiene usted una 
historia tan triste, y sin embargo ha logrado conservar la alegría. [...] –Ay no—le dijo—, ¿por qué 
le parece que tenemos una historia triste?" (Morales 94).	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towards one of indigent identity. Yet the question remains: who can tell this story? Di Nucci's 
oblique reference to the problem highlights concerns over realism and verisimilitude; here, then, 
is another register of the construcciones, one familiar to any critic of the testimonio debate in 
Latin American literature. Yet that question—is this the real thing?—falls immediately back into 
the quagmire of Nada. Does the author's appropriation of a sixty-year old Spanish novel about 
post-Civil War Spain, through the unapologetic anachronism of its very presence, somehow 
resolve the problems of representation through absolute overdetermination? 
 
 If the novel itself appears as improvised, as the piecemeal, cobbled-together dwellings in 
which the characters live, does that bring us away from or back towards the literary text? We 
know there are further constructions beyond the walls and chimneys that the Bolivian laborers 
build. Does Di Nucci ask his reader, contemplating the "constructed" text, to return to Laforet? 
(Nada is, Di Nucci mentions in various interviews, the third most translated Spanish novel...do we 
need to confirm that fact as well?) Is there some greater resonance between the appropriated 
scenes, a series that follows a frustrated and temperamental artist in his descent into the violent 
urban underworld while the narrator, foolishly in love with the painter's girlfriend, follows? The 
critic wants some guarantee before embarking on his own chase: will there be some critical payoff 
for the reader who tracks down all of these literary 'samples'? In the model that Di Nucci follows, 
that of Borges and Piglia, the literary detective is always rewarded. But this seems to be Di 
Nucci's formal break with his predecessors. The case of Piglia's Nombre falso, as Bruno Bosteels 
has demonstrated in a masterful reading, leads the reader through a reconfiguration of Argentine 
literary history, a conjugation of Borges and Roberto Arlt, Kafka and Max Brod, Brecht and Mao, 
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to a conclusion as inescapable as it is nonexisistent.196 Di Nucci's literary appropriation lacks the 
political coloring of Piglia's text; in effect, Di Nucci points somewhere else. If anything is 
articulated in Bolivia construcciones, it is not the systematic destabilization of a series of authors' 
proper names; it is, rather, construction in its material and immaterial guises. Laforet, it turns out, 
is a red herring. Di Nucci does not want to send his reader to the library. He wants to send her to 
the city itself, to those improvised structures of the shantytowns and the unexpected 
juxtapositions of the immigrant barrios. 
 At this point it is useful to return to Ludmer's thesis. While Piglia's text seeks to 
destabilize the author's proper name as such, Di Nucci seeks to reveal construction wherever it 
may be, especially at the expense of any concept of the autonomy of the aesthetic object.197 The 
text reveals the very construction of the city as a collective yet antagonistic effort, and this 
constructed nature of the urban fabric parallels the constructed nature of Di Nucci's text. Thus, the 
second half of the novel moves away from construction sites and towards the general circulation 
of these characters in the city, shown through scenes like those of their interactions with property 
developers seeking to gentrify their neighborhood, or the characters' attempts to organize a 
petition to remove the obnoxious megaphones from the grounds of a local school. In other words: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  196	  Bosteels explains how Piglia's text works against the very concept of originality so central to 
literature's claims of autonomy: "How, then, does one avoid, not just in theory but in the practice 
of a different writing, the whole of literary ideology with its basic elements that are creation, 
genius and the canon of absolute values? Piglia responds to this dilemma with the systematic 
application of plagiarism and false attribution, that is, with a practice that destroys the most 
obstinate of all ideologies of the literary: the cult of originality. It is here where the combination 
of Arlt with Borges acquires its politico-economic value through the false attributions made by 
Kostia or Piglia. Falsification does not bring about only a new literary aesthetic but, by attacking 
the very principle of the private appropriation of the written, it also attempts to annihilate the very 
foundation that has been the basis of aesthetic judgment throughout modernity" (Bosteels 241).	  197	  It is worth observing that although the characters spend their days planning and building 
dwellings for both themselves and for upper class Argentines, nowhere are they referred to as 
architects. They are albañiles through and through.	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this text opens out to the city at the expense of its own autonomy. 
 In the wake of the plagiarism scandal, Di Nucci made several gestures that reinforce this 
operation. In his subsequent interviews, the author explained that the novel Bolivia 
construcciones was merely an instrumental means in a larger social project. He had always 
intended to donate any prize money to community organizations in Buenos Aires that focused on 
issues of immigrant rights. In his enigmatic acceptance speech—presented before the discovery, 
but only transparent in its meaning after the revelation—he proclaimed, "There are ends, and 
there are means. The end was always this donation. The means—Bolivia construcciones—is only 
a novel. [...] Beginning with the author's use of a pseudonym, everything is construction in 
Bolivia construcciones, just as the novel's title announces. Construction, not a homage to a reality 
that no form of empathy will allow us to represent."198 The literary object—the novel— exists to 
serve the needs of a greater extra-literary project of community organization. Di Nucci thus 
strikes a pose of a literary Robin Hood, taking cash from the treasuries of publishing houses and 
prestige from a distinguished panel of judges only to distribute his booty amongst the indigent and 
voiceless. Or, viewed from another angle, Di Nucci has embraced the role of propagandist, 
subordinating aesthetic concerns to those of political mobilization and social organization. Or 
perhaps he is walking the line of the politically committed novelist who directs his creative gifts 
towards some sort of intervention without any sacrifice other than those demanded by the cause. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  198	  "Hay los fines, y hay los medios. El fin era esta donación. El medio—Bolivia 
construcciones—es sólo una novela. En los años sesenta, un novelista norteamericano blanco 
publicó el relato en primera persona de un esclavo. Aspiró a narrar con una voz que sonara negra, 
y terminó convirtiendo el libro en una clara falsificación. Yo preferí reconocer que nunca sonaría 
como boliviano auténtico. En literatura, lo verdadero no existe. Si nos desnudamos, es porque 
perseguimos un efecto: lo sabía un gran santo, que lo hizo en la plaza pública. Ya desde la 
adopción de un seudónimo para el nombre de autor, todo es construcción en Bolivia 
construcciones, como lo anuncia el título de la novela. Construcción, antes que homenaje a una 
realidad que ninguna empatía nos permitirá representar" (Di Nucci, Una felicidad; my 
translation). 
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 After Di Nucci's initial Robin Hood gesture, what remains of the aesthetic object as such? 
Two significant events follow. The "constructed" literary object appeared as a digital file under an 
anticopyright, freely available to anyone with an internet connection to download, manipulate, 
remix, and re-distribute.199 Furthermore, Di Nucci donated the text to a Bolivian organization 
called Yerba Mala Cartonera, a publishing house/community organization that prints literature 
from recycled materials. Yerba Mala Cartonera is a sister project of Eloisa Cartonera, located in 
Buenos Aires. The connection between Di Nucci's novel and the Cartonera is illuminating, as it 
situates Di Nucci's textual intervention in a larger constellation of contemporary creative 
production in Latin America.200  
 
IV Refuse Aesthetics, Aesthetic Refusal? 
 I will bracket the digital incarnation of Bolivia construcciones for now, as I investigate the 
phenomenon of digital distribution and copyleft in the next chapter. For the moment I would like 
to focus on the decidedly low-fi approach to social and creative production that is the Cartonera 
project. In the words of the founders of Eloísa Cartonera, "We are Eloísa Cartonera, a work 
cooperative located in the La Boca neighborhood in the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina. We 
produce handmade books with cardboard covers. We purchase this cardboard from the urban 
pickers ("cartoneros") who collect it from the streets. Our books are of Latin American literature, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  199	  Available at http://lavaca.org/notas/bolivia-construcciones/. La Vaca, the organization that 
hosts the electronic version of the novel, is a cooperative that mixes on-the-ground community 
organization with digital technologies. All content on their website is licensed under an 
anticopyright.	  200	  The Cartonera model has spread from Buenos Aires to the aforementioned site in La Paz, 
Bolivia, and also to Brazil, Paraguay, Mexico, Chile, Peru (links to each site at 
http://www.eloisacartonera.com.ar/amigos.html ). Furthermore, Harvard University has designed 
a collaborative intercultural art-based curriculum with the collaboration of Cartonera publishing 
houses and Professor Doris Sommer. See http://www.worldfund.org/cultural-agents-
initiative.html. 
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the most beautiful we had a chance to read in our lives, both as publishers as well as readers."201 
 The Cartonera project had its origins in the Argentine economic crisis of 2001-2002, in 
which political and economic turmoil led ultimately to a devastating currency devaluation, social 
unrest and widespread economic hardship. One of the figures who rose to prominence during the 
crisis was the cartonero. The cartonero is a collector of paper and cardboard. Due to the currency 
devaluation and a lack of local production facilities, the price of paper goods skyrocketed 
beginning in 2002; this fact, combined with widespread unemployment, led to a proliferation of 
families roaming through the streets, collecting paper and cardboard to sell to recycling centers. 
In 2003, the founders of Eloísa Cartonera partnered with a group of cartoneros in order to 
produce affordable editions of literary texts from recycled paper. Young cartoneros painted the 
cardboard covers—each one unique—of the texts, which themselves varied from stories and short 
novels from some of the most well-known Latin American authors to new voices and 
experimental forms. Not only does Eloísa Cartonera create affordable editions (averaging around 
one-tenth of the cost of traditional paperbacks, many of which are imported from Spain), but it 
also serves as a workshop for poor youth to learn the craft of artisanal bookmaking, along with 
generally promoting literacy in a community underserved by the State. 
 Eloísa Cartonera quickly became its own sort of local phenomenon, and their headquarters 
in La Boca became the center of a significant social movement. The project is not a frontal assault 
on Romantic conceptions of authorship and originality, but rather a coordinated guerrilla siege on 
the autonomy of the aesthetic object and the system of value that supports it. Instead of positing a 
labyrinth of  "deliberate anachronism and erroneous attribution" that ultimately results in the self-
canceling of authorship, the Cartonera project focuses on collaboration and collective social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  201	  All text from the English-language version of the Eloísa Cartonera website 
http://www.eloisacartonera.com.ar/home.html. Translations slightly modified. 
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production. This is a realization of literature as a social movement: the text reaches beyond 
itself—in what can be read as instrumental terms—to intervene directly in urban life. 
 This intervention returns us to Yúdice's concept of managed culture: the Cartonera project 
makes traditional notions of value unmanageable. As far as the beautiful and autonomous 
aesthetic object: its cover is made, literally, of recycled trash. The only unique aspect of the work 
is the hand-painted cover, while the text contained within flaunts its reproducibility (these texts 
were originally photocopies, now they are printed on a Multilith 1250 offset printing press). The 
early texts exploited the name-recognition of famous authors—Ricardo Piglia among them—yet 
the originality of the project resided exclusively in the contribution of the young cartoneros- 
turned-painters. The publishing house overpays for cardboard (at one point they advertised paying 
five times the market rate) and undercharges for literature (each volume costs at most several 
dollars), thus flaunting resistance to economic orthodoxy. Expensive trash, cheap literature. A 
book-object that installs the immaterial ideas of creative production firmly in the materiality of 
the city: the recycled covers have been known to stain the reader's fingers and carry the olfactory 
residue of their past lives. 
 Is this an example of the commons of peer production? One is tempted to declare an 
enthusiastic yes. Does Eloísa Cartonera exist in a sphere of production beyond the market? Not as 
such, but the publishing house certainly challenges the fundamental economic and aesthetic 
assumptions that support neo-liberal publishing models. The Cartonera publishers do not resolve 
the impasse between material and immaterial commons, yet their practices certainly reveal the 
impasse: objects of intellectual property find themselves wrapped in the most material and 
unwieldy of all things: refuse. 
 Strangely enough, this project would vanish if digitized, and thus it presents a useful check 
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on Benkler-style celebrations of the unparalleled newness of digital peer production. As it stands, 
Eloisa Cartonera opens literature beyond the preoccupations that lead authors and critics to fret 
over the status of authorship and originality. The project does not resolve those concerns; at best, 
as Di Nucci's case shows, it equalizes the social field, where the author would become one more 
collaborator in a larger social project that explodes beyond the boundaries of the literary. That, 
perhaps, is the process of revealing the commons: literature opens beyond itself and touches the 
material commons of the built environment. The immaterial commons of narrative circulates 
within the urban sphere, and ephemeral economies of citation resolve themselves into physical 
networks of recycled materials. 
 Does this mean that the literary, as such, must disappear to reveal the common? In this 
particular case, the autonomous literary object recedes, but this does not seem to me to be 
necessarily so. Some of the authors Ludmer cites in developing her post-autonomous thesis strike 
me as the most interesting novelists writing in Latin America today,202 and I think it is still 
valuable to read such practitioners as novelists. Yet it seems that the Latin American author is 
pulled in two directions; we can describe the two poles as object and process. Is the point of Di 
Nucci or Eloísa Cartonera's literary intervention the creation of an aesthetic object, or rather the 
author's participation in a social process? If Bolivia construcciones is a literary object—and it was 
evaluated as such by the Sudamericana/La nación prize committee—readers can judge it 
according to whatever familiar methodology of reading they choose (from 'reading for pure 
pleasure' to formal deconstruction, or any other number of reading strategies). The same applies 
for an Eloísa Cartonera text. However, if the sequence plagiarism-publication-prize-donation in 
its entirety is in fact the aesthetic process, would Bolivia construcciones have been a failure if the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  202	  Incidentally, many of those authors have also donated otherwise unpublished manuscripts to 
the Cartonera publishing houses.	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plagiarism hadn't been discovered? Would that aesthetic sequence have failed if it hadn't won a 
cash award, where the failure resides not in any qualitative shortcomings, but rather in its status as 
an unsuccessful instrument incapable of obtaining its goal? Similarly, or perhaps even more 
provocatively, does a Cartonera text fail if it, instead of being circulated and read to death among 
those who can not afford imported texts, the cardboard books end up preserved and displayed in 
academic libraries and the private salons of wealthy collectors? In other words, how to judge 
these aesthetic practices that expose the immaterial commons? 
 Reinaldo Laddaga, who like Ludmer has considered these new aesthetic forms at length, 
offers a sort of categorical imperative for new aesthetic practices focused on what he calls 
'experimental communities': Act in such a way that the artistic process in which you form part will 
be compatible with some form of experimental democracy.203 Yet this imperative, especially in 
light of Laddaga's other conclusions, reads like the evaluation of a social engineering project, not 
an aesthetic practice.204 If we remove the word "artistic" from his imperative, it quickly becomes 
simply a political imperative: Act in such a way that the process in which you form part will be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  203	  Laddaga articulates this imperative in various places; see, for example, Espectáculos de la 
realidad: Ensayo sobre la narrativa latinoamericana de las últimas dos décadas and Estética de 
la emergencia: la formación de otra cultura de las artes. It is unclear whether Laddaga realizes 
the irony of appealing to the Kantian categorical imperative in support of post-autonomous art, 
when Kant's Critique of Judgment contains one of the most philosophically rigorous defenses of 
the autonomy of the creative-artistic genius. See Sections 44-49 in Kant's Third Critique.	  204	  In fact, reading the conclusion of Laddaga's Estética de la emergencia, the reader may be 
shocked at how few traditional "art things" appear in his summation of the projects he has been 
studying: “De lo que se trata en estos proyectos es de articular en un territorio multiplicado […] 
una demanda democrática que no se conforma con la simple afirmación de principios sino que 
intenta movilizar otros procesos de innovación institucional, organizacional, técnica: de 
innovación al nivel de las maneras de articular conversaciones, distribuir los espacios y soportes 
para que se establezcan posiciones, situar esos soportes en espacios particulares y estos espacios 
particulares en redes [...] desplegar imágenes, textos, arquitecturas del espacio y del sonido, de 
modo tal que favorezcan la exploración, por parte de colectividades numerosas, de nebulosas 
sociales nunca condensadas, de sus vehículos, moradas o mundos comunes” (Laddaga, Estética 
292-3).	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compatible with some form of experimental democracy. As nice goal, certainly. But it is hard to 
accept as a categorical imperative for aesthetic judgment, for it would indiscriminately exclude 
certain practices that one would like to continue considering aesthetic (for instance, an art practice 
that explores humanity's authoritarian or tyrannical capabilities), along with including many 
practices that, while certainly comprehensible under the rubric of "experimental democracy," 
would seem to have no business in the sphere of art (like new forms of voting practices in a labor 
union). 
 Claire Bishop, in a series of recent interventions, warns that the tendency to substitute 
ethical judgment (i.e. Is Eloísa Cartonera an example of a good and just collaboration between 
artists and the community-at-large in which it operates?) for aesthetic ones (i.e. Does this 
particular story published by Eloísa Cartonera deserve critical attention, and what are its literary 
merits)? The problem, Bishop elaborates, is when ethical judgment displaces aesthetic judgment, 
Authorial intentionality (or a humble lack thereof) is privileged over a discussion of the work's 
conceptual significance as a social and aesthetic form. 
Paradoxically, this leads to a situation in which not only collectives but also 
individual artists are praised for their authorial renunciation. And this may explain, 
to some degree, why socially engaged art has been largely exempt from art 
criticism. Emphasis is shifted away from the disruptive specificity of a given work 
and onto a generalized set of moral precepts.205 
Laddaga would rightfully counter that a practice like Eloísa Cartonera or a project like Di Nucci's 
puts the very autonomy of aesthetics on the table, and thus the critic, when confronted with such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  205	  In "The Social Turn: Collaboration and its Discontents," Artforum 44.6. See also her 
"Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics," and her forthcoming book Artificial Hells: Participatory 
Art and the Politics of Spectatorship.	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an object and/or process, cannot act as if the ethical and political valences are not present in his 
evaluation. (This is, in part, the 'decision' Ludmer refers to, as her entire conceptual apparatus of 
postautonomy is based on the breakdown of aesthetic autonomy, and thus the postautonomous 
aesthetic object must be judged by some form of post-Kantian emergent criterion of judgment.) 
 Both Laddaga and Bishop would agree on the necessity to think the aesthetic and the 
social/political together, instead of simply subsuming all judgment under the category of the 
ethical. For all of that, Yúdice's underlying point still rings true: the neoliberal order now looks 
towards culture to step in where government and civil society have failed; it is precisely these acts 
of ethical aesthetics, the creation of experimental communities, that fill the void of the ineffectual 
State. Furthermore, even though Benkler's conflation of culture and information is spurious, we 
see an analogous activity in cyberspace: for instance, privatley-owned social media companies 
engaging in international diplomacy, as in the examples of Google and Yahoo's divergent China 
policies, or Twitter and Facebook's divergent privacy policies in Northern Africa and the Arabian 
Peninsula. Not that the rise of these community-oriented aesthetic experiments are scorn-worthy. 
(And here, once again, the problem of judgment returns...) We can say the best of these projects, 
in their fully complex and contradictory being, present unmanageable solutions to unmanageable 
problems. 
 That is, these community-oriented practices address problems that otherwise perplex the 
neoliberal order. (In our examples: immigration, the free circulation of ideas, geopolitically- 
based economic and cultural inequalities, systemic urban poverty, etc.) The processes and the 
objects they produce are themselves unmanageable within that same neoliberal order because of 
their exposure of, participation in, or connection to the commons. 
 In this light, perhaps the seeming abyss between material and immaterial commons is not 
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unbridgeable. The impulses that pull creative practitioners towards, respectively, the all-too- 
material realm of recycled cardboard, or the immaterial realm of digital networks, are not 
opposed, inasmuch as both impulses are impulses to reveal the commons. In the next chapter, I 
will consider the digital circulation and distribution of aesthetic, and principally literary, objects. 
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CHAPTER 5 
COPYLEFT AS TRAINING GROUD: THE DIGITAL HORIZONS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
"The alternative of the commons is too horrifying to contemplate."  —Garrett Hardin 
 
 This, then, will be a horror story. Garrett Hardin's 1968 diagnosis of the "tragedy of the 
commons" has structured much contemporary Western thought—with the notable exception of 
certain radical sectors—surrounding the concept of the commons. But today, the very definition of 
the commons has become a site of social, political and creative struggle. The concept— arguably 
as old as our species' relationship with the land itself—has been adopted and reconfigured to 
operate in the realm of intellectual property (IP), especially in connection with the architecture of 
the Internet and networked society, and in scientific advances in the control and manipulation of 
genetic material.206 
 This conceptual reconfiguration is not unilateral or monolithic, but it is possible to 
generalize certain concerns that link the many and diverse thinkers who take the problem of 
enclosure in its technological guise as central to an understanding of contemporary cultural 
circulation and radical politics. These struggles adopt the language of anti-enclosure to the 
immaterial realm of ideas and the ever-problematic realm of the genome. Such terms as 
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  Intellectual Property in the Anglo-American tradition can be subdivided into four separate 
areas: copyright (which deals with creative/professional expression and will be the main focus of 
this paper); patent law (which deals with inventions, and raises particular controversy in the realm 
of biotechnology, pharmaceutical production and genetic engineering); trademark; and trade 
secrets (this is a catch-all category, but think of a proprietary claim on a soft drink recipe). The 
Francophone tradition also includes the concept of author's rights. The classic introduction is 
Benjamin Kaplan's An Unhurried View of Copyright. For an introduction with an eye towards 
digital technology and remix culture, see the opening chapter of Siva Vaidhyanathan's Copyrights 
and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How it Threatens Creativity.	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informational ecology, digital enclosure, and creative/informational commons connect 
contemporary concerns about the status of intellectual property with a longer tradition of 
questioning private property as such, even if these connections are not fully articulated. Indeed, 
the dominant name for alternative IP schemes is copyleft, a tacit acknowledgement that thinkers 
of copyleft dedicate their energies to constructing a progressive or radical alternative to copyright. 
In other words: copyleft embraces an approach that focuses on re-imagining the legal/juridical 
structure of copyright in a digital/networked age. 
 The history of the development of the concept of copyleft is well-documented; at this 
point, the Free Software narrative has become a kind of mythology.207 This chapter will not retell 
that story; instead, it will attempt to do two needed and interrelated theoretical tasks: 1) connect 
the recent enthusiasm around alternative models of intellectual property regimes—broadly 
grouped under the general concepts of copyleft and the creative commons—to the ur-historical 
struggle centered around the idea of enclosure (simply: the process of erasing the commons); 2) to 
move beyond US Constitutional Law-based critiques of the contemporary IP regime— currently 
focused around competing interpretations of the meaning of Article 1 Section 8 Clause 8208—to 
an authentically global consideration of the implications of the contemporary enclosure of the 
immaterial world. The fundamental question is: what is the nature of human creativity, and what 
it can teach us about our concept of property, both intellectual and otherwise?  
 Asking this question will, I hope, create an opening through which the true history of the 
concept of the commons as a claim of radical inclusion can animate the current debate 
surrounding digital enclosures. What is at stake is NOT an attempt to create something like a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  207	  See, for instance, Eric S. Raymond, The Cathedral and The Bazaar. 208	  The Intellectual Property Clause: "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries. 
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'zone of free play' or a 'creative sandbox' in the heart of the private property regime where artists 
and creative types can entertain themselves. The stakes are much higher: it is a demand for an 
inclusive right that may begin at the level of culture and information (against digital enclosures, 
say), but will expand to encompass a common, inclusive demand to the right to the good life. 
 
I Authorship and Ownership 
 The arguments in favor of a creative commons take several forms. The most prominent 
proponents within the United States—and an ever-growing network of global affiliates—are tied 
to the Creative Commons (CC) organization. As this organization grew out of efforts to protect 
and enhance publicly available creative works within the United States, its arguments regarding 
the status of intellectual property and the commons tend to rely heavily on the US Constitution 
and relevant case law. The main criticisms about the current IP regime in the United States fall 
into three broad and overlapping categories: fair use, antimonoply, and the evolving medium.209 
"Fair Use" argues that there are certain exceptions to exclusive IP rights, and that current right 
holders are making unprecedented power grabs to regulate uses that were previously considered 
fair: brief quotation, parody, scholarly/education use, etc. This argument also attempts to balance 
the rights of past and future creators: the current IP regime is biased towards contemporary 
creators of IP and prejudicial to future creators, since restrictive IP regulation denies future 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  209	  For a synthesis of these three positions, see James Boyle, The Public Domain: Enclosing the 
Commons of the Mind (New Haven: Yale UP, 2008; also available at james-boyle.com). These 
criticisms have found global traction, as the US IP regime is affirmed as a model for the 
international standard through agreements such as TRIPS and the actions of NGOs such as the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO, a specialized United Nations agency). See 
Christopher May, A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights (London: 
Routledge, 2000).	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creators the very building blocks of any new creative works.210 
 The "antimonopoly" argument recognizes that the Framers of the US Constitution were 
loath to grant any kind of limited monopoly, and that all reconsideration of the IP regime should 
work to minimize (not maximize, as rights holders such as Disney argue) the scope and duration 
of the noxious yet necessary monopoly.211 Each of these respective two positions emphasizes a 
different part of the IP Clause in the US Constitution: "fair use" emphasizes the State's role in 
promoting "Progress of Science and useful Arts"; "antimonopoly" emphasizes the State's 
conventional compromise to grant monopoly IP rights only for "limited Times".212 
 Other arguments move away from the specifics of the US Constitution to make 
historically-supported global claims about technology. As the medium of expression evolves—a 
product, clearly, of technological change—our concepts of ideas and creativity, and whatever 
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  The provision is "Sec. 107 Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use." See Lawrence Lessig, 
Free Culture and The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World. In Free 
Culture, Lessig argues that society is relying upon the conventional "fair use" exemption to 
copyright to do more and more work in the digital age as previously unregulated activities 
become regulated thanks to technological advances (for instance: the number of devices on which 
you can read the e-book you purchased). Lessig wants to make legal adjustments "to restore the 
balance that has traditionally defined copyright's regulation—a weakening of that regulation, to 
strengthen creativity" (Lessig, Free 169). Thus he argues that the letter of today's increased 
copyright regulation betrays the spirit and intent of the copyright clause in the US Constitution. 
There is also a free speech component to the fair use argument based on the First Amendment to 
the US Constitution; See Yochai Benkler, "Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment 
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain."	  211	  See Boyle, Public Domain, especially cp 2, "Thomas Jefferson Writes a Letter." This 
antimonopoly argument also complicates any defense of current IP practices that invokes the 
"marketplace of ideas": most existing IP regimes are inherently anti-free market, as the regimes 
rely on a state-granted monopoly. See Boyle, Public Domain 198-9.	  212	  Another important consideration is the status of "orphaned works," works that are theoretically 
protected by copyright but practically have no right holder willing or able to enforce his or her 
claim. Historically, these works would have passed into the "public domain"; today, they make up 
the bulk of Twentieth century culture: works unavailable in any way for commercial use and in 
exceedingly limited and restricted ways for noncommercial use. See Benkler, "Free as the Air to 
Common Use." The status of orphaned works has been one of the main points of disagreement in 
the Google Books affair. 
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rights we might attach to them, need to evolve as well. Technology disrupts communication, and 
out of that rupture, users reconfigure society. Carolyn Marvin summarizes this methodological 
position: "If it is the case, as it is fashionable to assert, that media give shape to the imaginative 
boundaries of modern communities, then the introduction of new media is a special historical 
occasion when patterns anchored in older media that have provided the stable currency of social 
exchange are reexamined, challenged, and defended."213 Such thinkers appeal to other historical 
moments of disruptive technological advances (the most invoked moments tend to be the shift 
from scroll to codex, the European invention of the printing press and the rise of the Guttenberg 
Bible—with little or no acknowledgement of early Asian instances of printing—and the video 
cassette recorder/VCR); they then try to think through the problems of IP from the perspective of 
the medium itself. Cory Doctorow summarizes this position: "Just as the industrial economy 
wasn't based on making it harder to get access to machines, the information economy won't be 
based on making it harder to get access to information."214 
 In the service of these three points (the need to expand exceptions to exclusionary IP 
rights; the need to limit State-granted IP monopolies; the need to rethink the law to capture the 
democratic potential of new technologies), Creative Commons carves out a space for a public 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  213	  Carolyn Marvin, When Old Technologies Were New: Thinking About Electric Communication 
in the Late XIXth Century. Marvin's text is a key methodological reference point to anyone 
writing on technology. She reminds us: "The history of media is never more or less than the 
history of their uses, which always lead us away from them to the social practices and conflicts 
they illuminate" (Marvin 8).	  214See Cory Doctorow, Content: Selected Essays on Technology, Creativity, Copyright, and the 
Future of the Future. The essay "Microsoft Research DRM Talk" is a concise statement of his 
position, while "Ebooks: Neither E, Nor Books" develops an illuminating comparison between 
Luther Bibles and Ebooks. Doctorow's analogy is as compelling as it is problematic; it must be 
understood in the larger context of his argument that information itself (or "content," as he calls 
it) is both the product of the information economy and the mode of production itself. To complete 
his analogy, it should be said that while industrial machines work raw materials, in the 
information economy, information works information. Immediately, two limitations jump forth: 
who does the work? and how does this "access" to information spread materially?	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domain within the current copyright regime. This is the idea of some rights reserved.215 The CC 
license allows users to alienate specific rights from the "bundle of rights" implicit in copyright 
(for instance: future noncommercial use of a work; future derivative use of a work; attribution) to 
a general public-at-large of future creators.216 The Free Software community and its later 
derivatives have pioneered similar models. But again: these are not fully alternative models to 
copyright, but rather attempts to create something like a commons within a world of exclusionary 
and seemingly unlimited private IP rights.  
 Other branches of the loosely-defined copyleft family take a much more radical 
approach.217 Those who rally under the slogan "information wants to be free" tend to reject the 
validity of copyright as such, and they view tools such as the General Public License (GPL) as 
"legal hacks" that begrudgingly mobilize copyright to "counterfeit" the phenomena of 
anarchism.218 In this sense, the GPL still represents a "use of intellectual property rules to create a 
commons in cyberspace", but those in the Free Software movement affirm the moral imperative 
of a commitment to anarchist production, and they express optimism that anarchism will triumph 
in the digital age.219 These arguments tend to be nested in broader anarchist theories.220 Such 
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  I have yet to see persuasive argument for commons based on the "author's rights" model; as 
this model grants the author unlimited and exclusive individual rights, this might account for its 
lack of traction in the global copyleft movement.	  216	  For a concise definition, see www.creativecommons.org.	  217	  I assume that commercial bootleggers (who earn a livelihood from the willful infringement of 
copyright) do not present compelling moral justifications for their behavior, although I have heard 
a rather twisted argument that piracy in developing nations should be encouraged and looked on 
as part of US foreign policy (the soft colonizing power of popular culture).	  218	  On the GPL, see Eben Molen, "Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of 
Copyright." 219	  The arrival of this triumph has recently experienced a setback: A Swedish court found the 
founders of the Pirate Bay website—the focal point of the global community of file sharers—
guilty of copyright infringement. See http://torrentfreak.com/the-pirate-bay-trial-the-verdict-
090417/.	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critiques point to the danger of simply carving out a 'zone of free play' or a 'creative sandbox' at 
the heart of the private property regime where artists and creative types can entertain themselves. 
For there will always be bullies around the edge of that sandbox lying in wait to snatch up—that 
is, appropriate—anything they deem of value. This line of criticism has also been developed by 
contemporary Italian thinkers of the common, of which more below. 
 
 What all of these positions share is a deep suspicion of Romantic models of authorship and 
human creativity.221 In this connection, the thinkers of copyleft form part of a genealogy that 
passes near or through—in most instances—a specific debate about the status of the author in 
post-structuralist thought, a debate that centered around questions of the "death of the author", the 
"author function," or the author's "ghost-like" persistence.222 The suspicion of the genius author 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  220	  This position has been most passionately stated by Moglen: "Moglen's Metaphorical Corollary 
to Faraday's Law says that if you wrap the Internet around every person on the planet and spin the 
planet, software flows in the network. It's an emergent property of connected human minds that 
they create things for one another's pleasure and to conquer their uneasy sense of being too alone. 
The only question to ask is, what's the resistance of the network? Moglen's Metaphorical 
Corollary to Ohm's Law states that the resistance of the network is directly proportional to the 
field strength of the 'intellectual property' system. So the right answer to the econodwarf is, resist 
the resistance" (Molen 4). As Juan Manuel Espinosa points out, this metaphorical corollary 
implies a mapping of a mathematical equation (Ohm's Law) onto a social world (the emergent 
Internet); such a move requires ontologically constant patterns that should give us pause. Also 
note the usage of mathematic formulas to talk about social phenomena; this is a frequent 
occurrence amongst the digital commoners: substituting abstract mathematical formulas for 
historical and material analysis of social, political and economic struggles. 221	  For an authoritative account of the Romantic theory of composition, see Edward Young, 
"Conjectures on Original Composition. In a Letter to the Author of Sir Charles Grandison." For 
an indispensable critical reading of that theory that straddles cultural and legal studies, see Martha 
Woodmansee, The Author, Art, and the Market: Rereading the History of Aesthetics.	  222	  See, respectively, Roland Barthes, "The Death of the Author"; Michel Foucault, "What is an 
Author?"; Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx. These foundational critiques of authorship remain 
surprisingly confined to matters of literary creation (as opposed to a less medium-specific 
investigation into the manifestations of human creativity; although Foucault and Derrida would 
open their respective orientations to considerations of media itself later in their lives, and their 
students continue this trend). These seminal critiques of the Romantic Genius model are 
essentially literary rebuttals to a literary model of authorship. In the current literature, many 
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also found expression in much 20th  century creative work: Borges, Pessoa, Dada, Pirandello in 
the first half of the century; and in fields as diverse as computer programming, scientific research 
(especially with multi-author collaborative work), visual art, and music in the second half.223 
What unifies the critique is a rejection of the "solitary genius" vision of human creativity. 
Computer programmers, musicians and legal theorists argue that the logocentric (i.e. focused on 
the author's written word) vision of authorship is inappropriate for a digital age of remix culture; 
literary theorists and philosophers argue that a logocentric vision of authorship is not even an 
appropriate model to think literary creation itself. All parties would agree, however, that these 
problems of authorship showcase the impoverished nature of our legal understanding of human 
creativity. But the reason dominant conceptions of IP gravitate towards the Romantic Genius 
model is because it—as an account of the creative process—most clearly maps onto the dominant 
modes of understanding property as rights to material land and things. A Genius can be uniquely 
identified as the sole party responsible for creating a particular idea; the ownership of that idea 
can then be attributed to him with no limits or remainder. As the many and varied attacks on the 
concept of absolute/unlimited creativity and the solitary genius creator have demonstrated, the 
Genius is a patchwork concept whose survival should be attributed more to expedience than to 
any deep understand of the process of creative and/or artistic work. In this sense, perhaps the 
Romantics themselves give us the most proper metaphor for confronting their own myth of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
thinkers have moved beyond a purely literary critique of authorship to include examples of non- 
literary models of cultural production, namely: software and music. For instance, after 
demonstrating how Ray Charles's music is at once undoubtedly creative and undeniably 
derivative, and possibly an example of multiple instances of copyright infringement, Boyle 
summarizes his position: "If [Ray] Charles's songs do not fit our model of innovative artistic 
creativity, perhaps we need to revise the model—at least for music—rather than devaluing his 
work" (Boyle, Public Domain 135). In other words: "Our theories of aesthetics are poorer than the 
creativity they seek to describe." 223	  For a panorama of contemporary cultural practices the play with the idea of authorship, see 
Emily Apter, "What is Yours, Ours, and Mine: Authorial Ownership and the Creative Commons." 
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Genius Author: Frankenstein and his monster. The Genius author now stalks the world, a strange 
and unnatural hybrid that has escaped the control of its maker and threatens, in the words of one 
prominent thinker, the future of ideas themselves. 
 
II Ideas, Things and Rights 
 Intellectual property is, of course, a concept on metaphorical loan from our understanding 
of material property, or property as such. The status of ideas has always presented a challenge for 
the Western liberal conception of property, although the nuanced distinction between an idea and 
the expression of that idea (or the thing of the idea) in creative works has not been a historical 
concern of pressing social importance outside of narrow philosophical and legal circles. Whether 
an owner's IP rights referred to the pages of the book, to the particular pattern of ink on the paper, 
or to something else entirely didn't become a mainstream concern until the means of printing 
became commonly available; similarly, record labels did not worry about pirated vinyl. But as the 
immaterial world of ideas takes an ever-more material form—i.e. the ones and zeros of binary 
code—we find the traditional objects of IP forced out of their cozy metaphorical slumber and into 
the world of tangible things: the digital file, the sequenced genome, the archives of traditional 
knowledge. As ideas, these artifacts are non-rivalrous and non-excludable: as Jefferson famously 
said: "He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as 
he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."224 What the growth of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  224	  In Jefferson's letter to Issac McPherson. August 13, 1813. "If nature has made any one thing 
less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called 
an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the 
moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every one, and the receiver cannot 
dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every 
other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself 
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digital technology and networks adds is that now—as things—these artifacts are also non-
rivalrous and non-excludable: they can be copied for near-zero cost and distributed simultaneous 
to any user with capable technology. 
 Before the things of IP were digital—that rosy dawn when books were bound in leather—
content producers liked the notion of a particular expression of an idea trapped in a material form. 
This allowed legal theorists to posit the object of intellectual labour: she wrote a book. This 
reasoning is analogous to that expressed in the sentence: he plowed this field. Both set up a 
workmanship model of production. As the Romantic Genius pours his labour over the seedling of 
his idea thus allowing it to flower, so the farmer tends the field to produce the melons he will 
harvest. Both farmer and Genius produce things—objects—that will ultimately be sold in a 
market.225 
 As this model breaks down—when it is no longer possible to posit objects of IP as 
tangible things—two errors rise into our field of understanding. First, the workmanship model 
proves to be an uncomfortable fit with creative production: it is blind to processes of 
collaboration, the re-imagination of tradition, parody, and other such issues that emerge 
immediately when one considers the act of creative work. To return to our farmer: when he goes 
to the fountain to draw a pitcher of water (John Locke's favorite example), the liquid in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. 
That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual 
instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and 
benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space, 
without lessening their density at any point, and like the air in which we breathe, move, and have 
our physical being, incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation" (The Writings of 
Thomas Jefferson). 225	  For a very different meditation upon the status of creative things (namely, artworks and 
architectural features), see Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought. Heidegger's concept of 
the thing is a much more compelling account of human creativity than the idea/expression divide 
that dominates the Anglo-American juridical sphere; this is perhaps because gathering as a 
concept does not lend itself to juridical ontology.	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fountain is common, but that captured in his pitcher is his own. But when our Genius dips his pen 
into the river of stories—mankind's common cultural patrimony—the case is not so clear: how 
does the story become his own?226 Now that creators manipulate the very material expression 
itself—the digital file in binary code—we see the creative process revealed as a web of connected 
iterations of reinterpretation. Thus the displacement of ideas by things is an awkward fit when 
talking about the objects of IP, given that these things are no longer singular objects invested with 
an "aura", but rather infinitely and simultaneously reproducible manifestations of creative work. 
Large content owners have historically utilized this ambiguity to their advantage: when a 
consumer purchases an album, she is actually purchasing a license to use the content under 
exceedingly restrictive terms. One such term is that the work itself cannot—for all practical 
intents and purposes—enter into the commons or the public domain. An increased interest in 
"remix" culture has exposed the fallacy in this position: any license that includes within its terms 
a blanket restriction on future use is fundamentally incompatible with the human creative process, 
a process that is based on reuse and reinterpretation, not creation ex nihilo. 
 This brings us to the second problem that surfaces when we consider the property status of 
creative works. The record label that distributes its products under restrictive licenses highlights a 
prior confusion in the concept of property. The workmanship model itself conceals an earlier 
conceptual displacement: from rights to things. A "property" is actually a set of enforceable claim 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  226	  The conventional answer in Anglo-American law has been to divide an idea from its 
expression: the idea circulates freely, while any expression fixed in a determined medium enjoys 
legal protection. Much of the Anglo-American criticism on authorship focuses on the problematic 
interpretation of this divide, including many of the texts cited in the present article. For a 
fascinating interdisciplinary approach to these problematics (with a sharp eye for the effects of 
legal interpretations of this divide on culture and identity), see Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural 
Life of Intellectual Properties: Authorship, Appropriation, and the Law.	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rights: my property rights in this land allow me to exclude others.227 When we equate property 
with things—as happens across the entire social spectrum, from water coolers to courtrooms—we 
miss the most foundational idea for the concept of property. Macpherson explains: "To have a 
property is to have a right in the sense of an enforceable claim to some use or benefit of 
something, whether it is a right to a shore in some common resource or an individual right in 
some particular things. What distinguishes property from mere momentary possession is that 
property is a claim that will be enforced by society or the state, by custom or convention or law" 
(Macpherson, Property 3).228 Thus, talk about IP is actually talk about rights claims in ideas. 
When we put the concept of intellectual property into question, we should not ask, "Who owns 
ideas?" but rather, "What kinds of right claims can we make about ideas?" When we talk about 
private property, we talk about exclusive rights; when we talk about commons, we talk about 
inclusive rights. That is the commons: the claim of an inclusive right. It is clear, then, that only 
when we start with a concept of property as rights (and not as things) can we begin to understand 
what something like a commons would look like. Otherwise, we are simply trying to carve out a 
public domain within a private property regime, instead of asserting an alternative concept of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  227	  Macpherson argues this case most clearly: "In the seventeenth century, the word property was 
often used, as a matter of course, in a sense that seems to us extraordinarily wide: men were said 
to have a property not only in land and goods and in claims on revenue from leases, mortgages, 
patents, monopolies, and so on, but also a property in their lives and liberties [...] Clearly that 
wide sense is only intelligible while property per se is taken to be a right not a thing " 
(Macpherson, Property 7). 228	  Macpherson further elaborates how this confusion—mistaking property as things instead of as 
rights—grows out of the shift to market-based capitalism: "It appeared to be the things 
themselves, not just the rights in them, that were exchange in the market. In fact the difference 
was not that things rather than rights in things were exchanged, but that previously unsaleable 
rights in things were now saleable; or, to put it differently, that limited and not always saleable 
rights in things were being replace by virtually unlimited and saleable rights to things  [...] The 
state's protection of the right could be so much taken for granted that one did not have to look 
behind the thing to the right. The thing itself became, in common parlance, the property" 
(Macpherson, Property 7-8).	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property: instead of saying "these exclusive things are held in common", we ought to say "we 
have an inclusive right to the commons." When we understand the commons not as a group of 
exclusive things, but rather a demand for an inclusive right, our language begins to sound a lot 
more like those radicals of the English Revolution from whom the copyleftists borrow their 
vocabulary. So it is fitting that the most potent conceptual tool in the resistance to new digital and 
biological enclosures is on metaphorical loan from an older and continuing critique of private 
property. 
 
III Inclusion or Enclosure? 
 As stated above, there are compelling arguments—mostly based on Thomas Jefferson's 
interpretation of Lockean property as it pertains to ideas—that signal the category error of 
applying a concept of tangible private property to the realm of ideas. I do not reject these 
arguments, but such arguments, as they rely on the contours of the US Constitution, positive law, 
and judicial decisions, do not provide a sound universal basis for the insistence on a natural right 
to the commons. A key fact that is often lost by those who appropriate Lockean language (labour 
mixing with commons and thereby subtracting the made object from the commons) to justify 
expansive IP laws is that John Locke—the key thinker of the Western liberal concept of 
property—developed his justification of private property during an intense moment of public 
concern over the enclosure of common lands. In fact, Locke's Second Treatise is first published in 
1681, the same year that a third attempt to legalize non-consensual enclosure failed in the House 
of Commons. 
 Several of Locke's twentieth century readers have attempted to historicize and 
contextualize Locke's concept of property. This has led to a debate over Locke's status as the 
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liberal theorist of private property. Thinkers such as C.B Macpherson interpret Locke by looking 
forward in time to the development of the unlimited exclusionary property right that nascent 
capitalism will need to realized itself, while James Tully attempts to situate Locke's thought 
historically and thus reads Locke as a natural-rights communitarian (with Suarez and other 
precursors) and against his contemporaries such as Filmer. Although both Tully and Macpherson 
agree on the need to reassert inclusionary property rights, they disagree on the moment in which 
exclusionary rights came to be read—in common usage—as the only and natural relationship man 
could have with property. In essence, Tully charges that Macpherson "redescribes Locke's master-
servant relation as a capitalist-worker relation" when "the capitalist not only never appears in the 
Two Treatises; there is no place for him to appear" (Tully, Discourse 137-8).229 Tully, along with 
Richard Ashcraft, wants to reinsert Locke firmly in the camp of the radicals of the English 
Revolution, and he finds the Two Treatises to be the ex post facto theoretical foundation for the 
views advanced by Lilburne and Overton in their Leveller tracts.230 Yet it seems that Christopher 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  229	  This is most clearly articulated in Tully's gloss on Locke's "Turfs" passage (see Tully, 
Discourse 136-43). Also see Richard Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises 
of Government.	  230	  "The only form of property in land which he endorses in the Two Treatises is the English 
Common. Locke's theory is consistent with the proposals put forward by John Lilburne (1615-67) 
in England's Birth-Right Justified (1645) and by Richard Overton (?1600-?1660) in An Arrow 
Against all Tyrants (?1646)" (Tully 169); Tully goes further to equate Locke with William Petty 
at Putney: "With the Two Treatises the theoretical foundation for the view advanced by Petty is 
firmly laid; and revolution to reconstitute society accordingly is equally firmly justified" (Tully, 
Discourse 175). Linebaugh and Rediker have a harsher view of Petty, and view his ties to Locke 
through Petty's proto-labour theory of value and his endorsement of transatlantic slavery through 
"scientific racism": "Petty thus originated the labor theory of value by refusing to think of workers 
in moral terms; he preferred the quantifiable approach of number, weight, and measure. His 
method of thinking was essential to the genesis and the long-term planning of the maritime state" 
(Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra 147; see also 138-9). Linebaugh 
and Rediker, following Macpherson and Hill, read Locke as representative of the Leveller 
tradition that insisted on the "immutability of existing property relationships" (Christopher Hill, 
The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution 121); this position 
is contrasted with other English Revolutionary groups such as the Diggers who believed, 
following Winstanley's slogan, There cannot be a universal liberty till [...] universal community 
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Hill has the most straightforward assessment of Locke's rather expedient position: a "world in 
which kings ruled by the grace of God but could be turned out if they did not rule as the men of 
property wished" (Hill, World 393). 
 It is not the Levellers—with whom Tully strains to establish Lockean connection—but the 
Diggers and Gerard Winstanely who articulate the most passionate and developed defense of the 
commons. James Holstun sketches the fault lines of the conflict between nascent liberals and 
communitarian radicals in the English Revolution: 
It might be more accurate to describe the conflict over enclosure as a struggle 
between rival models of the human relationship to the land: between a rights- 
based model that gave the direct producers some measure of immediate access to 
the agrarian means of production, and a model of absolute property that gave them 
such access only though the mediation of the capitalist wage form (Holstun 378). 
Present-day opponents of "digital enclosures" may find an analogy with the XVIIth Century 
process of agrarian enclosure, as concepts such as "net neutrality" and "open access" also seek to 
provide—although in the realm of communications as opposed to agricultural infrastructure— 
some form of direct connection between users and the network. "Open" and "free-libre" (not free-
gratis) have been the communal and customary forms of regulating Internet communications 
technology since the early days of primitive DOD/university-based computer networks. And thus 
it is necessary to remind ourselves of the stakes of the enclosure debate as it developed around 
and in the aftermath of the English Revolution: 
What is significant about the enclosure movement as a whole is the elimination of 
the communal and customary forms of regulating agrarian production. It is in this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
be established (Hill, World 332). 
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sense that enclosures, as a means of literally enclosing a portion of the demesne by 
erecting hedges or fences, were less significant for the development of agrarian 
capitalism than were enclosures as a means of 'freeing' the land from the collective 
decision-making processes and communal regulation of the peasant community. 
Enclosure, therefore, was less about engrossing disparate plots of land, but rather, 
dissolving the communal regulations of production or customary tenancies and 
subjecting agricultural production to market competition between producers 
holding commercial leases, thereby stimulating a compulsory dynamic of agrarian 
'improvement' (Kennedy 75-6). 
But there is more to the current situation than just that. Certainly we are living through an attempt 
to neutralize certain elements of digital culture than had been implicitly understood as 
foundational, namely: the open and relatively non-commercial infrastructure that in turn gave rise 
to an incredible proliferation of experimentation. If we call that process of neutralization 
"enclosure," we are mobilizing a historical defense of inclusive property rights that precede any 
exclusive property right. In this case, since we are speaking of "digital enclosures," the properties 
in question happen to be immaterial. There seems to be something in the new technology we label 
"the Internet" that exposes the inclusive nature of such immaterial property in ways that were 
previously hard to see. Yet much of the rhetoric surrounding the "new digital enclosures," 
especially that coming out of the liberal FreeCulture movement, focuses its critical attention on 
the technology itself and not that which it exposes. 
 This, then, is the critique of FreeCulture and Creative Commons: the legal "work- 
arounds" may carve out a space within the liberal order of private property—an ecological 
preserve in which ideas may appear to be in their natural habitat—but such a space looks 
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suspiciously like an enclosed zoo. This problem only becomes more pronounced with the global 
expansion of IP discourse that has accompanied the spread of new information technologies. 
When other countries adopt a Creative Commons model of resistance, one of the first tasks is to 
'port' the CC licenses into the local legal code. Yet the local legal code, in many instances, has 
already been itself translated or 'ported' so as to conform with World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) and other supranational norms, most likely as a baseline condition for 
further participation in some form of international trade agreement.231 In other words, the 
adoption of the liberal Creative Commons model of resistance in the global South forecloses more 
radical positions; as FreeCulture models take US-style IP law as a given and then seek to reform 
it, this leaves little room for a critique of international IP regimes as such. As such, the 
FreeCulture-based resistance of international IP regimes itself replicates its constituitive liberal 
assumptions of the very object of its critique, namely, the assumption of possessive individualism. 
 Matteo Pasquinelli has diagnosed this problem. In his reading, the globalization of the 
FreeCulture position sets up an ideological trap: FreeCulture proposes software as a universal 
model for politics (Pasquinelli, "Ideology" 5).232 Projects such as Wikipedia and Linux-based 
operating systems become the ideal form of human participation and organization. Pasquinelli, 
however, rejects these models of human subjectivity (the neo-liberal incarnation of the 
economically maximizing possessive individual) and the vision of human creativity it posits. 
FreeCulture looks to incentivize creativity in a market setting; Pasquinelli's position is that 
creativity is the very form of human life. This leads Pasquinelli to assert a constituitive surplus: 
human creative practice will always produce a natural surplus because that is the nature of life, 
and this surplus must be managed rather than incentivized. It is the very models of incentivization 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  231	  See, again, May's A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights. 232	  See also his Animal Spirits: A Bestiary of the Commons. 
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themselves that participate in enclosing—that is, appropriating—the surplus. Pasquinelli proposes 
an autonomous commons that would be founded on the rejection of market incentivization and 
protected from capitalist appropriation; any non-autonomous form of the commons (or what he 
terms "Creative Anti-Commons") is merely Capital's ideological masking of the extraction of rent 
on the human surplus of creativity. Collective, autonomous human activity may build a free 
operating system, but once IBM installs that OS on their servers, the surplus of human creativity 
finds itself enclosed within a cycle of capitalist appropriation. 
 There is an irony in Pasquinelli's anti-corporate, pro-worker stance: the nebulous anti- 
monopoly position that he sketches is actually one of the main points of attack in the Creative 
Commons Constitutionalist-based critiques of copyright. CC and Pasquinelli both identify 
unlimited corporate monopoly as the enemy, and both propose some kind of autonomous subject 
as the solution to the problem. They differ in this: while Pasquinelli would install an autonomous 
worker monopoly, the liberal CC position prefers the "autonomous entrepreneur," a subject still 
profoundly marked by possessive individualism. Furthermore, Pasquinelli does not spend much 
time thinking about the systems of enforcement that will guarantee the continued existence of his 
autonomist, anti-corporate commons. Yet his attention towards the questions of creative 
production, surplus, and the commons is important, as is his critique of the universalization of 
software-as-model. He warns us of the tendency to replace faith in politics with faith in 
technology. 
 In his own way, Pasquinelli forces those who appropriate terms such as "commons" and 
"enclosure" to reckon with the radical content of the history they attempt to instrumentalize. If 
taken seriously (and not ironically), terms such as "commons" find their strength in a demand for 
an inclusive conception of property, prior to any individualization. In other words: the priority of 
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community.233 Thus, the demand for the "commons" is a productive paradox: it is a demand 
articulated by an individual, coded in the language of individual rights, that in fact insists on 
something prior to that individual's subject formation: the right to the commons. 
 
IV Copyleft as Training Ground 
 If we connect such ideas to contemporary calls for a creative commons, we can understand 
these calls as the demand for some prior inclusive right to culture. When commoners frame the 
question in these terms, it allows them to make claims that explode reformist negotiations about 
incentive structures that seek to balance competing exclusive claims; the power of the commons 
lies in its ability to put the question of property itself in relief.234 Furthermore, the commons—as 
concept—creates a natural linkage between critiques of authorship, which play out in the legal 
field of copyright, and critiques of biopolitical enclosures such as the human genome, which play 
out in the legal field of patent law.235 Those two critiques, in turn, find resonance in resistance 
movements that defend indigenous knowledge traditions from exploitation by, for instance, North 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  233	  In this line of reasoning, the primary assertion is that of an inclusive right; whether a resource 
is rivalrous or nonrivalrous, excludable or nonexcludable are distinctions that occur later. 
Asserting an inclusive right to information does not immediately suggest any particular economic 
model to be applied, although it does set a standard against which any legal, political, economic, 
or social structure that impedes that right must be deemed unjust.	  234	  The Access to Knowledge (A2K) project is a good example of the failure to make this 
connection. Although A2K represents an exciting and promising global challenge to the TRIPS 
consensus, its platform insists on the unique nature of IP: "Knowledge goods are also 
fundamentally different from physical goods and services. They can be copied. They can be 
shared. They do not have to be scarce." (Available at http://www.cptech.org/a2k/) By demanding 
that the singular nature of IP—non-rivalrousness and non-exclusivity—be recognized in 
international norms, A2K immediately forecloses any radical option to critique property regimes 
as such. The project is a tentative first step, saying 'Property as we understand it makes sense; it's 
just that this particular kind of property is special' instead of 'Our new understanding of IP in a 
digital age underlines how tenuous our very concept of property is. Perhaps these changes in our 
understanding of how IP functions point to a more fundamental and pressing need to reconsider 
our current regime of social property relations.'	  235	  See Vandana Shiva, Biopiracy: The Plunder of Nature and Knowledge. 
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American and European pharmaceutical corporations. In fact, we see the idea of commons 
bubbling up in some form or another in almost all critical investigations into the nature of IP. This 
understanding opens up a space for a more fundamental critique: that of property as such. The 
struggles surrounding IP, then, can be thought of as the training ground for struggles over 
property. 
 
 I take the idea of a "training ground" from Walter Benjamin's 1935 essay "The Work of 
Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction."236 Mobilizing Benjamin's "now of recognizability," 
we can—indeed, Benjamin would state that we must—connect contemporary struggles over the 
"creative commons" with historical struggles about the commons as such. We could phrase this 
another way: organizations such as Creative Commons resemble the first electric lights that 
appeared in the Parisian Arcades. As Benjamin notes, these light bulbs took on a peculiar shape: 
that of the flames produced by the old gaslights the electric bulbs had replaced. The electric 
lightbulb was undoubtedly a technological innovation, but this first blind step of a new 
technology reaches back to the past even while it announces the future: lighting will resemble fire 
even when we assert that we have progressed beyond fire. We find ourselves in an analogous 
position today: we recognize the revolutionary potential of the Internet, but we are still groping 
about in the dark, hanging old models onto that which is new. But by tapping into the historical 
truth of the commons, we avoid such fetishization: a public domain carved out merely within 
private property is a light bulb imitating a gas light; the assertion of the right to commons and the 
right of the commons connects the nowness of the Internet with the ur-historical struggle for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  236	  Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility: Second 
Version," Selected Writings Volume 3, 1935-1938 and "The Work of Art in the Age of Its 
Technological Reproducibility: Third Version," Selected Writings Volume 4, 1938-1940.	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inclusive rights.237 
 Benjamin thought that mechanical reproduction, as a fundamental change in the means of 
artistic production, could provide a tool for, as he says, "neutralizing" the conceptual framework 
that makes something like an 'aura', or a 'genius creator', or a mythical valorization of art, 
possible. Film is what, to Benjamin, could serve as a "training ground" to teach human beings 
"that technology will release them from their enslavement to the powers of the apparatus" BUT 
"only when humanity's whole constitution has adapted itself to the new productive forces which 
the [...] technology has set free" (Benjamin, "Artwork: Second Version" 108).238 Benjamin is 
interested in the emancipatory potential contained within the new developments of artistic 
production. His project is not, however, a simple affirmation that the medium is the message. It is 
rather the tracing of the constellation shining in the now of recognizability: ur-history colliding 
with current innovations that gesture towards the unfulfilled promise of human liberation. This 
constellation crystallizes in the "dialectical image:" 
In the dialectical image, what had been within a particular epoch is always, 
simultaneously, 'what has been from time immemorial.' As such, however, it is 
manifest, on each occasion, only to a quite specific epoch—namely, the one in 
which humanity, rubbing its eyes, recognizes just this particular dream image as 
such (Benjamin, Arcades [N4,1] p. 464). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  237	  Historians will most likely recoil at the appeal to a concept of ur-history, but my appeal to the 
radical thought of the English revolution is not a historical argument per se. When I connect 
contemporary struggles around the commons to, for instance, sixteenth century English radicals, I 
am, following Walter Benjamin, appropriating that past in order to animate the current 
discussion. Obviously, Gerard Winstanely, for instance, operated under different historical and 
economic conditions, and I am in no way claiming that the specifics of Winstanely's demands 
correspond in any one-to-one fashion with the demands of today's digital commoners. What is 
important to recognize, however, is that Winstanely's demands and the demands of digital 
commoners do share some kernel: the demand for an inclusion that precedes any and all 
exclusion. 238	  This line is absent in the Third Version. 
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"That which has been from time immemorial" is nothing other than the common pool of human 
creative power.239 When we think critically about IP, when we arrive at copyleft, we are 
connecting our current practices with an ur-historical image that we reclaim through experience. 
That image takes the name of the commons, and thus humans can reappropriate what they never 
really gave away in the first place: the collective of human knowledge.240 
 
 As we fill in the constellation, surprising new connections emerge. As this constellation 
reveals itself in our contemporary moment, we find ourselves witness to a possible mental 
opening, a moment of imagination that grasps—childlike—at its hazy indeterminate form. This is 
the newness of copyleft: it lays bare the digital architecture of our informational ecosystem. 
Infrastructure decisions have always been political: they are made by political bodies and they 
determine the very fabric of social life. Those who insist on enclosing that ecosystem—those who 
insist on the priority of exclusive rights claims—are clearly unwilling to consider or critique the 
fundamental social and political infrastructure established by a private property regime. Yet there 
are moments in history when such questions have presented themselves in a manner impossible to 
ignore. That we are living such a moment further emphasizes the imperative that we activate the 
historical constellation beneath the fight against digital enclosures. Indeed, the common 
connection to land serves as a safeguard against technological fetishism: the dream of a true 
commons propels us forward, urging us ever closer to a practical critique of intellectual property 
and, in turn, property in general. Digital technology has not yet lived up to its promise; it is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  239	  The legal scholars recognize this as well: "The importance of open source software is not that 
it introduces us to a wholly new idea. It is that it makes us see clearly a very old idea" (Boyle, 
Public 193).	  240	  On Benjamin and the dialectical image, see Susan Buck-Morss, Dialectics of Seeing: Walter 
Benjamin and the Arcades Project. These lines are my own appropriation of her words.	  
	   187	  
mean to actualize the common dream, not the end itself. As Benjamin reminds us, the hour of full 
satisfaction, the hour of true reappropriation still remains elusive.241 
 What will this moment look like when it arrives? Christopher Hill reminds us of the 
radical slogan of the English Revolutionaries: The world turned upside down. Today's "now of 
recognizability" allows us to complete the slogan. In the enclosing world, we must ask the 
question of what a world turned inside out would look like. The world can spin on its axis, and 
today's "right side up" will be tomorrow's upside down. Yet until we open that world—turn out 
the enclosures and rip down the fences—we will be no closer to realizing the commons. 
 That does not mean such an opening is without its challenges. Fetishization—substituting 
technology for politics itself—is a constant and proximate danger. There are two other challenges 
that thinkers of the common must grapple with: the question of surplus (as touched on above) and 
that of essence. 
 
V Surplus and Essence 
 Although Roberto Esposito's Communitas: The Origin and Destiny of Community does not 
directly address the question of digital technology and information enclosure, he does present a 
framework for a common imagined beyond the limits of possessive individualism and liberal 
social contract theory.242 Esposito's basic argument is that the modern 'absolute individual' has 
freed himself from the debt originally implied by community; this argument is in part 
etymological, as Esposito reads 'gift' and 'obligation' into the semantic concept of community. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  241	  "It has always been one of the primary tasks of art to create a demand whose hour of full 
satisfaction has not yet come" (Benjamin, "Artwork: Second Version" 118). On the risk of 
technological fetishization, see Buck-Morss, Dialectics of Seeing 118-20. 242	  For a reading of the different contemporary invocations of the commons or the commons 
(singular or plural), see chapter four, "The Commons, Between Literature and the City."	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This 'freeing' Esposito calls immunity, as in an immunity from the contagion of the relationship 
with others. The gift/obligation (the 'munis' in communitas) is neutralized by the Hobbesean 
contract. That is to say: under Hobbes' sovereign, individuals are released from their debt to the 
community; they are immunized in such a way that negates the very idea of human community in 
the interest of individual survival.243 (This argument parallels Macpherson's concept of possessive 
individualism in Hobbes.) Esposito contrasts this position with one he develops based on the 
thought of Martin Heidegger and George Bataille. 
 If Hobbes proposes a negative immunity that disintegrates community, Bataille— 
according to Esposito—locates community precisely in contagion and the mutually infecting 
wounds of human existence. Esposito contrasts the two positions: Hobbes conceives of man as a 
naturally wanting being, and man compensates for this weakness with the prosthesis of the 
contract. The contract—the basis for the 'absolute' individual's modern immunity to communal 
obligation—is guaranteed by the fear of the sovereign. While Hobbes' metaphysics is founded on 
fear and want, Bataille proposes one founded on surplus, desire, and gifts. There is no immunity 
in Bataille's community: instead, it is the universal and specifically human superabundance of 
energy destined to be unproductively consumed and wasted without limit. In short, Esposito 
suggests that life within Hobbes' state of nature is closer to a true community, and it is the 
Leviathan itself which makes life atomized, alienated, and miserable.244 
 Once again, surplus is a problem that must be reckoned with. Esposito's Bataillean- 
influenced metaphysics operates in a different register than Pasquinelli's ideology critique of 
FreeCulture. But still: both point towards a fundamental instability in the unenclosed commons. If 
the current IP scheme can only account for creative or immaterial labour—the work involved in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  243	  See especially the chapter "Fear," which focuses on Hobbes.	  244	  See chapter five, "Experience," of Esposito's Communitas.	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producing intellectual property—in a negative fashion via enclosure and appropriation of the 
surplus, a true commons that affirms the productive creativity of humanity must remain 
precariously open and permanently hostile to enclosure. Yet this task demands that we take 
account for a surplus—the productive, desiring energy of human life and creativity—that is 
constituitively uncountable. It is, after all, a pure surplus of energy. How, then, to enforce an 
inclusive right to the commons—be it material or immaterial—when part of what is to be 
included is pure excess? 
 Elinor Ostrom's work attempts to provide an answer to that question from within 
economics and social policy analysis. It would be fair to say that Ostrom's entire opus is directed 
against Garrett Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons."245 She attacks two of Hardin's underlying 
presuppositions: 1) that human rational decision making always functions in the logic of a 
Prisoner's Dilemma;246 2) that the only two possible solutions to managing resources are either a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  245	  Ostrom gives the following summary of Hardin's argument: "Biologist Garrett Hardin created 
a memorable metaphor for overpopulation, where herdsmen sharing a common pasture put as 
many cattle as possible out to graze, acting in their own self-interest. The tragedy is expressed in 
Hardin's famous lines: 'Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own 
best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons 
brings ruin to all.' [...] Hardin's vivid narrative contains a number of contentions that commons 
scholars have repeatedly found to be mistaken: (1) he was actually discussing open access rather 
than managed commons; (2) he assumed little or no communication; (3) he postulated that people 
act only in their immediate self-interest (rather than assuming that some individuals take joint 
benefits into account, at least to some extent); (4) he offered only two solutions to correct the 
tragedy—privatization or government intervention. [...] There may be situations where this model 
can be applied, but many groups can effectively manage and sustain common resources if they 
have suitable conditions, such as appropriate rules, good conflict-resolution mechanisms, and 
well-defined group boundaries" (Hess and Ostrom 10-11).	  246	  Ostrom explains the prisoner's dilemma: "Another frequently used model in commons analysis 
is the prisoner's dilemma (PD), developed in the early days of fame theory in 1950 by 
mathematician A.W. Tucker at Stanford. The original narrative of the two-person, 
noncooperative, non-zero-sum game concerns two criminals who are interviewed separately about 
a crime. Each is given a strong incentive by the prosecutor to inform against the other. The 
prisoner's dilemma has remained popular perhaps because it is one of the simplest formal games 
to understand and can quickly illustrate the problems of collective action and irrational group 
behavior when trust and reciprocity have little opportunity to develop and be expressed" (Hess 
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Leviathan-like absolute sovereign or the unlimited private property rights of total privatization. 
Against these assumptions, Ostrom advances empirical studies of common-pool resources that are 
in fact managed by the members of their respective community. From these studies, she— along 
with the research group of which she forms a part, the International Association for the Study of 
the Commons—has proposed a third type of good as a supplement to the two traditional goods 
exchanged in contemporary economic theory: in addition to public goods and private goods, she 
adds common-pool resources. (In this sense, her account of property is much closer to 
Macpherson's than any other scholar working in mainstream liberal economic theory.) 
 In other words, one cannot theorize the social with baseline assumptions about human 
subjectivity that are fundamentally hostile and opposed to the very idea of society. Humans can 
and do cooperate empirically, thus any model of human behavior that only allows for a tragic 
social outcome must be rejected. Harin's concept of the "tragedy of the commons" represents a 
theoretical failure which ignores the empirical existence of common-pool resources that are 
effectively managed, for instance, groundwater basins, fisheries, forests, or irrigation systems. 
Thus, "What is missing from the policy analyst's tool kit—and from the set of accepted well- 
developed theories of human organization is an adequately specified theory of collective action 
whereby a group of principals can organize themselves voluntarily to retain the residuals of their 
own efforts" (Ostrom, Governing 24-5). 
 Ostrom's conceptual shift from owning things to managing common resources is welcome, 
but it still does not account for surplus. As I have argued throughout this project, there is 
something fundamentally unmanageable about human creativity. According to Ostrom, well-
managed common-pool resources almost always share two key characteristics: small number of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and Ostrom 11). 
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users, and well-delineated and stable boundaries. Common-pool resources with indefinite 
boundaries and near-unlimited numbers of users pose a profound problem to management 
regimes: think of air quality or ocean temperatures on a planet-wide scale, for instance. This 
problem is only compounded when the resource in question—in the case of intellectual property: 
knowledge, creativity, or information—is itself constituted by excess and surplus. Again, the 
question crashes upon the logic of inclusion: how to include the surplus of human creativity in a 
well-defined and bounded management regime? Or, in more direct terms: how to manage the 
unmanageable? 
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EPILOGUE 
TRAINING GROUNDS AND AMUSEMENT PARKS 
 
 The question of inclusion is not limited to the surplus production of human creativity. 
There is also the question of who makes inclusive demands to the commons. If the commons is an 
inclusive demand, or rather a demand of inclusion, then the community it defines must be open 
and inclusive as well. This at once poses a paradox: how to circumscribe—that is, to define—a 
commons which must remain open and contingent?247 Jean-Luc Nancy meditates upon this 
problem in his La Communauté désœuvrée (The Inoperative Community, 1982). The true risk in 
thinking the common, he argues, is that of falling into essentialism. Community cannot be a 
single thing; Nancy warns: "The community that becomes a single thing (body, mind, fatherland, 
Leader...) necessarily loses the in of being-in-common" (Nancy, Community xxxix). Running 
beneath Nancy's thought, of course, are the many twentieth century examples of exclusively-
defined communities which culminated in persecution of minorities, wars, and even genocide. 
Thus he focuses on the issues of identity in defining community. He explains:  
I start out from the idea that [...] the thinking of community as essence [...] is in 
effect the closure of the political. Such a thinking constitutes closure because it 
assigns to community a common being, whereas community is a matter of 
something quite different, namely, of existence inasmuch as it is in common, but 
without letting itself be absorbed into a common substance. Being in common has 
nothing to do with communion, with fusion into a body, into a unique and ultimate 
identity that would no longer be exposed. Being in common means, to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  247	  For a more empirical treatment of this problem, see chapter two, "Appropriation and Enclosure 
in the New World."	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contrary, no longer having, in any form, in any empirical or ideal place, such a 
substantial identity, and sharing this (narcissistic) 'lack of identity' (Nancy, 
Community xxxviii). 
In Nancy's thought, "being-in-common" is ontological; it is "in no way 'added onto' the dimension 
of 'being-self,' but is rather co-originary and coextensive with it" (Nancy, Community xxxvii). 
Furthermore, it is opposed to any and all thinking of community as a being-togetherness, because 
that path leads straight back to an essentially defined community—that is, a community defined 
by the assumption of the one essential thing that ties an "us" together—which posits a fusional 
assumption of a group of I's into some collective hypostasis (Nancy, Community 14). 
 And yet there is one thing to which community pertains: death. For Nancy, death can also 
be understood as the impossibility of immanence; around the figure of death, community 
crystalizes and reveals itself. Community, then, is the togetherness that reveals our ultimate 
isolation in death. His emphasis on death puts Nancy in a strong position to reject any view of 
community based on a Golden Age. Community cannot be apprehended via some retrospective 
consciousness of a lost utopia; on the contrary, Nancy provocatively advances, "Community has 
not taken place." He continues, "Society was not built on the ruins of a community. It emerged 
from the disappearance or the conservation of something—tribes or empires—perhaps just as 
unrelated to what we call 'community' as to what we call 'society.' So that community, far from 
being what society has crushed or lost, is what happens to us—question, waiting, event, 
imperative—in the wake of society." (Nancy, Community 10-11) 
 Nancy thus poses the question of a contingent, open community—the philosophical 
equivalent of a commons—in these terms: "How can the community without essence (the 
community that is neither 'people' nor 'nation,' neither 'destiny' nor 'generic humanity,' etc.) be 
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presented as such? That is, what might a politics be that does not stem from the will to realize an 
essence?" (Nancy, Community xxxix-xl) 
 It is this deferral and openness that allows Nancy to affirm, "Community cannot be 
presupposed, it is only exposed" (Nancy, Community xxxix). It is exposed through the singular 
plural: there is no singular being without another singular being (Nancy, Community 28).248 
Through the immanent, emergent meeting of two beings, community exposes itself as being-in- 
common. In a less philosophical register, we can ask: is there something particular about new 
communications technology that alter the process of this exposure, the presentation of community 
to its constituent members? 
 In effect, Nancy answers his question by separating the articulation of a community from 
its organization; it is this process of thinking which exposes community not as a pre-existing, 
self-sufficient, autonomous essence, but rather as being-in-common (Nancy, Community 75). We 
could translate this to say that there does exist a community, or commons, that precedes any 
political form of enclosure; to return to the language of the second chapter of this project, the 
ontological name for Fence is death. In other words: the only ontological enclosure that precedes 
community, following Nancy, is the closure brought about by death itself. 
 While the distinction between the articulation and the organization of a community may 
carry a certain philosophical weight, it is little use when considering the problem of the 
management of any particular commons. In that sense, we must ask: doesn't Nancy's reading 
simply postpone the political moment of organization? Even if we concede that articulation in fact 
precedes organization (a point on which he is philosophically convincing), the next question that 
poses itself with great immediacy would be: has there ever been an empirical community that 
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  See	  also	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  Being	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  Plural.	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resides in pure articulation, without self-organizing around some essential identity? In a word: 
without enclosure? 
 Nancy's own answer to that question, an answer that appears yet another deferral of 
political considerations, is called 'literary communism.'249 Literary communism, as the inscription 
of infinite resistance at the limit of any possible community, posits literary creativity as that thing 
capable of escaping the logics of essentialism, enclosure, and appropriation. The only way for 
Nancy's formulation to have any concrete meaning, beyond being a mere rhetorical suspension 
between the articulation and the organization of a community, is via an appeal to literature's 
exceptional nature. Somehow, literature escapes all of those thorny pitfalls of essentialism that 
frustrate every other possible articulation of community. Yet is this not simply a dressing-up of 
the so-called 'cultural exception'? It seems as if any gesturing towards the privileging of literature 
(or culture in general) can only occur over a background of retrograde Romanticism. In other 
words: Nancy's view of literature as the non-essentialist space of freedom rests upon the 
uninterrogated foundation of Romantic Genius that so much contemporary literary production has 
worked to unsettle!  
 "Literary communism" would then be the name for the cultural amusement park, fenced in 
by a cultural exception, in which Genius-Authors can persist in a pre-political, pre-organizational 
state of pure articulation. Yet it is precisely not an amusement park we want. The demand is not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  249	  Nancy explains: "This [understanding of community] does not determine any particular mode 
of sociality, and it does not found a politics—if a politics can over be 'founded.' But it defines at 
least a limit, at which all politics stop and begin. The communication that takes place on this 
limit, and that, in truth, constitutes it, demands that way of destining ourselves in common that we 
call a politics, that way of opening community to itself, rather than to a destiny or to a future. 
'Literary communism' indicates at least the following: that community, in its infinite resistance to 
everything that would bring it to completion (in every sense of the word 'achever'—which can 
also mean 'finish off'), signifies an irrepressible political exigency, and that this exigency in its 
turn demand something of literature, the inscription of our infinite resistance" (Nancy, Community 
80-81).	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for a sandbox set off from politics and the world with a fence of cultural exception; the demand, 
indeed, is for a commons. This is why copyleft works as a training ground: the very concept of 
copyleft puts any boundary or fence whatsoever in question.  
 Within the amusement park, the cloistered Geniuses practice autonomy, enclosure, and 
exception. Even so, the amusement park turns in upon itself. It is an enclosed zone of officially 
sanctioned inversion: the world turned upside-down only in the loop of a roller coaster's tracks. 
On the training ground, however, commoners struggle, collectively and in the open. Even the very 
act of naming a ground 'training ground' begins the process of tearing down Fence. For the only 
thing commoners train our themselves: training to turn the world inside out. 
 
 This is all to say: "training ground" is a key concept because the ontological problem of 
community can never be separated from the political problem: if politics is to exist at all, it must 
be premised on some form of organization. Contemporary struggles over intellectual property 
actually expose the inexorable connection between the ontological and the political problem of 
community. This is why copyleft becomes the training ground for all future struggles against 
property as such: the new technological advancements of the "digital age" cast the problem of the 
commons in relief; our task then become that of thinking the commons in its material and 
immaterial manifestations. It is a question of both access to infrastructure—the economic and 
social conditions that permit or exclude access to the commons—and of the status of creative 
human activity. 
 Indeed, it is the perspective that views the problem of the commons as at once a material 
and immaterial problem that separates the liberal from the radical thinking of the commons. There 
are plenty of techno-utopians who tirelessly celebrate online collaborative projects as examples of 
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emergent communities joined in the creation of what is common, but rarely would someone like 
Yochai Benkler articulate that process as finite existence exposing itself to finite existence. The 
concept of exposure is quite relevant, and one way to frame the question becomes what is it that 
the Internet exposes? When we understand that question within the parameters of Walter 
Benjamin's formulation of the newness which exposes that which has always been, we begin to 
see the commons, exposed. Our task now is to reconceptualize our relationship to ideas, 
creativity, production, subjectivity, and ownership in a way that conforms with this exposed 
commons, with this world turned inside out. And, in doing this, we must always keep the 
questions of surplus and essence on the horizon of our thought. 
 Commoners, then, ought support the work of organizations such as Creative Commons; 
indeed, as creators, we should embrace open content licensing as the best practical solution for 
our own production. But we must recognize such work as the training ground it is. The 
theoretical, historical and philosophical task for which we train lies in connecting copyleft 
projects to other radical struggles that insist on an inclusive commons over and above exclusive 
private property rights. By insisting on the centrality of the commons, progressive thinkers—and 
we can all be thinkers—activate a secret history of struggle. But there is no need for this history to 
be secret. The struggle over intellectual property is the struggle over the very meaning of the 
concept of property. When we demand a commons, those who have fought enclosure in all of its 
forms march behind us. To keep their dreams and struggles alive, we must do what that most holy 
parodist of enclosure—Thomas More—did: imagine another possible world. And that world will 
be a world turned inside out. 
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